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Abstract
This portfolio of work is divided into three sections: an Academic Dossier, 
a Therapeutic Practice Dossier and a Research Dossier. They contain 
papers written during the three years of my doctoral training in 
Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology. Although the papers have 
been organised in this way, there are considerable overlaps between the 
different areas. In fact, I have explicitly examined these overlaps between 
science and practice, between theory and experience -  particularly in the 
General Introduction, in the Therapeutic Practice Dossier and in the final 
piece of research I present, whose method incorporates psychotherapeutic 
process into the process of data collection and analysis. The examination 
of these overlaps is also echoed in other papers here which bring to 
attention the constructed nature of the divisions between diagnostic 
categories in mental health. Mental health diagnosis is also the 
predominant object of the deconstructive stance that I have assumed in 
most of the work here. Deconstructionism has been at the heart of the 
method of all three papers presented in the Research Dossier, especially 
the study in the title above, which analyses constructions of diagnosis on 
the internet. I have also attempted to deconstruct my own clinical 
development and to an extent aspects of psychotherapeutic models (the 
relationship in cognitive behavioural therapy and psychotic development 
in psychoanalytic theory) that I write about in the Academic Dossier. 
Having Reconstructed, I have also attempted to be constructive: for 
example, I have propose a schematic for the relationship in cognitive 
behavioural therapy; I suggest how a post-structuralist framework might 
be used to enrich cognitive therapy in an inpatient setting; and I model a 
psychosocial research method that uses skills derived from clinical and 
theoretical learning as a trainee counselling psychologist.
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General Introduction
General Introduction
Putting together this portfolio has in itself been an educating exercise. As in all the 
pieces of written work which make up this portfolio and its appendix, I have found 
that the act of writing and editing has focussed me. In the forensic process of 
revisiting all the pieces of work contained here has, some historical questions about 
counselling psychology practice and the nature of knowledge have resurfaced; other 
new questions have also arisen.
I have been able to evince some elements of coherence (or at least of commonality) in 
the whole portfolio but, being aware of the occurrence of reinterpretation even in my 
own process, present these elements as a guide to answering the questions above, 
rather than an attempt to present a canonical version of what has been. In fact I hope 
to learn from further reinterpretation (by myself or others) of the material herein. In A 
Contemporary History o f my Clinical Identity (which appears in the Therapeutic 
Practice Dossier below) I elaborate more on the impossibility of a crystallised 
historical account. However, here I want to propose that a less locked account may in 
fact be expedient, because it enables the continued extraction of meaning and thus the 
creation of new secondary knowledge through interpretation.
At no other time in the last three years has it been possible to spend time looking over 
an thinking about my clinical work, my research and my other academic work as a 
whole. This has also evoked sensations and memories of interactions with staff, other 
trainees, clients and colleagues which are not documented here. The process of 
training has often felt itinerant and sometimes uncomfortably so. In contrast, I have 
been reacquainted with ideas that I had forgotten about through retrospection. I now 
have a more concrete sense of everything that I have attempted to produce, perhaps 
too because I have staked out better what I may attempt to produce in the future. At 
the least, it seems like periodic retrospection and gathering my ideas and feelings into 
a written format may be useful practices to continue in my personal and professional 
development.
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Overlaps
It would perhaps be a fruitless endeavour to attempt to describe an overarching 
progression into which the papers in this portfolio neatly slot (an idea which I go on to 
elaborate in A Contemporary Assembly o f  My Clinical Identity). However, I believe 
there are two motifs which link the various pieces of academic, therapeutic practice 
and research. The first of these is the idea that these categories overlap. It is an idea 
that is manifested particularly in the Therapeutic Practice section, in The Body, the 
Book and the Organisation in the Academic Dossier, in I t ’s not My Place... * in the 
Research Dossier and in Process Report 4 in the Portfolio Attachment (in which I 
attempt to bring discursive ideas learnt in my research into a psychodynamic 
formulation). Overlapping is also a motif that is echoed in Deconstructing Diagnosis, 
in which I describe the many problems that have beleaguered systems of discrete 
classification in the field of diagnosis.
Overlaps have also been an important element in my training with regard to working 
in different modalities. To some extent, many therapeutic modalities may be thought 
to be reiterations of common ideas with differences at linguistic, theoretical or 
epistemological levels (Draghi-Lorenz, 2010). Realising this has been the source of 
some continuity and comfort during training, since another point of overlap between 
person-centred, psychodynamic and cognitive behavioural practices has been me -  the 
instrument of their delivery.
The process of training has also overlapped with significant events in my personal 
life, not least becoming a father in the middle of my second year. Apart from the 
expected difficulties that this caused (tiredness, time management and so forth) the 
continuity of the training provided some security. In addition, the process of personal 
development that had begun in personal therapy and continued through the use of 
myself in a therapeutic capacity was carried further by the all-encompassing changes 
that (looking now in retrospect) were taking place. In fact the containment, open- 
mindedness and confidence that I had felt developing in my second year 
psychodynamic placements were useful at home as well as at the clinic. Also -  and it 
is difficult to know whether theory (such as Freud’s (1958) ‘pleasure principle’) 
preceded experience, or vice versa here - 1 was struck by my son’s instinctive nature.
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I was amazed by the power of his urge to suck milk and the strength of the muscles in 
his little mouth. I was reminded that I and my patients began life in this animal state.
It also seemed to me that he was not bom an isolated being but one who, immediately 
after his umbilical cord was cut and he and his mother ceased to have physical 
integrity, existed still in relation to her, me and the world. The essential nature of this 
relationality can be captured by the phenomenologist Martin Buber’s term, I-Thou 
(Adams, 2007). It can also be captured in psychoanalytic terms: my son and his 
mother’s metaphysical integrity was pre- mirror stage (Moncayo, 2008). 
Alternatively, his essential relationality might be defined as before the point where 
carved up the world into himself and everything other than himself -  a view of the 
world that William James (1950) suggests becomes common to all adults1. In 
therapeutic terms, this experience has strengthened my conviction of the importance 
of the intersubjective, an importance that is prized by Counselling Psychology (BPS, 
2006).
Deconstruction
Another ubiquitous element in this portfolio is deconstruction. Deconstruction often 
sounds to me like a negative word. It makes me imagine buildings being knocked 
down, or ideas being tom apart by belligerent critics. Some of the work below does, I 
think, have a combative feel: for example, in Heresy, Hope & The Holy Grail I write 
about the psychiatric establishment in a way which invites the unfavourable 
comparison of its technologies to historical Christian practices.
However, deconstruction can also be seen as a less destructive process. In fact, it can 
be seen as something which requires no action at all, but rather a shift in viewpoint. 
For example, the rings of Saturn (which I return to in the Therapeutic Practice 
Dossier) are entities which seem to have integrity from afar, but from close up are 
separate fragments of rock and frozen gas held in a pattern by Saturn’s gravitational 
force. It takes no active deconstructing to see this, but only a move in space, or a
11 give a few conceptualisations here in order to demonstrate the kind of conceptual 
overlapping described above.
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change in the instrument through which we choose to observe the rings. To 
Reconstruct the rings in this way is no more perverse than constructing them from 
isolated fragments. Such shifts in focus can be useful in providing new information 
about what is present in the therapeutic relationship; they invite us not to destroy, or 
restructure (to use a cognitive behavioural term) what is there, but to reassess how we 
perceive it.
This type of deconstruction is to some extent a connecting motif that spans my 
research, my academic and my therapeutic work. It is informed by social 
constructionist ideas that I have come across in my research, and which I have also 
attempted to translate into my clinical work (see for example Process Report 5 and 
The Body, the Book and the Organisation). Even the most obvious things may be 
deconstructed as well as constructed: I am reminded of the psychophysicist Gustav 
Fechner’s2 proposition that there is no such thing as number in nature (Michell, 1999). 
Applied to the psychotherapeutic realm, the possibility of deconstruction and 
construction could be seen to open new pathways for patients (although probably 
within the limits of cultural discourse).
Absence
So far, I have written a little about what is present in this portfolio. However, I think it 
is also worth mentioning a little about what is absent. Some pieces of work conducted 
during the course were crucial to the propagation of the papers contained here: for 
example, a group research project conducted during my second year of training in 
which I and the other members of the group analysed the construction of cosmetic 
surgery in online forums was a key stage in developing interests in discourse analysis 
and the internet as a medium. These interests intertwined with my interest in 
psychiatric diagnosis to form Heresy, Hope and the Holy Grail. Similarly, writing the 
process reports written about clients I met in my first year learning disabilities 
encouraged me to think about communication and diversity in a way that has informed 
more recent therapeutic work and even the way I conducted the dialogues in my third
2 Interestingly, like Strawson (whose rejection of Cartesian dualism I have mentioned in A 
Contemporary Assembly of My Clinical Identity), Fechner embraces monism and 
panpsychism, arguing that the difference between mind and body is one of perspective.
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year research project, ‘I t ’s not My Place... They are not included in the Portfolio 
Attachment because I decided that others would fit more coherently and contained 
better examples of clinical practice and writing.
There are other, less formalised absences too. I have attempted to capture some of the 
pertinent extra-clinical influences on my work in A Contemporary Assembly o f My 
Clinical Identity, but there have been other factors at work on the pieces in this 
portfolio: the influence my fellow trainees have had (and perhaps my positioning in 
the group in relation to them), as well as my tutors and colleagues. There are probably 
less tangible omissions than this too. As T. S. Eliot suggests in the quotation I use at 
the beginning o îHeresy, Hope and the Holy Grail (p. 128 below), we may carry with 
us the sediment of centuries of culture: perhaps there are presences in this portfolio of 
which I am not aware, but others will be.
Some notes on the text
The DSM
As I have explained above, an interest in the taxonomic structures that guide the 
treatment and classification of mental health is recurrent in the papers that follow. The 
first paper to written here was begun in 2011 and the last a month or so after the 
publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders, 5th Edition 
(APA, 2013) in March this year. I have updated D&M-related references where 
appropriate, but in other places -  particularly where I cite specific sources that focus 
on an earlier edition - 1 have limited my discussion to the edition in question. 
Likewise, the weighting of the diagnostic discussion is towards DSM-IV-TR (APA, 
2000) in some parts (in Deconstructing Diagnosis in the Research Dossier, for 
example), whilst elsewhere (as in The Body, the Book and the Organisation in the 
Academic Dossier) I explicitly gear my discussion towards what recent criteria 
changes in DSM-5.
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Contemporaneity
In some papers, I have used the present tense in order to evoke the immediacy of the 
ideas and feelings which arose at the time. The academic, therapeutic and research 
work contained in this portfolio are selected examples of the strata on top of which my 
current practice and thought now sit. To a degree, they are historical; yet I hope to 
maintain their contemporaneity for the reader. I hope this General Introduction and 
the introductions to the dossiers below will provide an adequately concrete 
architecture in which to reanimate them.
Nomenclature
I have used the terms ‘patient’ and ‘client’ below to refer to people with whom I have 
come into contact in a therapeutic setting. Generally my preference is for the word 
‘patient’ (and I explain my reasons for this in greater detail in the A Contemporary 
Assembly o f My Clinical Identity in the Therapeutic Practice Dossier). However, 
writing the word ‘patient’ would have felt incongruent in reference to some of the 
services and models (notably the person-centred model) I have worked in. Therefore, 
as a rule of thumb, my choice of word in the text below reflects the predominant 
nomenclature in the service or model I am writing about. Deviations (and reasons for 
these devations) from this rule of thumb have been explained in footnotes.
Anonymity
In order to protect the anonymity of the people and organisations I have come into 
contact with and written about, all proper names included in this portfolio and the 
Portfolio Attachment have been changed.
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Academic Dossier
Even though the papers in this dossier are predominantly theoretical, they are 
grounded in my clinical experience: the central conceit of Ironing out or Factoring 
stems from my difficulty with an outpatient I worked with during my third year 
placement, while in The Body, the Book and the Organisation, the clinical 
implications which follow a brief genealogy of anorexia nervosa and discussed with 
reference to my work with an inpatient I came into contact with in the same year.
The link to clinical experience in the Marginalisation and Terror is perhaps less 
explicit. I began to write this about a patient I was working with at the time, who had 
been diagnosed with severe depression with psychotic episodes. As I continued to 
reflect on her formulation I happened to read R. D. Laing’s (1969) work on psychiatry 
and schizophrenia, which contained references to Ophelia in Hamlet. It occurred to 
me that there was much in common between my patient and Shakespeare’s character -  
particularly her lack of control in a cultural environment dominated by male politics. I 
have used the word ‘archetype’ in the title not strictly in a Jungian sense, since 
Ophelia might be thought to ‘appear in a form that reveals quite unmistakably the 
critical and evaluating influence of conscious elaboration’ rather than be purely 
‘unconscious content’ (Jung, 1959, p.5). Nevertheless, I hoped that the archetypal 
facets that emerge from her story might provide more familiar access to the theoretical 
content of the paper. It also opened up a wider pool of literature for analysing my 
patient (for example Showalter’s (1985) feminist literary criticism).
In addition, the overlap between clinical and fictional that is manifested in an analysis 
of Ophelia felt pertinent, because it was an opportunity to bring some experience from 
my past as a comedic writer and performer to bear on my work. Hamlet can hardly be 
described as comedic, but imagining myself into written characters was a practice I 
attempted to do faithfully as a comedic performer. I found myself doing the same 
when I was writing about Ophelia. To some extent, I also think this process requires a 
degree of empathy and self-knowledge which I have tried to bring to bear on my 
therapeutic work too. Furthermore, it is pertinent that I mention comedy in this
14
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introduction to the Academic Dossier. In Ironing out or Factoring in? and The Body, 
the Book and the Organisation, there are comedic (or at least irreverent in the case of 
the latter) tropes. I believe the use of humour has the potential to offer unusual 
perspectives on situations, as well as to connect people in the same physical and 
emotional state. Humour is essential rather than merely artificial (another lesson from 
living with a baby); it is a primitive mode of communication (Martin, 2007).
While there is some intersection between the literary and the psychological in 
Marginalisation and Terror, the theoretical intersection in Ironing out, or Factoring 
in? occurs in my attempt to conceptualise countertransference in cognitive 
behavioural terms; in The Body, the Book and the Organisation, it is in the more 
formal proposition of a post-structuralist framework for pluralistic counselling 
psychology practice. In all three papers, I have attempted to explore these 
intersections, rather than to provide definitive integrated positions.
15
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Marginalisation and Terror: Working with an Archtypal ‘Schizophrenic’ Patient
from a Psychoanalytic Perspective
‘Divided from herself and her fair judgment,
Without the which we are pictures, or mere beasts’
{Hamlet, IV.v, 68-69,)
Introduction
In the DSM-IV-TR (First & Tasman, 2004), ‘schizophrenia’ is described as a chronic 
and debilitating mental illness whose diagnosis necessitates two or more of the 
following symptoms in its active state: delusions; hallucinations; disorganised speech; 
disorganised or catatonic behaviour; and negative speech. The authors concede that 
although the term ‘schizophrenia’ is relatively new to our vocabulary, chronic 
psychotic illnesses have been in evidence throughout civilised times. This is a 
pertinent statement for the purposes of this essay, since some of the psychoanalytic 
formulations of schizophrenia I will be making use of originate from before the 
current DSM  taxonomy.3 In addition, Shakespeare’s Ophelia -  the case I will be using 
to illustrate schizophrenic activity -  was created long before the invention of the word 
‘schizophrenia’. Nevertheless, as Laing suggests, ‘she is latterly undoubtedly a 
schizophrenic... There is now only a vacuum where there was once a person’ (1969, 
p.195).
It is also worth noting here that in addition to different historical definitions of 
schizophrenia in the DSM  taxonomies, there are different descriptions of 
schizophrenia in the work of major psychoanalytic theorists (Arlow & Brenner, 1961; 
Fonagy & Target, 2003). Additionally, there has been some doubt cast on the validity 
of the concept of schizophrenia per se by Szasz (1974) and more recently by Boyle 
(1990) and Bentall (2003): while these critiques may be useful for thinking about how 
to work with patients as individuals rather than representatives of an arguably
3 For this reason I will occasionally use the broader term ‘psychosis’ in accordance with some 
of the earlier literature.
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imaginary organic psychopathology, their more detailed examination lies beyond the 
remit of this essay. The DSM-IV-TR has been criticised for being too symptom- 
focused in nature (Bentall, 2003), but these symptoms usefully provide a facade, 
behind which theories of schizophrenia’s psychological and metapsychological 
aetiology may be examined.
Therefore, before returning more specifically to a psychoanalytic formulation of 
Ophelia (whose plight I aim to show has relevance for modem clinical work), I will 
examine a few psychoanalytic conceptualisations of schizophrenia, focusing primarily 
on their explanations of its aetiology and their ramifications for clinical work.
Conceptualisations of schizophrenia
Theory o f  conflict
Freud asserts that psychosis occurs when the ego rejects entirely an intolerable notion 
along with its accompanying emotions ‘and behaves as if the idea had never occurred 
to the ego at all’ (1962a, p.58). The loss of connection with reality that occurs (as 
communicated by the symptoms outlined by the DSM  above) is due to the fact that 
this same intolerable notion is connected to reality: therefore, by successfully 
estranging the notion, the ego also estranges at least a portion of reality. The 
consequent symptoms (hallucinations and so on) are therefore misguided attempts to 
achieve a libidinal equilibrium. Rather than libidinal energy being invested in object 
representations, it is redistributed to the self in the case of delusions of grandeur, or in 
the case of persecution delusions it is unsuccessfully recathected back to object 
representations. Freud also suggests (Arlow & Brenner, 1961) that the disorganised 
speech exhibited by patients with schizophrenia is symptomatic of this partly 
successful recathexis back to object representations which can only go as far as the 
verbal part of the object.
Arlow and Brenner (1961) propose a revised conflict model for psychosis, arguing 
that neither the first stage of Freud’s early conceptualisation, which describes the 
withdrawal of cathexis from objects; nor the second stage, which is characterised by 
the onset of hallucinations or delusions, accurately explain the condition. Clinical
18
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evidence, they argue, indicates that rather than exhibiting a cathectic detachment from 
objects, psychotic patients often exhibit an unusually strong attachment to infantile 
objects. Furthermore, evidence exists that patients can often recall vividly what has 
happened during catatonic periods and therefore that the real world has not been 
cathected.
Arlow and Brenner (1961) also consider the manifestations of psychosis, such as 
hallucinations and delusions, to be more complicated than an attempt to equalise 
libidinal energy. They assert that the content of hallucinations and delusions are 
powerful analogues of a patient’s intrapsychic conflicts, which often predate the onset 
of psychotic behaviour. It is the severity of the disturbances of ego functions, which 
mark the psychoses apart from the neuroses. In addition, although these disturbances 
are still fundamentally thought to be the result of poor development or conflict, this 
conceptualisation does encompass the ill effects developmental traumas (Beres, 1956) 
and genetic factors (Hartmann, 1950; 1953) which are thought to open up different 
paths to ego regression.
In its application to clinical work, this conceptualisation of schizophrenia advocates 
the deciphering of which functions of the ego are involved in the defensive regressive 
tendency. Then it may be possible to work out the motives for the patient’s defense 
and to point out how his or her symptoms are the manifestation of either an attempt to 
control unwanted urges, or to escape from the vicissitudes of an excrescent superego: 
in this way it may be possible to mollify the ‘intensity of the intrapsychic conflict and 
to enhance the ego’s function of integration and adaption’ (Arlow & Brenner, 1961, 
p. 12), thereby reducing the patient’s anxiety.
Boyer (1971) describes such an approach with a female patient who experiences 
terrifying black visualisations in her head. By presenting himself to the patient as 
objective and sanguine but not overtly reassuring or didactic, he was able to aim 
communications towards the patient’s ego strengths and offer a model with which to 
identify. Accepting that the patient had a fear of losing ego control, he encouraged 
awareness of unconscious fantasies which may have been previously unwelcome in 
order to strengthen the ego boundaries.
19
Academic Dossier
Theory of deficit
This conceptualisation also stems from Freud, but largely from his later work, starting 
with the Schreber case (Grotstein, 1975). There is believed to be a primary catastrophe 
which becomes reactivated in psychotic episodes and which is thus ‘consistent with... 
the dramatic clinical phenomenology of schizophrenia’ (Gunderson, 1975, p. 146). 
Rather than being the result of a conflict as in the above models, psychosis is seen to 
be due to the complete removal of the object from the psyche. This act of primary 
disturbance, London (1988) notes, is seen to be more significant than disturbances in 
reality. Schizophrenia is also seen as qualitatively different to the neuroses, unlike in 
the conflict conceptualisation.
Arguing that the ego is too defective in schizophrenia, some theorists suggest that 
psychoanalysis is not suitable at all. For example, Freeman (1969) was skeptical about 
interpretations, believing that they could be dangerous and threaten to topple the 
delicate ego structure entirely, especially if used to implement therapeutic regression. 
Furthermore Freeman suggests that, while transference neuroses may be therapeutic in 
the treatment of neurotic patients, transference psychoses ‘are not ‘genuine’ 
transferences’ (1965, p.46).
Gunderson (1975) points out that the deficit conceptualisation continued to be 
developed because it did not necessitate a genetic or organic basis; also because it 
employed language which tied into early psychoanalytic traditions. However, he 
explains, it has been criticised for the following reasons: first, although it proposes a 
deficit, it gives no indication of why that deficit might exist, or whether it is distinct 
from deficits in other disorders; second, it falls short of encompassing non-matemal 
influences; third, it does not seem to be openly manifested in a great deal of clinical 
evidence. Furthermore, as Fonagy and Target (1990) point out, the idea of regression 
to an infantile conflict state is not well backed up by developmental psychological
20
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research, which seems to show that infants can accurately identify their mothers and 
their mothers’ facial expressions from birth4.
Among the more interesting clinical developments stemming from the deficit 
conceptualisation were Sechehaye’s (1951) symbolic realisations, in which she 
offered symbols, such as the doll ‘Ezekiel’ to Renée -  a patient whom she deemed to 
be incapable of appraising interpretations. Even though Renee’s ego and the ‘imago’ 
of the doll could not be separated, Sechahaye believed that Renée might be rehearsing 
the reconstruction of her own ego in the form of this better adjusted imago; or in 
Piagetian terms (Piaget was a great influence on Sechahaye) Renée might imitate the 
imago in a process akin to a 12 to 18 month-year-old gaining self-awareness. In a later 
stage in the therapy Renée would go on to imitate the therapist and to more openly 
engage more orthodox analytical practice. Grotstein (1975) explains how the 
permissive, symbiotic environment of Sechahaye’s work was also used by Searles, 
who advocates recognition of the codependency of therapist and patient. Searles 
believes that this codependency, or ‘symbiotic relatedness’ (1973, p.247), is necessary 
for the treatment of patients with schizophrenia.
Kleinian theory
Members of the Kleinian School, such as Bion, Rosenfeld and Segal have developed 
their own view of schizophrenia, which nevertheless derives from Freudian ideas 
(Grotstein, 1975). In their conceptualisation, schizophrenia is engendered by the faulty 
development of the ego as a result of a priori hereditable characteristics or early 
infantile traumas. Maldevelopment further on in infancy is due to the defective part of 
the psyche launching over-defensive attacks on other parts which can sense the 
psyche’s needs; the defective part also attacks perceptions of objects which meet these 
needs. Thus, the inborn defensive apparatus (the death instinct) constantly 
compromises the mind’s ability to unite the necessary awarenesses of needs with the 
awarenesses of objects which can satisfy these needs. This results in an incomplete 
psyche which has particular difficulty in utilising and internalising helpful objects 
(Grotstein, 1975).
4 This criticism can also apply to any conceptualisation of schizophrenia which hinges on 
regression to early, confused states.
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Another relevant concept in the Kleinian model is fragmentation. Bion (1962) 
suggested that projective identification is a manifestation of the kind of primitive 
anxiety described above: part of the ego becomes fragmented before being projected 
into an object representation, which then itself becomes fragmented. This gives rise to 
a ‘bizarre object’, an internal object experienced as having a life of its own, which 
contains fragments of the self at the same time as being essentially hostile. He 
proposed that the psychotic part of the personality fears emotional reality and thus 
fragments certain thoughts or destroys the perceptual apparatus in an effort to destroy 
it (Symington & Symington, 1997). The Oedipal pre-conception is destroyed and it is 
therefore pointless trying to reconnect the patient with Oedipal malfunctions using 
therapeutic parental transference: only in cases where fragments of the Oedipal pre­
conception can be detected is there any hope of rebuilding the ‘sieve-like’ (Symington 
& Symington, 1997, p.48) schizophrenic container.
Finally, of further interest to clinical work with patients with schizophrenia, Rosenfeld 
(1982) describes his difficulty in using interpretations with one patient, who felt 
paranoid or that he was being attacked however the interpretation was slanted: he 
believes this is due to the inability of such patients to think abstractly and only 
concretely. Therefore, he suggests that therapists should use their countertransferential 
feelings as a guide, particularly that we are aware of what the patient projects into us 
by verbally and non-verbally and that can verbalise what we unconsciously 
comprehend (Rosenfeld, 1982).
Further conceptualisations
It is not possible to summarise all the psychoanalytic conceptualisations of 
schizophrenia here, but of interest to the example below is the British Independent 
School’s model, incorporating Winnicott’s idea of the false self. The false self is 
formed as a result of trauma during the stage of absolute dependency (Winnicott,
1960) and continues to protect the true self, whose pain may only manifest itself in the 
unconquerable psychopathological symptoms.
22
Academic Dossier
The interpersonal-relational approach proposes that some of the anxieties expressed in 
schizophrenic symptoms may be rooted in infantile fears transferred from the 
mother’s anxieties (Fonagy & Target, 1990). To this end the concept of the 
schizophrenogenic mother was coined by Fromm-Reichmann, and Searles (1965) has 
added that therapists’ countertransferential feelings of despair and confusion may be 
inherited from the patient’s early experiences with caregivers.
More recently Fonagy and Target (1990) have formulated psychopathology (including 
schizophrenia) from a mentalisation perspective. They conclude that the aim of 
psychoanalysis should be primarily to rebuild the mentalisation function and that the 
focus should be on the patient’s experience of the current transference: this can be 
pragmatically achieved through an emphasis on understanding moment-to-moment 
fluctuations in the patient’s existence.
Shakespeare’s Ophelia: a quasi-clinical example
Formulations of Ophelia
Perhaps a formulation of Ophelia’s schizophrenic symptoms seems a far cry from 
conceptualisations described above. However, I wish to use her to highlight another 
crucial matter for work with patients with schizophrenia. Byles (1989) postulates that 
Ophelia’s madness may spring from a restriction in her language and thus her identity. 
From a Lacanian point of view, formation of self-image is a function of the language 
of others: ‘The psychoanalytic experience has rediscoved in man the imperative of the 
word as law which has formed him in its image’ (1977, p.80). Motherless and forced 
by her father Polonius not to interact with Hamlet, Ophelia exists in a male-dominated 
world in which the men have defined her subjectivity for her, dictating how she 
should think and feel.
Furthermore, as Lidz (1975) suggests, Ophelia is put in an impossible position of 
choosing between Hamlet (her love object) and her father when Hamlet kills Polonius. 
His consequent attacks on her arise from his dissatisfaction with his own mother, but 
their effect is to restrict further Ophelia’s true self. Like the choice impressed on her 
between father and lover, Hamlet’s imperative, ‘Get thee to a nunnery’ (IILi, 21)
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emboldens the dichotomous and false world (nunnery means convent or brothel in 
Elizabethan slang) which Ophelia inhabits. Her consequent symptoms, especially her 
disorganised speech -  particularly on the return of her brother Laertes in Act IV, scene 
v -  are the communications of a damaged ego, which has had to eschew the reality of 
infantile trauma that has been reactivated by the abandonment of her lover, father and 
brother. In their absence, even her male-constructed false self is punctured and, rather 
than confronting intolerable emotional realities, she is left with no other option but 
suicide.
Showalter (1985) also points out that Ophelia has become an archetype for 
representations of female madness in psychoanalytic and literary theory, yet the story 
of her madness is seldom told. In fact, even within Hamlet, Shakespeare dedicates 
relatively little time to her tragedy, which becomes subsumed by Hamlet’s tragedy. 
Similarly, in Freud’s examination of Hamlet (Freud, 1962b) Ophelia’s plight is 
portrayed only as an addendum to Hamlet’s madness. I believe that her madness may 
stand for a general malady that is suffered not only by the other women in 
Shakespeare’s plays (Byles, 1989) but which may be perpetrated in general on 
marginalised groups in any environment. For example, it is commonly known that 
incidence of schizophrenia in black Caribbean living in the UK is higher per capita 
than in the white British population (McGrath et a l, 2004; Pinto et al, 2008). While 
there is no reason to believe that the fundamental ego apparatus or incidence of 
infantile traumas may be different in the two populations, it is possible that symptoms 
may be more commonly triggered in groups whose subjectivity is impinged by a 
hegemonic language.
Working with Ophelia
My formulation of Ophelia’s schizophrenia here alludes to an original trauma, which 
has brought about the construction of a false self. Later events, especially the 
abandonment by male figures in the context of an environment which has restricted 
her subjectivity have meant that the only way she can communicate is through 
psychotic symptoms. Working with Ophelia, or others like her, would necessitate the 
reformulation of her ego boundaries. The ability to do this would depend on how 
much shards of non-psychotic ego could be detected in the clinical environment.
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Kleinian theorists might advocate that an approach would be taken in which 
interpretations did not try and harness Oedipal pre-conceptions through parental 
transference (Shakespeare’s total failure to write in a mother here may be significant), 
while conflict theorists might try to encourage awareness of her unconscious fantasies 
in order to reveal that the ego might reconnect with their real content. It seems, 
however, that Ophelia’s ability to mentalise becomes progressively compromised so 
that perhaps a more open, symbolic approach, such as Sechahaye’s (1951) might be 
useful. In any case the interpretation of countertransferential feelings would be 
important: when Laertes asserts that she is ‘A document in madness, thoughts and 
remembrance fitted’ (IV.v, 159), he is not monitoring his own reactions to her or 
trying to communicate these back to her, but daubing her with a the language of 
madness in a way which sends her further into her psychotic reverie.
Laing (1959), also concerned with labelling schizophrenic activity, suggests that 
psychotic behaviour is diagnosed only when there is a schism in communication 
between two people and one of those people is sane by common consent. He suggests 
that it is important to acknowledge the (so-called) psychotic patient’s loneliness in 
psychotherapeutic work with them. However, Leverenz (1978) points out that his 
description of Ophelia’s speech as ‘incomprehensible’ (Laing, 1959, p. 195) is strange 
given his normal sensitivity to schizophrenic voices. Leverenz suggests that rather 
than being a vacuum, Ophelia is the conduit for multiple voices, but none of these are 
her own: she ‘becomes the mirror for a madness-inducing world’ (1978, p.294). As 
such, psychoanalytic work with her would have to examine her projections in the 
countertransference, but also present a non-threatening environment in which some 
remnant of the ego behind the mirror might acquire its own voice.
Finally, to return to the opening quotation of this essay, Horatio’s assessment of 
Ophelia has resonances in some of the conceptualisations described above. From a 
mentalisation point of view, her inability (if Horatio’s assessment is correct) to 
comprehend the thoughts of people around her might render them inhuman. This idea 
of manifold beasts around her is also reminiscent of Rosenfeld’s (1971) formulation 
of the ‘narcissistic gang’, which attacks and pervades every aspect of self, thus 
impeding the internalisation of good objects which help maintain a strong ego.
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Although this does not only apply to schizophrenia, it might result from a process 
which Freud (1962a) describes in which during the formation of psychotic symptoms, 
there is a narcissistic redistribution of libidinal energy away from the real, but 
terrifying object to the self.
Steiner’s work with psychotic patients aims to rescue the infant from the narcissistic 
gang (Robinson & Fuller, 2003). In addition, both Sinason and Richards’s clinical 
work involves helping the patient to distinguish her real self from the psychotic 
cohabitant, rather than trying to reduce splitting per se -  the usual aim of 
psychotherapy (Robinson and Fuller, 2003). In the case of Ophelia, this would involve 
getting to know the psychotic personality as well as the real personality (as opposed to 
trying to shut it down), or as Lucas (2009) has helpfully called it, tuning into the 
‘psychotic wavelength’.
Conclusion
By using Ophelia as a clinical example, my aim was to continue a tradition of 
applying psychoanalytic theory to cultural archetypes, but especially given the 
prevalence of work on Hamlet (for example Freud (1962b)), to elucidate the 
interaction of societal marginalisation with psychosis, informed by Lacan’s (1977) 
linguistic work. Interestingly, thinking about Ophelia has led me to thinking about 
how some of the patients I work with have may have been marginalised and with one 
patient in particular, this does play a part in her psychosis, in which she believes that 
she cannot communicate with other people at work and that they are laughing behind 
her back. She has also related a dream to me in which she is persecuted by a group of 
men in army uniform.
Fonagy and Target (1990) propose that psychoanalytic practice cannot be deducible 
from any one psychoanalytic theory for three reasons: that psychoanalytic technique 
has been developed on a trial and error basis; that psychoanalysts do not understand, 
or claim to understand why their treatment works and psychoanalytic practice has 
changed little since a few papers written by Freud just before the First World War. 
They propose that a model of inductive reasoning is better, whereby instances 
consistent with a premise are gradually accumulated.
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By that rationale I might begin my next session with my current patient -  or with 
Ophelia -  with the following premise: that confronting the psychotic part of oneself is 
terrifying precisely because it is a part of oneself. Therefore to highlight what are 
countertransferentially felt to be real interactions in the therapy room might, while 
listening to what is being communicated by the psychotic part, be the best way of 
strengthening the ego. I believe there are enough instances of real, non-psychotic 
interaction to proceed accordingly.
27
Academic Dossier
References
Arlow, J. & Brenner, C. (1961). The psychopathology of the psychoses: A proposed 
revision. International Journal o f  Psychoanalysis, 50, 5-14.
Bentall, R.P. (2003). Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human Nature. ePenguin.
Beres, D. (1956). Ego deviation and the concept of schizophrenia. The Psychoanalytic 
Study o f the Child, 12, 164-235.
Bion, W.R. (1962). A theory of thinking. International Journal o f  Psychoanalysis, 43, 
4-5.
Boyer, L.B. (1971). Psychoanalytic technique in the treatment of certain 
characterological and schizophrenic disorders. International Journal o f  
Psychoanalysis, 52, 67-85.
Boyle, M. (1990). Schizophrenia: A Scientific Delusion? London: Routledge.
Byles, J.M. (1989). The problem of the self and the other in the language 
of Ophelia, Desdemona and Cordelia. American Imago, 46{\), 37-
First, M.B. & Tasman, A. (Eds.) (2004). DSM-IV-TR Mental Disorders. Chichester: 
Whiley.
Freud, S. (1962a). The neuro-psychoses of defense. In J. Strachey & A. Freud (Eds.) 
The Standard Edition: Vol. I l l  (pp. 45-61). Toronto: Hogarth Press. (Original work 
published 1894)
Freud, S. (1962b). The Interpretation of Dreams. In J. Strachey & A. Freud (Eds.) The 
Standard Edition: Vol. IV  (pp. 264-266). Toronto: Hogarth Press. (Original work 
published 1900)
Freeman, T. (1965). Studies on Psychosis. London: Routledge.
Freeman, T. (1969). Psychopathology o f  the Psychoses. New York: International 
Universities Press.
Grotstein, J.S. (1975). A theoretical rationale for psychoanalytic treatment of 
schizophrenia. In J.G. Gunderson & L.R. Mosher (Eds.) Psychotherapy o f  
Schizophrenia (pp. 175-201). New York: Jason Aronson.
Gunderson, J.G. (1975). The current metapsychology of schizophrenia. In J. G. 
Gunderson & L.R. Mosher (Eds.) Psychotherapy o f  Schizophrenia (pp. 145-160).
New York: Jason Aronson.
Hartmann, H. (1950). Psychoanalysis and developmental psychology. The 
Psychoanalytic Study o f the Child, 5, 7-17.
28
Academic Dossier
Hartmann, H. (1953). Contribution to the metapsychology of schizophrenia. The 
Psychoanalytic Study o f  the Child, 5, 177-198.
Lacan, J. (1977). A. Sheridan (Trans.) Ecrits. New York: Norton & Company.
Laing, R.D. (1969). The Divided Self (Pelican edition). Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Leverenz, D. (1978). The Woman in Hamlet: An Interpersonal View. Signs, 4(2), 291- 
308.
Lidz, T. (1975). Hamlet’s Enemy: Madness and Myth in Hamlet. New York: Basic 
Books.
London, N.J. (1988). An essay on psychoanalytic theory: Two theories of 
schizophrenia. Part II: Discussion and restatement of the specific theory of 
schizophrenia. In P. Buckley (Ed.) Essential Papers on Psychosis (pp. 23-48). New 
York: New York University Press.
Lucas, R. (2009). The Psychotic Wavelength: A Psychoanalytic Perspective for  
Psychiatry. London: Routledge.
McGrath, J., Saha, S., Welham, J., El Saadi, O., MacCauley, C. & Chant, D. (2004). A 
systematic review of the incidence of schizophrenia: the distribution of rates and the 
influence of sex, urbanicity, migrant status and methodology. BioMed Central 
Medicine, 2(13), Retrieved 1 December 2011 from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC421751/
Pinto, R., Ashworth, M. & Jones, R. (2008). Schizophrenia in black Caribbeans living 
in the UK: an exploration of underlying causes of the high incidence rate, the British 
Journal o f General Practice, 55(551), 429-434.
Rosenfeld, H. (1971). A clinical approach to the psychoanalytic theory of the life and 
death instincts: An investigation into the aggressive aspects of narcissism. 
International Journal o f Psychoanalysis, 52, 169-178.
Rosenfeld, H. (1982). Psychotic States. London: Kamac Books. (Original work 
published in 1965)
Searles, H.F. (1965). Transference psychosis in psychotherapy of chronic 
schizophrenia. In H. F. Searles (Ed.) Collected Papers on Schizophrenia and Related 
Subjects (pp.654-716). New York: International Universities Press.
Searles, H.F. (1973). Concerning therapeutic symbiosis. Annual o f Psychoanalysis, 1, 
247-262.
Sechehaye, M. (1951). Autobiography o f a schizophrenic girl: Reality lost and gained, 
with analytic interpretation. New York: Grune & Stratton.
29
Academic Dossier
Showalter, E. (1985). Representing Ophelia: Women, madness, and the 
responsibilities of feminist criticism. In P. Parker & G. Hartman (Eds.) Shakespeare 
and the Question o f Theory (pp.77-94). London: Methuen.
Symington, J. & Symington, N. (1997). The Clinical Thinking o f Wilfred Bion. 
London: Routledge.
Szasz, T. (1974). The Myth o f Mental Illness: Foundations o f  a Theory o f Personal 
Conduct (1st Harper Perennial edn). New York: Harper Perennial.
Winnicott, D.W. (1960). The theory of the parent-infant relationship. International 
Journal o f Psychoanalysis, 41, 585-595.
30
Academic Dossier
Ironing out, or Factoring in? Conceptualisations of Therapists’ Reactions 
Towards Patients in Cognitive Behavioural and Schema Therapies
Introduction
A couple of weeks ago I found myself ironing a shirt. The clumsiness which I 
performed this act testified to its infrequency. I never iron shirts. So why was I now? 
The realisation began to come over me that I was smartening myself up for a patient -  
a patient who, since the first assessment, had disturbed some compulsion in me to 
measure up; to meet standards and to be competent. Working as I currently do in a 
specialist service for the cognitive behavioural treatment of eating disorders, I 
wondered how I might I make sense of this compulsion. Should I try to banish it? Or 
might there be some way that this subjective data might be captured in the language of 
cognitive behavioural5 (CBT) and related therapies and used profitably in the process 
of therapy?
In order to address these questions, I have analysed the literature from three different 
areas. Beck’s (1976) and Beck et a/.’s (1979) classic cognitive therapy provides a 
theoretical starting point, while Young et a l ’s (2007) schema therapy provides a more 
refined conceptualisation of the therapeutic relationship, which explicitly 
encompasses issues relating to therapists’ feelings. I will also examine some of the 
CBT literature on eating disorders, as it was within this milieu that the powerful 
feeling described above arose. These analyses are not exhaustive, but will provide the 
basis for the tentative proposition of a model of later in this essay. I hope they may 
also elucidate ways of understanding such feelings (which in psychodynamic terms 
might commonly be called ‘countertransference’6) in a way that are in line with the 
emphasis counselling psychology places on subjectivity (Rizq, 2005).
51 use ‘CBT’ here to encompass the range of cognitive behavioural therapies (including 
cognitive therapy, cognitive behavioural therapy and so on).
6 Countertransference is defined by Freud as feeling ‘which arises [in the therapist] as a result 
of the patient’s influence on his unconscious feelings’ (1957, p. 144).
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Beck’s cognitive therapy
In classic formulations of cognitive therapy, it is suggested that the therapeutic 
relationship should ‘require the same subtle therapeutic atmosphere that has been 
described explicitly in the context of psychodynamic therapy’ (Beck et a l,  1979, 
p.50). This is combined with a person-centred emphasis on warmth and empathy 
which Beck (1976) and Beck et al. (1979) attribute to Rogers’s (1951) work on 
therapeutic collaboration.
I feel that there is a tension between these two elements. On the one hand, there is a 
promotion of therapist attributes that are thought to aid psychological change (as 
opposed to being sufficient in themselves for it, as Rogers (1951) proposed). On the 
other hand, there is a promotion of a kind of subtlety that could arguably be lost if the 
therapist values coming across as warm and positive as a therapeutic position over 
confronting and even evoking negative feeling from the patient which can be worked 
through in the relationship. Although Beck et a l (1979) concede that the display of 
warmth and empathy must be regulated according to the therapist’s discretion in 
different situations, little description of this process is given. Warmth and empathy are 
overall attributes whose presence is more central to psychological change than 
elements of transference and countertransference. Indeed, transference and 
countertransference are notions that Beck et a l (1979) describe as being preferably 
reduced by the collaborative therapeutic relationship in cognitive therapy.
It is perhaps this collaborative and active relationship which necessitates an agenda 
for ‘desirable characteristics of the therapist’ (Beck et a l, 1979). Whereas in 
psychoanalytic theory emotions are conceptualised as the results of stimuli 
secondarily triggered through unconscious impulses, in the cognitive model they are 
the results of stimuli filtered through conscious interpretations (Beck, 1976). In other 
words, evoking the Stoic maxim that was also central to Ellis’s cognitive work, ‘it is 
not events which distress us, but the meaning we give to them’ (Edwards & Amtz, 
2012, p.5). This being so, the therapist is required actively to investigate these 
interpretations. The therapist is also encouraged to ‘confront negative therapeutic
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reactions head on’ (Beck et ah, 1979), rather than passively encouraging the patient to 
express negative reactions.
Reading Beck’s description of how through ‘empathy and identification...’ with one 
depressed female mother he could ‘...understand the meanings she attaches to her 
experiences’ (1976, p. 16), I wondered what the therapist’s process in this 
identification would turn out to be. However, no detail about this process was 
elaborated. Perhaps, being (as he referred to himself in a conversation with Albert 
Ellis) a ‘closet psychoanalyst’ (Wills, 2009, p.98), Beck expected his readers in the 
1970s to be familiar with psychodynamic process that might explain the possibility of 
this identification. However, this example is indicative of the overall emphasis in 
cognitive therapy on the internal cognitive processes of the patient rather than the 
therapist.
Cognitive behavioural therapy for eating disorders
...We are not automatons, who can shut personal issues away in a box at
home. (Waller et a l, 2007, p. 134)
So reads a statement from a section in a leading handbook on CBT for eating 
disorders which describes how to survive as an effective therapist. Patients with eating 
disorders are generally thought to be at the challenging end of psychopathological 
spectrum, particularly because of the egosyntonic nature of their presentations 
(Vitousek et a l, 1998). For this reason, Waller et al. suggest that therapists need to 
take notice of their own facets -  particularly ‘perfectionism, anxiety and over- and 
underinvestment in the patient changing’ (2007, p. 126). They go on to warn that high 
levels of perfectionism in the therapist can lead to self-criticism if he or she does not 
‘cure’ the patient.
Here, there is the acknowledgement that the coexistence of similar feelings in patient 
and therapist can occur. Waller et al. also allude to the dynamic of the ‘white knight’ 
and the ‘special patient’ (2007, p. 131) in which the therapist believes that he or she is 
the only individual who can truly understand the patient. However, these are seen to 
be dynamics of which therapists should be aware, with the aim of extracting
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themselves in order to become more objective. They are not dynamics which the 
authors suggest should be analysed with the potential to inform therapists about the 
nuances of the patient’s distress.
Nevertheless, I feel there may be some overlap between them and my ironing 
quandary. According to their formulation, my feelings might be a function of this 
particular patient group’s perfectionism interacting with a set of intermediate ‘white 
knight’ beliefs that over-compensate for a core belief about defectiveness (which may 
be typical in therapists working in eating disorders (Waller et al. (2007)).
Elsewhere in the CBT literature on eating disorders, neither Fairbum’s (1997) 
formulation of CBT for eating disorders, nor Fairbum’s (2008) enhanced CBT (CBT- 
E) -  a transdiagnostic procedure for eating disorders -  give much emphasis to the 
dynamics of the therapeutic encounter. The latter lays out a set of attributes which will 
aid the success of the therapy -  ‘...be empathie and engaging... be professional but not 
intimidating... instill hope’ (2008, p.49) but do not encourage the therapist to be 
reflective about how the client might affect her or him.
Neither do Waller and Kennerley (2003) provide any information on the how 
therapists’ reactions to patients might be conceptualised in CBT terms. They suggest 
that ‘there are important interpersonal... issues that contribute to eating pathology’ 
(Waller & Kennerley, 2003, p.241). However, these are abstracted from the 
therapeutic relationship, even though elsewhere in the eating disorders literature there 
is convincing evidence for the existence of peculiar difficulties in therapist/ patient 
relationships -  for example Delucia-waack (1999), Satir (2009) and Schneider (1995).
Schema therapy
Schema therapy’s emphasis on the dynamics in the therapeutic relationship are central 
and explicit. Indeed it ‘alerts therapists to transference and countertransference issues’ 
(Young et a l, 2007, p.53). Moreover, the predominant differences between schema 
therapy and modem psychodynamic approaches seem to be in their delivery rather 
than their view of the aetiology of distress, the former being more directive,
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collaborative and involving homework. In this respect it is similar to the other forms 
of CBT above, but differs in its focus which is broader than the patient’s cognitions, 
affect and behaviours alone. Perhaps then it is a therapy influenced by CBT which 
could encompass an explanation of my unusual feeling in relation to my patient.
Young’s (1990) definition of ‘schema’ differs from earlier definitions in psychology, 
which referred to abstract cognitive frameworks that construct memories and 
expectations (Bartlett, 1932). The schemas addressed in schema therapy are 
necessarily maladaptive in some way and necessarily involved in the way people 
interact with each other, although they share the same developmental origins (Young 
et a l, 2007). They were also conceptualised to be constructs which interfered with 
more traditional forms of CBT (Young et a l, 2007). Young et a l  (2007) identify 18 
different maladaptive schemas, with accompanying coping styles: schema surrender, 
schema overcompensation and schema avoidance.
Since the therapeutic relationship is so central to schema work, Young et a l (2007) go 
into some detail about ways in which therapists’ schemas can interefere with the 
process of therapeutic change and also give examples of how they might interact with 
patients’ maladaptive schemas. Of particular interest to my situation is a case example 
given to illustrate the schema interplay between ‘Kenneth’ and his ‘female therapist’ 
(pp. 187-188). In this relationship the therapist’s ‘Defectiveness schema’ is triggered 
by Kenneth’s ‘Unrelenting Standards schema’. One of her coping strategies which 
overcompensates for her schema is suggested to be ‘becoming defensive or blaming’
(p. 188).
I recognise a similar dynamic in the situation I described at the start of this essay. My 
patient, I believe, has an Unrelenting Standards schema which she copes with by 
attempting to achieve perfection in her restrictive diet and unrelenting work and 
exercise patterns (a ‘surrender’ coping style’). This interacts with my Defectiveness 
schema (commonly triggered amongst trainees, I am sure., it can’t be just me, right?) 
which I try to overcompensate for by dressing smartly and becoming preoccupied 
about my preparation for her sessions.
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Another dimension of schema therapy that can shed some light on therapists’ feelings 
in the relationship is the ‘schema mode’: Young et al. (2007) explain a schema mode 
as the set of schemas, or coping responses that are working simultaneously in a person 
at any given moment. Therefore, as the person moves from one mode into another, 
different schemas or coping styles become triggered or become inactive. Accordingly, 
the presence of interacting schemas in therapist and patient can cause a therapist to 
enter a specific schema mode. One example Young et a l (2007) give is the therapist 
who slips into ‘punitive parent’ mode in reaction to her patient’s inability to complete 
homework tasks. Having a Defectiveness schema, she feels inadequate and thus 
overcompensates by becoming unhelpfully punitive. This example provides a useful 
account of the mutability of modes and thus a possible framework for the shifting 
feelings and schema activations that occur in therapy. Although my feeling towards 
my patient is fairly pervasive outside the therapy room, the concept of the schema 
modes may help me understand this feeling’s real-time ebb and flow in situ.
In addition, Leahy (2007) points out that a schematic understanding of personality can 
help to explain why different therapists elicit different reactions from the same 
patients and how certain therapists are not as liable to collude in the prolonging of 
maladaptive patterns. Indeed Leahy (2007) also suggests that some psychopathology 
results from the power of certain maladaptive schemas to elicit complementary 
behaviour in other people. It is thus the therapist’s job to interrupt the continuation of 
this interpersonal pattern. The therapist may use knowledge of their own schemas to 
better effect such an interruption. In such a way, my realisation over the ironing board 
may yet help me understand inter-schema dynamics in therapy with my patient and 
may consequently equip me to intervene in rigid patterns of thinking and behaviour 
more effectively.
Recent conceptualisations in CBT
Katzow and Safran (2007) propose that the therapeutic relationship in CBT can be 
conceptualised as an ever-evolving negotiation, to which the therapist and the patient 
necessarily bring in their own preconceptions. They view the therapist’s subjective 
reactions as invaluable -  specifically because they can enable the therapist to 
‘collaboratively explore the patient’s construal patterns with them in the moment’
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(Katzow and Safran, 2007, p. 97). Katzow and Safran (2007) also advocate 
mindfulness practice for therapists, which has been suggested to increase a therapists’ 
ability to attend not just to their own internal processes, but also distinguish between 
their own and their patients’ input into the therapeutic dynamics.
The intertwined conceptualisation of the therapeutic relationship is also influenced by 
interpersonal psychotherapy, which conceptualises countertransference as including 
not just unusual responses (such as ironing shirts), but ‘all emotional, cognitive... 
engagements experienced from the client... [which] serve as important clues to the 
client’s unsuccessful lifestyle’ (Keisler, 1982, p. 17). In interpersonal psychotherapy, 
the patient’s maladaptive interpersonal evoking style is seen as the sine qua non of 
treatment. For Katzow and Safran (2007), this evoking style can be re-conceptualised 
cognitively: maladaptive schemas have a ‘complementarity’ (Keisler, 1996); they hold 
power over other individuals’ behaviour, which then reinforces their maladaptiveness. 
Thus in my case, I may be experiencing a pull towards thinking and behaving in a way 
which is predicted by my patient’s maladaptive schema.
Prasko et a l (2010), reviewing a broad range of literature on CBT, transference and 
countertransference, have concluded that analysis of transference and 
countertransference issues should be a mandatory part of CBT provision to patients. 
They advocate that therapists address, rather than try to override, feelings towards 
patients adding that clinical supervision should be an essential part of this process, 
even providing an example of a therapist thought record. Furthermore, their literature 
review indicates that the therapist’s countertransferential feelings can be a good 
indicator of the kinds of effects that the patient can have on people outside of therapy. 
This may in turn be used to relay the interpersonal effects of their schemas to patients.
Elsewhere, Miranda and Andersen (2007) have provided a social cognitive model for 
transference influenced by attachment theory and interpersonal theory. In this model, 
mental representations of important developmental figures reside in memory, which 
are are triggered when we meet new people, who are necessarily experienced through 
the filter of these representations. Miranda and Andersen (2004) have extended this 
idea to representations of the self, which may be similarly triggered by contextual 
stimuli. Furthermore, they point to significant experimental evidence which indicates
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that this transference effect takes place with expectations of others (for example Berk 
& Andersen, 2000) and with expectations of how people expect themselves to be in 
interpersonal situations (Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). It is not a point explicitly made, 
but I might expect the same processes to be true of therapists as well as patients.
A tentative synthesis
In Figure 1 below, I have attempted to synthesise the conceptualisations of therapists’ 
feelings with an emphasis on immediate behavioural, emotional and cognitive 
processes that is central to CBT. I have also tried to incorporate something of the 
dynamics of complementary or opposing schemas that can have a powerful effect on 
the therapeutic relationship (Young et al., 2007; Katzow & Safran, 2007).
I hope to show in this figure how the patient’s schemas -  exercised in thoughts and 
then manifested in behaviours -  can be triggered by the therapist’s behaviours, and 
can in turn activate automatic thoughts in the therapist which are rooted in her or his 
own schemas. This may be particularly the case if, as in the figure, the therapist has a 
schema which is the same, or complementary to the patient’s own. However, through 
self-reflection and supervision (Prasko et ah, 2010), the therapist may come to know 
their own schemas and how they may affect the emotional and cognitive architecture 
of the patient.
The double-ended arrow that connects the schemas to the cognitions also indicates the 
process by which the therapist might hope to bring about schematic change in the 
patient -  through working in the moment at the level of cognitions, emotions and 
behaviours which are necessarily affected by her or his own cognitions, emotions and 
behaviours in the therapeutic encounter.
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Patient
SchemaSchema 2Schema
Cognitions Behaviours
Emotions
Therapist
Emotions
CognitionsBehaviours
Self-reflection/
Supervision
Schema
Figure 1: Interpersonal cognitive processes in the therapeutic relationship
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Conclusions
It has not been my aim with the quandary with which I started this essay to find a 
definitive solution, but to provide some focus to what otherwise might have been an 
unwieldy topic. Even in the few areas of CBT and schema therapy I have surveyed, 
there is a huge range of different emphases placed on therapists’ use of subjective 
feelings. Nevertheless, the underlying theoretical importance of meaning attached to 
events (Beck, 1976) connected with behaviour, emotions and different levels of 
cognitions is something common to them all. For this reason, therapists’ feelings 
about patients do not form the main part of the therapy as they might in interpersonal 
psychotherapy, but are to a lesser or greater extent thought to be important in how the 
therapist should work with the patient. At one end of the spectrum, the therapist 
should use countertransferential feelings to assess their own shortcomings and then try 
to bracket them; at the other end feelings about the patient should be thought of as an 
evoking function of their maladaptive schemas and thus play an important part in 
hypothesis formation.
In the CBT literature on eating disorders in particular, very little is said on how 
feelings towards patients may be used in the therapy, even though it is acknowledged 
(Vitousek et a l, 1998; Waller et al. 2007) that this patient group can pose 
considerable difficulties for therapists (a tension that was the starting point for the 
formulation of this topic). Nevertheless, I believe the model I have arrived at can help 
me understand some of the interpersonal dynamics between my patient and I, even if 
the therapy itself continues to focus on the restructuring cognitions relating to diet and 
weight gain.
Now, I should probably go and iron a shirt for tomorrow.
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The Body, the Book and the Organisation: Towards a Post-structuralist 
Understanding of Anorexia Nervosa and its Treatment in a Clinical Setting
Introduction
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f Mental 
Disorders, 5th Edition, published this year (APA, 2013), contains the most 
fundamental changes to the diagnostic criteria for anorexia nervosa7 since the changes 
from DSM-III (APA, 1980) to DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) were made, an event that will 
affect many of the contexts in which counselling psychologists practice. This latter 
volume set out the four criteria which remained relatively unchanged in DSM-IV-TR 
(APA, 2000) and which are commonly used today (see Figure 1 below).
A. Refusal to maintain body weight at or above a minimally normal weight for age and 
height (e.g., weight loss leading to maintenance of a body weight less than 85% of 
that expected; or a failure to make expected weight gain during a period of growth, 
leading to body weight less than 85% of that expected).
B. Intense fear of gaining weight or becoming fat, even though underweight.
C. Disturbance in the way in which one’s body weight or shape is experienced, undue 
influence of body weight or shape on self-evaluation, or denial of the seriousness of 
the current low body weight.
D. In post-menarchal females, amenorrhea, i.e., the absence of at least three 
consecutive menstrual cycles. (A woman is considered to have amenorrhea if her 
periods occur only following hormone, e.g., estrogen, administration.)
Figure 1. The DSM-IV-TR criteria for anorexia nervosa
The changes in the DSM-5 matter because, as Hebebrand and Bulik (2011) suggest, 
they will guide public, professional and experiential perceptions about anorexia
71 have not capitalised anorexia nervosa as is the practice in some psychological literature, 
because this might imply that it is a monolithic rather than socially constructed entity.
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nervosa. In addition, from a discursive perspective, they invite us to consider what 
political conditions have allowed them to take place (Hepworth, 1999). Such 
conditions, I will argue, have a direct effect on how people are positioned by being 
diagnosed with anorexia nervosa and the nature of their distress. I will illustrate this 
point with personal case material and give examples of how a post-structuralist 
framework may be used clinically. I will also explain how it has particular relevance 
for working with people who have been diagnosed with anorexia nervosa -  for, as 
Maison (1998) asserts, an analysis of patriarchal discourses’ effects on the experience 
of female embodiment is necessary to any clinical presentation of anorexic behaviour.
A brief genealogy of the construction of anorexic psychopathology8
Post-structuralism is a philosophy in which language is taken not to be representative 
of the structure of things, but as constitutive and dynamic in itself. In psychology, 
Michel Foucault’s historical analyses of language have been influential in the critique 
of the dominant discourses of positivist psychological and psychiatric treatments 
(Hepburn, 1999). Such analyses can expose diverse discourses relating to terms or 
practices whose everyday meaning is often taken for granted.
Maison (1998) proposes that dominant biomedical discourses around anorexia nervosa 
are engaged in reducing the narratives to a homogeneous subject position, in which 
there appears to be little interaction with social or political influences. This can be 
seen in the largely somatic and individualistic language of the DSM  criteria for 
anorexia nervosa, whose roots can be traced through a variety of tectonic cultural 
shifts.
Historical accounts of voluntary self-starvation date from as far back as classical 
Greece and Egypt (Bemporad, 1996). In addition, the ascetic ideal of self-starvation is 
a long-standing motif in mythology: for example, figures who starve themselves as a 
symbol of renouncing the material world can be found in Hindu tales (Mogul, 1980)
81 have not used terms like ‘psychopathology’ and ‘inpatient’ with alternative terms like 
‘distress’ and ‘client’ interchangeably, but according to the way they are employed by the 
discourses I examine. I hope not to create unnecessary confusion. Their coexistence 
exemplifies the coexistence of diverse clinical discourses employed in treatment (or therapy) 
for anorexia nervosa.
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and the Christian New Testament. However, for Cohn (1986) it is not until the Middle 
Ages when female self-starvation became analogous to modem anorexia nervosa. The 
relationship between women and religion in ‘holy anorexia’ (Bell, 1985) has been 
suggested to be parallel to the relationship between women and thinness: it manifests 
a struggle for female identity in a patriarchal culture.
Hepworth (1999), however, makes the link between women and starvation in the 
Middle Ages via women’s political inequality. Unlike men, whose property or money 
could be revoked, women’s bodies became the site of punishment and control. This 
idea is echoed in Schmidt and Treasure’s (2006) current conceptualisation of anorexia 
nervosa, in which the drive for control is cited as the core psychopathology of 
anorexia nervosa rather than an overvaluation on body image or weight, as is 
proposed by other experts (for example Fairbum, 2008). Another significant shift 
(Erenreich & English, 1979) during the Middle Ages was the transformation of 
representations of self-starvation from being holy to being deceitful and dangerous. 
This, Hepworth (1999) suggests, paved the way for the witch-hunts in the 15th and 
16th centuries and ultimately for the clinical control of women’s madness in the 18th 
and 19th centuries.
Foucault’s (1971) seminal analysis of the construction of madness as the antithesis of 
reason and its subsequent control under medical rather than religious authority has 
been employed by Hepworth (1999) in her explanation of the ‘discovery’ of anorexia 
nervosa. In 1874, pervasiveness of the ‘medical gaze’, in Foucault’s terms (Rabinow, 
1984a), allowed previously private aspects of family life and women’s eating habits to 
be controlled by medical authority. That anorexia nervosa was seen as an ‘extension 
of female irrationality’ (Hepworth, 1999, p.29) can also be demonstrated by its 
original appellations -  apepsia hysterica (Gull, 1874) and anorexia hystérique 
(Laseque, 1873). Hysteria, whose etymology is derived from the Greek word for 
uterus, was originally believed to be due to unruly wanderings of a woman’s womb, 
and the discourse that surrounded it is commonly theorised in feminist and post­
structuralist critiques (Foucault, 1971; Showalter, 1987) to have been employed in the 
pathologisation and control of women. The function of this médicalisation of anorexia 
nervosa was also to stifle discourses relating to resistance that would surface in 
feminist literature a century later (Hepworth, 1999).
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Figure 2. Un cas de anorexia hystérique (Gasne, 1900)
The photographs above in Figure 2, taken of a patient from the Pitié-Salpêtrière 
Hospital in Paris at the end of the 19th century, exemplify the médicalisation of self- 
starvation. The woman is presented nude -  from the front and back -  so that no part of 
her can escape the medical gaze. As onlookers we are invited to take part in the 
depersonalisation and somaticisation that allow her to be labelled ‘Un cas\
The diversification of clinical knowledge into the realms of philosophical and social 
academe that took place in the second half of the 20th century enabled a new range of 
discourses around anorexia nervosa, even in the context of the still dominant medical
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discourse (Hepworth, 1999). Feminist theory (for example Orbach, 1978) challenged 
this medical supremacy, mobilising discourse around patriarchy and resistance. 
Indeed, it was theorised that a resurgence in eating disorders had occurred due a new 
manifestation of patriarchal suppression, as evidenced through media images.
Interestingly, the historical accounts above stand in direct opposition to what Maison 
(1998) describes as the rhetoric of anorexia as a modem disease, which is propped up 
by the popular discourse of thinness and the media. Furthermore, the recent and 
copious emergence of the literature documenting historical cases of anorexia 
(Bemporad, 1996) may be indicative of a discursive shift away from this hitherto 
popular view. Nevertheless, it is difficult to dispute that discourses around anorexia 
nervosa have branched out in the second half of the 20th century -  through 
psychoanalytic theories, which conceptualised anorexia nervosa as a rejection of adult 
femininity (Dally & Gomez, 1979); through systemic investigation (Minuchin, 
Rosman & Baker, 1978), which theorised the adolescent body as a locus for families’ 
distress; and through socio-cultural accounts (Bruch, 1974), which considered the 
effects on identity of the growing public profile of anorexia nervosa. Crucially, the 
emergence of the body as an object of interest in social and post-structuralist debate 
(Turner, 1982) may have delimited anorexic identity such that traditional medical 
discourses of control have been weakened. The changes to the DSM-5 diagnostic 
criteria may reflect this process.
What might the DSM-5 revisions signify?
Perhaps the most marked of the changes from DSM-IV-TR to the DSM-5 in anorexia 
nervosa is the omission of criterion D (see Figure 2) which details the absence of 
menstrual activity necessary for anorexia nervosa diagnosis in post-menarchal (and 
presumably pre-menopausal) women.
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A. Restriction of food intake relative to caloric requirements leading to the 
maintenance of a body weight less than a minimally normal weight for age and 
height (e.g., weight loss leading to maintenance of body weight less than 85% of 
that expected; or failure to make expected weight gain during period of growth, 
leading to body weight less than 85% of that expected).
B. Intense fear of gaining weight or becoming fat, even though underweight, or 
persistent behavior to avoid weight gain, even though underweight.
C. Disturbance in the way in which one's body weight or shape is experienced, undue 
influence of body weight or shape on self-evaluation, or persistent lack of 
recognition of the seriousness of the current low body weight.
Figure 3. The DSM-5 criteria for anorexia nervosa (APA, 2013)
Some critics have welcomed this change on the grounds of experimental evidence 
which indicates that significant proportions of women who do not meet the criteria for 
diagnosis on the grounds of menstrual activity do not differ in other areas of 
psychopathology or response to treatment (Watson & Andersen, 2003). Others 
(Hebebrand & Bulik, 2011) argue that criterion D effectively omits women who use 
contraceptives, although they do suggest that other criteria should take better account 
of other somatic symptoms.
Such critiques about criterion D’s validity emanate from within the same biomedical 
discourse: in effect they suggest revisions and problems which imply that a definitive 
physical indicators of anorexia nervosa are necessary for diagnosis per se. However, 
for the purposes of a post-structuralist analysis, it is helpful to consider more diverse 
discourses.
Evolutionary theory has also been deployed in a biomedical discourse of reproductive 
ability which rendered same-sex activity pathological in earlier editions of the DSM  
(APA, 1968) and continues to sideline it, or present it as a genetic byproduct 
(Futuyma & Risch, 1983; Muscarella, 2006). The same discourse has, I believe, been 
implicated in the continued existence of criterion D in the DSM-IV-TR's description of 
anorexia nervosa. As used to be the case with the DSM s  definition of homosexuality,
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lack of reproductive ability is viewed as pathological in someone who is of an age to 
reproduce: indeed the diagnosis of anorexia nervosa hangs on a measure of 
reproductive ability. This reproductive discourse also ties into the biopower discourse 
which came about in the 19th century and which ascribed to medical authority the 
‘power over life’ (Rabinow, 1984b, p.258).
That behaviour which induces lack of reproductive health is interpreted unequally 
according to gender can be illustrated by the following exercise. The criteria for 
alcohol dependence are shown in Figure 4 below.
A maladaptive pattern of alcohol use, leading to clinically significant impairment or 
distress, as manifested by the following, occurring at any time in the same 12-month 
period.
A. Tolerance, as defined by either of the following:
a) a need for markedly increased amounts of the substance to achieve 
intoxication or desired effect
b) markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same amount of the 
substance
B. Withdrawal, as manifested by either of the following:
a) alcohol withdrawal syndrome
b) alcohol is taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms
C. There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control alcohol 
use
D. In post-pubertal males, infertility i.e., oligozoospermia, asthenozoospermia, 
teratozoospermia, or necrozoospermia in three consecutive semen analyses
Figure 4. Criteria for alcohol dependence -  adapted from the DSM-IV-TR
Criteria A to C above are adapted from the DSM-IV-TR for substance dependence. 
Criterion D has, I hope, caused a degree of surprise: it is made up. It was my 
hypothesis that reading about a physical and invasive measure used in the service of 
pathologising men might seem strange. Yet exactly such a measure is used to 
diagnose women with anorexia nervosa. It is common for men who are dependent on 
alcohol to have low sperm count and decreased fertility (Muthusami & Chinnaswamy, 
2005), yet this lack of reproductive ability does not feature as a criterion for
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psychiatric diagnosis. As Spitzer (1981) has shown of archaic pathological 
conceptualisations of ‘homosexuality’, the application of physical reproductive 
markers to gauge mental illness and the enterprise of classification in 
psychopathology can be seen to be value laden.
Another change from the DSM-IV-TR to the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria is the wording 
of criterion A (see Figures 1 and 3 above). Hebebrand and Bulik describe how they 
welcome the shift in language away from ‘refusal and denial, for which empirical 
evidence was lacking and which conveyed a paternalistic and pejorative attitude’
(2011, p.667). This in itself is interesting since their article is written from a positivist 
empirical perspective: that the disavowal of paternalistic attitudes has bled into 
positivist literature might be considered to be indicative of a discursive shift. 
Certainly, it is difficult to imagine such an assertion a half a century earlier.
Overall, the omission of criterion D from the DSM-5 diagnosis of anorexia nervosa 
and the shift towards less patriarchal language might be indicative of a shift of power 
around the diagnosis. Indeed the factors like emergence of charities like Men Get 
Eating Disorders Too (www.mengetedstoo.co.ukl may make have empowered the 
discourse in which the greater gender equality of the DSM-5 diagnosis has been 
constructed. However, it is important to focus on how these changes may impact 
counselling psychologists and how historical discourses may still impact clients and 
clinicians because of how they are positioned by the organisations which employ or 
treat them.
Competing discourses within the panopticon
One criticism that has been levelled at post-structuralist approaches to human distress 
is that they have little clinical applicability (for example Holmes, 2001) and that even 
the most powerful post-structuralist accounts of anorexia nervosa, like Malson’s 
(1998), do not go quite far enough in their infiltration of clinical work (Bray, 1999). In 
view of this, I shall attempt first to refine how post-structuralist theory might be used, 
then demonstrate how it has informed my work with Maria (a subject composed from 
composite case material for the sake of confidentiality), a 20-year-old inpatient at an 
eating disorders unit.
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Luepnitz (1992) suggests that post-structuralist deconstruction is essentially negative 
and cannot comprise solutions or some of the creative interpersonal aspect which have 
been shown to be so useful in psychological therapy. A similar philosophical 
quandary is outlined by Hepworth (1999): if a post-structuralist framework is adopted 
as a framework for therapy, it becomes part of the kind of institutional practice it must 
challenge. Indeed, Foucault’s work (Rabinow, 1984b) deconstructs therapeutic 
practice per se. In addition, there can be little room for the experience of individuality 
in the Foucauldian individual, who is no more than a product of different discourses 
(Hollway, 1989).
White & Epston’s (1990) narrative therapy aims to unravel the individual from 
restrictive discourses and externalise the problem. In the field of anorexia nervosa, a 
person would not be viewed as ‘having anorexia’; instead, ‘anorexia has “ them” 
(Lock et aL, 2005). Churven (2008) has criticised narrative therapy for being too 
focussed on the individual cognitions in its application. Perhaps, as Hepworth (1999) 
describes, this is an inherent problem of adopting post-structuralist theory as therapy, 
due to the nature of (at least most types) therapy as an individualistic enterprise.
However, if post-structuralism is adopted to inform therapy^ accounts of how people 
have come to be diagnosed with anorexia nervosa can be examined, and alternative 
positions can be identified within the discursive terrain of the patient’s gender, family 
and context of treatment. Post-structuralism informing rather than as therapy should 
also avoid the problematic philosophical grounding (Luepnitz, 1992) and inattention 
to physical starvation effects (Churven, 2008) for which narrative therapy has been 
criticised.
In order for this process to work, I believe the therapist must assess how he or she, in 
addition to the client, is positioned by discourses and how these may work 
intersubjectively. For example, the primary therapeutic model the therapist uses (in 
my case cognitive-behavioural) is likely to be recommended by clinical guidelines 
(for example NICE, 2004). This should give the therapist a clue about what the 
dominant discourses around treatment are and to a lesser or greater extent what goals 
the therapist and client together may realistically be able to work towards.
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Perhaps a helpful metaphor for the Foucauldian subject is a stained glass window, 
which at any one time is both an assembly of fragments and a unique Gestalt. The 
client may experience the latter as identity, but may also experience the tension 
between the fragments as distress. The therapist may experience her- or himself in 
both parallel forms (a collection of discursive parts and a Gestalt) through self- 
awareness, learning and interpersonal awareness. Ultimately the therapeutic 
relationship may bring about a process of identity negotiation in which the discursive 
fragments which cause the patient distress become a less integral part of the Gestalt.
In practice, this might entail the identification and deconstruction of situations in 
which the patient experiences distress. These may be experienced as social, 
interpersonal or intrapersonal and may be dislodged in whatever language is clinically 
appropriate. For example, in the cognitive behavioural paradigm, the jostling of 
discourses which create subjective distress might be framed as maladaptive thinking 
styles, or cognitive traps. The extra dimension that post-structuralist thinking can 
bring is the idea of the constructed subject, and thus rejection of the humanistic idea 
of the sovereign individual (Maison, 1998). This can encourage therapists to consider 
how clients experience themselves in different situations -  outside therapy, in their 
families and in the wake of greater political forces.
The primary foci of Maria’s care within the inpatient ward are weight gain and a 
degree of movement within her psychological state. In fact the consultant psychiatrist 
where I work has stated that rather than assessing normal weight by BMI bands -  as is 
commonly the practice elsewhere (Fairbum, 2008) -  he prefers to judge inpatients’ 
progress by the return of their menstrual cycle, a measure which directly links to the 
kinds of discourses around normalisation of femininity highlighted above.
Another feature of the inpatient setting is the regular ward round in which inpatients 
are invited to be interviewed in a room surrounded by over a dozen nurses, 
psychologists, dieticians, occupational therapists, specialty doctors and medical 
students, some of whom they may never have met. From a Foucauldian perspective 
such a practice constructs a medical panopticon: a technology of the normalising 
discourse of médicalisation, where the recidivism of the individual (Bell, 2006) allows
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the organisation to imprison her (I am reminded of the circumstances in which Figure 
2 above was produced). Indeed, after Maria has ‘been presented’ (the jargon of the 
organisation) in the ward round, there is a discussion of how much leave should be 
given to her and when she might be discharged. Frequently inpatients dispute to the 
expert advice which is given to them regarding their freedom to walk, see family or go 
shopping and more often than not they acquiesce to the clinicians’ consensus.
The ward round serves as an example of how both Maria and I are positioned by 
different discourses in different situations under the umbrella of the same 
organisation. In therapy, Maria is engaged, eloquent and sometimes emotional, 
whereas in the ward round she is laconic, uncommunicative and even dismissive. 
Clearly, these are broad characterisations of how she can be in these two situations, 
but they point to the fact that different discourses are positioning her according to how 
they are evoked in different power situations.
Crucially, I am also positioned differently by these different situations. In the ward 
round I become another set of eyes monitoring the perimeter of the panopticon, 
whereas in individual therapy my identity is constructed by more current discourses of 
collaboration and therapist/ client equality which dominate the cognitive behavioural 
modality in which I work (Padesky & Greenburger, 1995). The process by which I 
can sense the different subjective positions is by monitoring my own reactions, such 
as, ‘This feels like a safe environment’, ‘Why do I feel I can’t say anything? I should 
be advocating for Maria in this hostile environment’, or ‘I’m glad Maria’s been able to 
connect that core belief to the way she interprets other peoples’ actions.’
With Maria, a discursive approach to considering how she has come to be in the 
situation she is in can begin to make sense of the multiple and often conflicting 
subjectivities she (and I) inhabit. A recent session began with her telling me about 
something she had done during the week of which she was ashamed. She thought that 
I might have heard about it from other staff on the ward already, but in a way that did 
not represent what she had experienced. By thinking about my role (at least as it might 
appear to her) in the organisation, I was encouraged to explore the function of what 
she had said. What power dynamics might she have felt subject to in order to ‘own up’ 
like this? Was she communicating with discursive fragments that constructed me as
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an operative of the system and as a man at that point? That was how I felt. Had this 
added to her uncomfortable sense of shame? This might be elicited through 
exploration of her experience of being an inpatient and of the therapeutic relationship.
Two further examples here might show how competing discourses are located in 
Maria and how this contributes to her distress. She is currently successfully gaining 
weight, yet she feels like she is failing to succeed as an anorexic. Here, I feel that the 
medical discourse about healthy weight may be conflicting with a variety of different 
discourses: the cultural discourse within her family of the need to achieve perfection; 
the cultural discourse of resistance within the inpatients that is reactive to patriarchal 
hegemony (Bell, 2006; Boughtwood & Halse, 2008); and the popular discourse of the 
ideal feminine body (Maison, 1998).
Finally, it is worth noting that the emphasis of Maria’s treatment being twofold 
(physical and psychological) is itself indicative of what Churven (2008) sees as the 
pervading legacy of the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy. This discourse perhaps 
legitimises the clinical focus on the restoration of her menstrual cycle, the current 
absence of which is less of a worry to her (at least in how s he has talked about it to 
me) than the emotional isolation which is to some extent exacerbated by her status as 
an inpatient. The recent revisions to the DSM  criteria for anorexia nervosa may or may 
not change the clinical focus for inpatients like Maria but, as I have described above, 
they reflect and may bring about discursive shifts. As a counselling psychologist, I 
believe it is helpful to be aware of how these discursive shifts position Maria and 
others like her in how they experience their ‘symptoms’. I also believe that having a 
post-structuralist view of diagnostic taxonomies has helped me navigate these shifts.
By addressing the discourses that construct Maria’s ‘psychopathology’ and her 
position as an ‘inpatient’, she and I may reposition her subjectivity and anticipate the 
intersection of these and other discourses once she is discharged -  a situation which 
may yet bring about another set of problems for the construction of her identity 
(Boughtwood & Halse, 2008). She has talked about a fear of dependency, which she 
relates to the effects of previous relationships in her life, but which may also be 
currently reinforced by the dependency the inpatient institutions foster. In this 
situation it may not only be helpful for us to address how she will address feelings of
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dependency that are considered normal in the coming months and years, but also on 
the idiosyncratic manifestations of her struggle within therapy and the institution.
Implications for counselling psychology practice
By exploring the kinds of dilemma described above, counselling psychologists might 
espouse a cognitive behavioural framework but with an added dimension of 
sensitivity. In order for this to be the case, we have to be aware of the effects that this 
framework may have. For example, an emphasis on physical and behavioural progress 
feels uncomfortable because it jars with Maria’s sense of herself at the moment. 
However, the individual focus (and thus different ontological status) of cognitive 
behavioural therapy is not necessarily unworkable in a broader post-structuralist view 
because, pragmatically speaking, it is a dominant discourse within which Maria may 
feel important psychological progress. It may also prepare her to continue to alleviate 
her distress in environments in which individualistic discourses are common: the idea 
of individual is, for example, essential to the laws, healthcare provision and dominant 
spiritual discourses of the UK (Maison, 1998).
A post-structuralist perspective may also encourage counselling psychologists to 
view the ends towards which they work with caution. As I have hoped to show 
through the analysis of the absence, presence and removal of criteria,and categories in 
the DSM  iterations. The alleviation of these criteria as a sine qua non is a 
demonstrably value-driven enterprise: it may also conflict with the agendas of 
organisations and the subjective identities of the therapist and client. Such battles, and 
the discourses which produce them, are physically embodied by Maria and others. 
They also embroil the clinicians involved in their care.
In addition, successive revisions of taxonomic criteria may present clues for clinicians 
about the discursive framework in which their work is situated. I also believe that 
(even though an explicit discussion of these revisions has yet to come into my work 
with Maria), as Charland (2005) suggests, the democtratisation of diagnostic terms 
through the internet will embolden people’s constructions of their own diagnoses. As 
counselling psychologists who value idiosyncratic experience over hegemonic ideas 
of psychopathology, we need to keep up with this process.
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Conclusions
The recent changes from DSM-IV-TR to DSM-5 in the criteria for anorexia nervosa 
matter becuase they reflect and construct a cultural shift. The awareness of this shift 
and other discourses that impact inpatients and clinicians at a subjective level may be 
helpfully encompassed by a post-structuralist view of subjectivity and clinical 
practices.
This view has theoretical validity given the lack of evidence that exists for the 
effectiveness of any one traditional therapeutic modality in its pure form and the 
prevalence and depth of post-structuralist literature on women and eating diagnoses. 
This view may also be used in a way that enriches existing therapeutic approaches 
rather than simply deconstructing them.
For clinicians working in an inpatient or multidisciplinary setting, adopting a post­
structuralist view necessitates making sense of their own shifting allegiances and 
pressures. Perhaps counselling psychologists, being trained with an emphasis on use 
of self, cultural awareness and discursive psychology, may be well suited to take up 
such a challenge. Perhaps also the juxtaposition of the post-structuralist concept of 
subjectivity and the humanistic idea of sovereign individualism (Maison, 1998) that 
underpins the conduct of the organisations in which counselling psychologists tend to 
work presents an impasse. However, this is a dilemma with which Counselling 
Psychology has engaged in its development (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2003) and which 
perhaps now merit further exploration.
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Therapeutic Practice Dossier
In the clinical paper which follows, I have described some of the ways I feel my 
clinical practice has changed and examples of the kind of situations I have learnt from. 
These -  and the work appended in the Portfolio Attachment and log books -  have 
arisen in the context of the five different clinical placements I have had over the last 
three years.
Learning to communicate
My first clinical placement took place in a learning disabilities service in Greater 
London. Having previously volunteered in an inpatient learning disabilities service 
before I started the doctoral training, I was keen to continue working with this 
population. I had become familiar with some of the stigma and lack of access to 
psychological services people with learning disabilities face (for example Dormer et 
ah, 20109) and also the benefit of non-judgemental interaction and attention to 
specific needs. The person-centred paradigm seemed like a good fit to engage with 
this issues therapeutically.
This multidisciplinary service comprised a consultant psychologist, a counselling 
psychologist (my supervisor), language therapists, occupational therapists and 
specialist nurses. The client group contained people with a range of severity of 
learning disabilities -  from mild to profound. All the clients lived with their families 
or in assisted living quarters and had been referred to the psychology service by 
psychiatrists, neurologists and social workers. They were then assessed for suitability 
for talking therapy by my supervisor or me.
As well as working in a person-centred modality in this placement I was fortunate 
enough to have other opportunities for clinical development. For example, I was given 
the opportunity to integrate some cognitive behavioural work -  particularly with one
9 A paper written by the psychologist who supervised me in this volunteering role.
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client who was suffering from insomnia. This was done with sleep records, by 
exploring her rules and beliefs around sleep and by putting alternatives strategies to 
the test (Erdinger & Carney, 2008). With one non-verbal client, I conducted a 
functional behavioural observation and engaged with other members of the 
multidisplinary team members in designing therapeutic changes in her environment. I 
also delivered psycho-educational training sessions about sensitive communication for 
staff working in local residential homes.
In addition, I took on an analysis of quality of life data collected from the services 
clients over a two year period. This involved an inferential statistical analysis of the 
data and interpretation of findings. I presented this at a borough-wide team meeting. It 
was also used by my supervisor in subsequent meetings.
This placement was only available for one day per week, so in addition I was able to 
take on a day at an Asperger syndrome service located in a different London borough. 
Here, I was responsible for conducting assessments and counselling people. Referrals 
either came from an adjoined employment service, or from the borough’s learning 
disability service. The clients were mainly male and many of them had only recently 
been diagnosed with Asperger syndrome even though many of them are in their 30s 
and 40s.
I found this work challenging, particularly because of the communication difficulties 
that are often inherent in naïve interaction with people with autistic spectrum 
disorders. Supervision (my supervisor here was a counselling psychologist) was 
essential in growing to understand that concrete expression was essential. On 
reflection, I now feel that the person-centred model was very well-suited to these 
circumstances, because to some extent communication which was too much 
characterised in vagueness, impersonality, or my own idiosyncracies would have been 
impossible. I found myself thinking a great deal about Rogers’s sixth core condition 
(1957) -  the communication of empathie understanding and unconditional positive 
regard to the client. Prouty’s work on person-centred ‘pre-therapy’ (Prouty, 2007; Van 
Werde & Prouty, 2007) for people with learning disabilities was also instructive here 
(as it was also for my work at the learning disabilities service).
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At the Asperger syndrome service, I also had the opportunity to co-facilitate two post­
diagnostic groups for men, as well as learn how to administer, score and write reports 
based on the WAIS-IV (Wechsler, 2008). In addition, due to the difficulties some of 
the clients had in getting themselves to therapy unassisted, I found myself interacting 
a great deal with parents and carers at both of the placements I have described. This 
necessitated concision and clarity when explaining therapeutic aims, techniques and 
progress and particular care with confidentiality. Again, supervision was essential in 
this regard.
Learning to use myself
I also had two placements in my second year of training. The first was in a specialist 
psychotherapy service for in Greater London. Here, the patients all came from the 
borough in which the service is situated and had often already had shorter term 
therapy. Most were deemed to have undergone severe and enduring mental distress. 
They were assessed by the consultant psychotherapist (my supervisor) over two one 
and a half hour sessions then referred on for long-term psychodynamic therapy, which 
lasted 12 months. Supervision took place weekly for one and a half hours along with 
either one or two other trainees.
Here, I felt a considerable shift from my therapeutic work in my first year. The focus 
in the psychotherapy service was entirely on the psychodynamic therapy and the 
nature of the therapeutic relationship. Although in my first year placements I had paid 
attention to communication in the therapeutic relationship, this work felt like it shifted 
a stage further into the intersubjective realm -  a realm which also necessitated further 
exploration of the therapeutic instrument (me) in personal therapy. In fact, my 
psychodynamic therapist from this time and supervisor from this placement are both 
figures whom I have to some extent internalised. The ability to go back to these potent 
internalised objects -  particularly when it comes to infringement of boundaries, 
confusion and attack -  has and, I think, will remain an important element of my 
therapeutic work.
Supervision here was also a forum in which helpful papers were introduced. In 
particular, I found literature by Bion (1984), Casement (1990) and Steiner (2011) of
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great interest. Crucially also, the connection between theory and practice was 
explicitly discussed, the foremost propositions emerging that one does not get caught 
up in theory while engaging in the process; and that interpersonal process should 
always take precedent over verbal content. It was in the context of this placement that 
Process Report 4 (to be found in the Portfolio Attachment) was written.
Unfortunately this service became threatened with closure a few months after I had 
started, and because I was thus unable to take on more patients (the waiting list had 
been cut off), I decided to find another placement for one day per week in which I 
would be able to work psychodynamically. This materialised in the form of a 
community mental health team (CMHT) in the Home Counties, where my supervisor 
(a counselling psychologist) was keen to take on a trainee to do just that.
Here, clients were referred by CPs and local mental health charities. They were all 
assessed by the team psychiatrist and their suitability for psychological therapy is 
determined. At this point, my supervisor determined which patients will benefit from 
long-term psychodynamic therapy. Supervision was one to one and took place for one 
hour every week. In practice, the feel of this placement was very different. Compared 
to the focus and quiet of the psychotherapy service, the CMHT seemed busy and even 
chaotic -  being filled with different types of clinicians providing different therapies 
and services. I had the opportunity to present and discuss my formulations and 
thoughts to community psychiatric nurses and the team psychiatrist, and was also 
encouraged to work a little more integratively.
My therapeutic work with the client I worked with for the longest time on this 
placement encouraged me to pursue further work with people diagnosed with eating 
disorders. Her distress had become manifested in entrenched eating and vomiting 
practices but were also, I believed, rooted in the shame of a series of developmental 
crises. I was interested to see what different conceptualisations the cognitive 
behavioural paradigm might provide.
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Learning to collaborate
My third year placement was been in an eating disorders service in Greater London 
for two days per week. The service comprised an inpatient and outpatient wing: I 
worked in both. In the inpatient unit patients were predominantly diagnosed with 
anorexia nervosa and admitted (sometimes under section 3 of the Mental Health Act) 
on the basis of what were considered to be a dangerously low weights. Individual 
therapists were allotted on the basis of availability and included people who worked 
psychodynamically, systemically, cognitive behaviourally, and with art and music 
therapy. I was supervised by a senior clinical psychologist for my work with 
inpatients and I worked in a cognitive behavioural modality.
There was a long waiting list for the outpatient service, where people were allotted to 
group or individual therapy on the basis of new and previous assessments. The 
outpatient service dealt with people diagnosed with anorexia nervosa, bulimia 
nervosa, binge eating disorder and eating disorder not otherwise specified. Outpatients 
were also seen every couple of months by a medic in the same service and sometimes 
by dieticians and the team family therapist. My work with outpatients was also 
cognitive behavioural and supervised by the team’s principal counselling 
psychologist. In addition, I worked with one outpatient systemically in conjunction 
with the family therapist (who also supervised me for this piece of worked). Finally, I 
received supervision for a group I co-facilitated by another counselling psychologist 
within the service.
Like the CMHT where I worked the previous year, this felt like busy and pressured 
environment. I saw four of five patients per day at some points and was also involved 
in other placement activities like ward rounds (which I refer to in The Body, The Book 
and the Organisation earlier and in the paper which follows, A Contemporary 
Assembly o f My Clinical Identity) and multidisciplinary care plan meetings. I also 
found myself producing a lot more written work than in previous placements: 
psychology reports, referral letters, assessment letters, closing letters and the day-to- 
day literature of cognitive behavioural session preparation. It was in the context of this 
placement that I wrote Process Report 5 (located in the Portfolio Attachment).
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With both outpatient and inpatient work, Fairbum’s (2008) transdiagnostic cognitive 
behavioural manual was the basis for treatment, but particularly with the inpatients, a 
degree of flexibility was encouraged by both supervisors -  especially since the 
National Institute of Clinical Excellence guidelines (NICE, 2004) for anorexia nervosa 
describe no standout treatment protocol. In practice, this has meant that I was 
encouraged to use classic cognitive reframing (for example Padesky, 1994) and 
emotional regulation (Linehan, 1993) techniques, as well as schema therapy (Young et 
ah, 2007) to inform my ongoing formulations. Happily, I was able to rehearse new 
techniques in supervision.
During my third year placement -  while working broadly within a cognitive 
behavioural framework - 1 also felt that, where appropriate, I had the opportunity to 
use therapeutic skills learned previously in addition to some of the newer techniques 
listed here. In a way, the collaborative nature of cognitive behavioural work (in 
supervision and therapy) has made this possible. In addition, I felt exposed in earnest 
to the multidisciplinary organisation in which I was placed, which necessitated the 
communication of formulations and ideas conceived in cognitive behavioral terms to 
clinicians working in different modalities (and vice versa).
I wrote above that I had hoped to improve my understanding of eating disorders 
through cognitive behavioural practice and theory. I do believe this happened, and in 
particular it was encouraging to see some symptom change -  especially in the bulimia 
group I co-facilitated. Moreover, this was a placement where a lot of my thinking 
about post-structuralism, about the nature of diagnosis, or ‘illness’, and about my 
place in peoples’ treatment continued to come together: for in the literature, the 
inpatient ward and anorexia (perhaps even more than other ‘female malady’ 
(Showalter, 1987)) are politically charged domains. This thinking is expounded in the 
Academic Dossier above, in the Research Dossier below and, in addition to some 
other points of change and development, in the following paper.
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A Contemporary Assembly of My Clinical Identity 
The Rings of Saturn
The central task in writing a final clinical paper is to create a meaningful account of 
one’s clinical development as a counselling psychologist -  particularly over the three 
years spent training. One way of creating such and account might be to track 
chronologically a linear progress and augmentation of knowledge and practice 
exemplified through written work rooted in successive clinical encounters. However,
I found myself wondering whether such a chronological narrative would capture the 
rich farrago of influences have contributed to my clinical work. I also wondered 
whether a definitive account could encompass the ambiguity about ontology, 
knowledge and scientific practice whose examination has been a rich seam of my 
learning.
Therefore, in this account I have attempted to go beyond standard, primary clinical 
sources and to delve into diverse secondary, tertiary and quaternary sources -  these 
are the interactions with people and literature behind the work I have submitted, some 
of the social processes that have governed these interactions and clues about the 
nature of things in which the therapeutic relationship is situated10. In order to illustrate 
points of clinical development I will allude to and quote from the books, whose titles I 
have used as headings; my personal journal; conversations with my patients11; 
conversations with my supervisors; conversations in course-related groups; media
101 hope to reflect this process by my use of footnotes. The footnotes in this paper (as here) 
are either comments on the main text, or auxiliary data that spin off from or inform 
information therein. The use of footnotes is a deliberate attempt to reproduce the 
multidimensional nature of clinical experience and how these different dimensions may 
interject (and be read) contemporaneously).
II Debates about whether to use the word ‘patient’, ‘client’, or ‘service user’ for someone 
engaging in psychological therapy are abundant (McGuire-Snieckus et ah, 2003; McLaughlin, 
2009). My preference is for the word ‘patient’, with its etymology inpatiens (from the Latin 
verb ‘suffer’, or ‘endure’) rather than ‘client’ (deriving from cliens, meaning ‘dependent’): a 
term that I associate with the inequitable client/patron relationships of Ancient Rome. Where I 
refer to specific people, I have tried to avoid using such appellations altogether.
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outside what is traditionally considered academic psychological literature; and other 
personal historical experiences. The format for this paper has been influenced by the 
German writer W. G. Sebald -  particularly The Rings o f Saturn12 (2002), a non-linear 
and free-associating account of discovery that, when I began to write this paper, 
reminded me of my journey as a clinician.
This account is systematic inasmuch as it is organised around the questions ‘what 
have been the nodes of change that have influenced my practice?’ and ‘what has felt 
important?’ Moreover, it does not present a fossilised account of self-improvement, 
because I am constructing this paper now {now being itself a patchwork of moments, 
places and memories amongst which the only common element is perhaps the laptop 
on which these words are tapped in). This reflects my view not only that any account 
is refracted through the present -  a stance that is partly captured by Croce’s well- 
known maxim, ‘All history is contemporary history’ (cited in Allan, 1972, p.95) -  but 
equally that everything contemporary is historical.
Psychic Retreats
At the moment, I co-facilitate a psychology group for outpatients diagnosed with 
bulimia nervosa. It is a relatively manualised and psycho-educational group, which 
encourages commitment, openness to change and work outside the group. This week, 
one of the five group members became dismissive of the group and of the possibility 
of change through cognitive behavioural techniques. Discussing this with the other co­
facilitator after, I found we had both experienced similar dilemmas: how might we 
make this member feel that she could be heard; what could we do with our urges to be 
punitive towards her; how might we protect the rest of the group; and how might we 
still encourage openness and rekindle a sense of faith in the model and the group? 
Also, how might we do this in the context of a group whose agenda is not primarily 
experiential?
12 The heading ‘The Rings of Saturn’ above alludes to the idea that what can seem like a 
beautiful and integrated Gestalt is in fact the product, with a closer focus, of fragmentation 
(astronomers believe that Saturn’s rings were created by the shattering of a moon that was too 
close to its gravitationally potent neighbour). Sebald’s emphasis is on the beauty of 
dilapidation and destruction, whereas mine is more on fragmentation and the illusion of 
wholeness.
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Fortunately, we were able to explore some of these questions in supervision. In 
addition, I felt that I would be able to draw on some of my own experience from co- 
facilitating a support group in my first year placement for men recently diagnosed 
with Asperger’s syndrome -  a group in which explicit, structured and concise 
description of agenda process was helpful (Weiss & Lunsky, 2010). However, at the 
moment I describe above, I also found myself experiencing a more subtle and 
insidious sense of confusion.
I experienced the same confusion during my second year placement when I was in a 
complex cases psychotherapy service. I was working with a 42-year-old woman, 
Lindsay, who had been referred after a psychotic episode as a result of which she had 
been sectioned and spent two weeks in hospital. My formulation was (in brief) that, 
partly because Lindsay had been brought up by a depressed, alcoholic father and an 
emotionally invalidating mother, ‘Omnipotent forces [had been] mounted to create a 
retreat organized in a psychotic way in defiance of reality’ (Steiner, 1993, p.64). In 
therapy, this meant that Lindsay related to me as a part object; my interventions were 
often ignored, or submerged by what seemed like torrents of speech in what I believe 
were unconscious attacks on what she perceived to be incursions of an unbearable 
reality.
In supervision, when talking about my experience with Lindsay, I remember 
becoming unusually confused, particularly when my supervisor asked me why I 
thought I had become confused. Over the next half an hour or so, during which I felt 
fragile and exposed, we were then able to analyse what had been happening in the 
therapy and what was happening to me in supervision. Eventually, what had felt like 
an overwhelming and amorphous feeling was able to be labelled as confusion and we 
were able to hypothesise that it might be understood as a dissociation in defense 
against her unconscious attack (Kemberg, 1987) and to some extent an identification 
with the powerlessness that she was projecting (projective identification, (Bion, 1967) 
being a key mechanism of the psychotic part of the personality).
I also realise that this mirrors the process which I am encouraging people to 
comprehend in the bulimia group. One of the techniques that is recognised to be 
helpful is constructing a chain analysis (which may be thoughts, behaviours, feelings
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physical and affective) around bingeing (Safer et ah, 2009). This is effected by 
slowing down (contemporaneously or post hoc) an anxiety-related chunk of 
experience13. The benefit is theorised to be that people are able to deconstruct what is 
going on into manageable fragments, some of which they may be able to challenge 
cognitively, or at least understand better functionally and aetiologically. What is 
previously experienced as ‘autopilot’, or an indomitable urge may become explicable. 
Such a transformation is also lubricated by theory. Terms like ‘thought’, ‘behaviour’ 
and ‘feeling’ themselves compartmentalise and name experience. The process of 
examination of this experience is also essentially reflexive.
In the same way, the analysis of my confusion that began with an experiential 
awareness of the therapeutic process in supervision was also cemented by theory and 
has become a point of reflexive learning that can inform me in the therapeutic 
relationship. The consideration and use of my experience has thus been a node of 
change in my clinical development, which also continues to be calibrated by my 
experience in personal therapy.
I am writing here about naming -  or attempting to name -  what is happening in the 
therapeutic relationship. Any attempt to get to truth of experience with language may 
be thought to be imperfect and bring with it only a symbolic reality (Lacan, 1977) but 
also, I have found, has required a trust in my own ability to contain the often difficult 
notions that I have been trying to name. For me this trust has grown through the 
experience and subsequent analysis of difficult feelings from the therapeutic 
relationship in supervision in addition to a familiarity with the evidence behind certain 
interventions and techniques, for example bulimia groups (Lee & Rush, 1986; 
Openshaw et aL, 2004).
For Bion, thinking that connects the thing which already exists pre-verbally to an 
expression of recognition of this connection constitutes reverie (Symington & 
Symington, 1996). This is a way of being that I have not only thought about and tried
13 Recently, while explaining this to a patient, I found myself drawing on a dance lesson I 
once had, in which the teacher encouraged the students to ‘slow down time’ in our minds 
while trying to execute a complicated sequence. Miraculously it worked. I imagined myself 
watching a video of a dancer in slow motion -  only then was I able to carve up the Gestalt in 
into a sequence of steps.
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to occupy since the birth of my first child last year, but was also activated (well before 
I read Bion’s theory) in my first year clinical placement working with a young man 
with a moderate learning disability.
Michael was 19 and had been referred to the specialist learning disabilities service 
where I worked by his mother, who had been worried about his increasing 
recalcitrance and tendency to disappear from home. In the session from which the 
following extract was taken, Michael had mentioned early on that he had brought a 
wrestling magazine with him. He has been talking about one of his female friends.
Michael: And... erm. I just really miss her for some reason...
Sam: Mm.
M: ... so, yeah.
S: That sounds hard... difficult 
Michael nods.
M: Is there anything you want to ask me...? What would you like to 
talk about, Sam?
Pause in which Michael grins.
S: Wha-?
M: No, s’alright (giggles).
S: Do you want to show me the wrestling magazine?
Communicating with Michael often felt difficult and his questions to me like above 
(which I often felt were mimetic of my style of speaking) were disarming. However, 
in the pause above I felt that Michael’s grin was accompanied by a shared experience
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of nervous sexual excitement. Michael’s wrestling magazines tended to have full-page 
photo portraits of muscular men and women in bikinis. He was not at this stage 
equipped with the vocabulary with which people generally talk about sex, so I felt (not 
confidently) that this magazine was a way of bringing something that was in the room 
into common discourse. Michael’s mother was dismissive of his developing sexual 
feelings14 and tried, I thought, to stunt his adolescence. At the time, my process was 
informed by the person-centred facets of empathy and unconditional positive regard 
(Rogers, 1957); retrospectively I might interpret our interaction as me attempting to 
detoxify his sexual feelings by containing them (Mitrani, 2010). Consequently we 
spent a great deal of our time in our sessions on the topic of sexual development.
Discipline and Punish
If she doesn’t gain weight, NG15 feed; if she doesn’t keep to her meal 
plan, NG feed; if she refuses to be weighed appropriately, NG feed.
These were instructions I heard earlier this week in a ward round in the eating 
disorders service where I am spending my third year placement. The ward round is a 
multidisciplinary meeting of a dozen or so clinicians including nurses, specialist 
medics, psychologists, psychotherapists, dieticians and psychiatrists. Inpatients are 
invited into the room where the meeting takes place and interviewed by the consultant 
psychiatrist. Then their requests for leave, family visits, cigarette breaks and so on are 
discussed by everyone present (including me).
The instructions issued by the consultant psychiatrist above were concerning a 27- 
year-old woman, who has been an inpatient for almost a year and who still has a BMI 
(body mass index) of less than 13. In this case, it has been discussed that the woman 
in question will have to be entirely sedated in order for this to happen; it will be 
impossible otherwise because she will resist. In the meeting we have discussed how
14 In fact the freedom of sexual expression of people with learning disabilities has historically 
been limited (Taylor Gomez, 2012). I wonder how much of this in a clinical setting might be 
due to clinicans’ difficulty (as I experienced) in bringing up sex, as Gochros (1985) describes.
15 NG is an abbreviation of nasogastric. In nasogastric tube feeding, a tube is passed through 
the nostril and pushed down into the stomach.
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positive reinforcement (such as the lure of more leave in exchange for compliance) 
has failed thus far and how the deterrent of punishment now remains the only option16.
Much of the emphasis in my clinical training as a counselling psychologist so far has 
been on parity in the therapeutic relationship. I have been encouraged to think of the 
patient as the expert on her- or himself (Rogers, 1986). Coercion has been something 
other people do. What can I do then, being involved in the kind of coercive process 
described here? How might I interact in the multidisciplinary organisation, and in 
therapeutic relationships that (situated as they are within this organisation) position 
me as the clinician and the other as the patient?
To some extent, I feel that a node of change has come about from having to address 
this kind of problem this year. The collaborative nature of cognitive behavioural 
therapy (Kuyken et al, 2009) has eased this process to some degree. I have attempted 
to reshape a model that felt prescriptive to begin with (especially Fairbum’s (1998) 
transdiagnostic manual) into a fluid interpersonal format in which knowledge and 
ideas can be given over to the patient. More often than not patients have taken an 
interest in formulating their own distress and have taken an interest in developing 
ideas or techniques that I have introduced. For example, one patient has personalised 
her own distress tolerance techniques from Linehan’s (1993) skills manual, while 
others have preferred behavioural experiments (Cooper et a l, 2003).
Yet I have been (and continue to be) wary about introducing such techniques, being 
mindful of the Lacanian proposition that truth in therapy may be produced rather than 
discovered and that it is unlikely to be created via the introduction of pre-established 
concepts (Glynos & Yannis, 2002). Furthermore, it is not my belief at the moment that 
descriptions of cognitive models can conjure the same image for the therapist and 
patient. For example, in Lacanian terms, I cannot know what a patient conceives when 
I say, or write ‘belief and he or she cannot know what I conceive (Pavon, 2010). 
Rather, the symbolic belief may help create the architecture for her or his self­
161 remember here an unusually vivid dream I had earlier in the year, in which I am walking 
the beagle which my family kept when I was a child. We walk along a country lane and come 
to a gibbet. I am horrified by the lifeless animals that are nailed to the structure and I feel I 
must protect the dog from seeing them. She, however, strains at the lead ahead of me and 
pushes on oblivious to the horror.
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discovery; I may have an idea of what this architecture is, but this idea is imaginary. 
Nevertheless, in the domain of reality -  as opposed to the real, which is beyond 
comprehension (Pavon, 2010) -  the language and exercises of cognitive behavioural 
psychotherapies construct an architecture which may explicitly be ascertained as 
common and within which I have found the opportunity for creativity.
A related development has been the introduction of some previously purely theoretical 
thinking into the clinical realm17. An inpatient setting has its own organisational 
dynamics which position people in different ways and whose function may be seen to 
be normalising and disciplinary (Foucault, 1977). My discomfort at this kind of 
disciplinary action is perhaps evident from my dream, in which protection and 
confinement also plays a part. At the beginning of the year, I often felt tom between 
doing what the institution wanted me to do and what I felt would be best for the 
patient -  the former being a cognitive behavioural intervention solely aimed at weight 
gain and symptom reduction, and the latter being a more idiosyncratic examination 
and exploration of the social and intrapsychic factors which not only maintained, but 
had engendered the way things were now.
For one patient, Augustine18, it has been particularly important to construct a narrative 
about what had happened and also to acknowledge the difficulty she experienced as a 
result of the coercive regime she experienced as an inpatient. I brought my dilemma to 
group supervision at the university19. Here, my feeling of being caught between 
different roles and different goals was opened up; consequently I realised that these 
were problems that I could to some extent share with (rather than protectively hold
171 am aware here that I present a dualism, some of the problems with which I go on to 
examine below.
18 All names have been changed to protect confidentiality.
19 As I write the word ‘group’ here, I am reminded of the importance of the group as part of 
the training at the University of Surrey. In particular, the time given to the exploration of 
group dynamics in experiential groups in the first and second years has been very valuable in 
learning to be attentive to dynamics in multidisciplinary ward rounds and the therapeutic 
groups I have co-facilitated in my first year and third years. The recognition that individuals 
may make contributions in the group that either reflect their identity or that reflect their view 
of the group’s identity, and that contributions may thus be anonymised to mask hostility or 
fear (Bion, 1959) has been one particularly useful point of experiential learning.
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back from) Augustine. I also realised that the post-structuralist theory I had been 
thinking about in my research concerning the construction of diagnosis could usefully 
hang as a backdrop behind the cognitive behavioural model which I was using. The 
nature of the power differential in the institution helped explain some of the 
powerlessness that this patient (and I) felt; it also explained my discomfort at the 
deference sometimes shown towards me. I have included an extract from a dialogue 
with Augustine here.
Augustine: Definitely, erm... and I think. I think I mentioned before, but 
being here around these people who are at different stages to me... is not 
helpful...
Sam: Mm.
A: ...In any way. Erm, even if it’s just little things like... Tanya said that 
she wore... tight jeans yesterday; that she’d never worn on the ward, but... 
nobody batted an eyelid over there.
S: Right.
A: I think it’s just, it’s like losing that sense of... that sort of hyper­
awareness of weight and appearance that you have here...
[...]
S: ... And I was, actually I was thinking about some of those things and I,
I feel like we’ve done... we’ve talked quite a lot about how you might 
have the ability to interpret things in a way which can confirm kind of 
negative, broader ways of seeing things, but I think... but I think in another 
sense, sometimes perception of things... I feel like how you kind of talked 
about when you perceived people saying kind of ‘you’re a tough cookie’or 
something that... you know probably actually when things...
A: Mm...
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S: ...Are meant a bit critically.
In this extract, Augustine is talking about the difficulty she has putting on weight for 
fear of criticism from the other inpatients. She has explained previously how she feels 
that any compliment paid to her like ‘you look well’ feels like a criticism to her 
because it means she’s losing the anorexic competition by putting on weight. 
Accordingly we have discussed how, in intrapsychic terms, she is liable to interpret 
comments negatively in a way that confirm powerful core beliefs about her own 
failure.
However, I have access to the ward in which she spends her time and have seen the 
critical comments people are subjected to when they put on weight. How can 
Augustine’s cognitions be ‘biased’ in this culture? Similarly, I know that for her the 
tight jeans that she is not permitted to wear as long as she remains an inpatient 
represent freedom. From a poststructuralist perspective (Maison, 1998) she inhabits 
multiple identities (inpatient, student, girlfriend, daughter, artist) some of which will 
have to be renegotiated in a different context outside the hospital. By allowing myself 
to consider the different subjective positions afforded to me by our discourse 
(therapist, man, representative of the institution, confidant) I feel I am better able to 
access her realities20.
Foucault’s critical work on institutions and madness (from which corpus the title for 
this section comes) has also been crucial to the development of this clinical stance. 
Reading Madness and Civilisation (2001) in the first year of my doctoral training 
catalysed my emerging view that the médicalisation of mental health though diagnosis 
is a moral and power-related agenda -  a view that was seeded before my doctoral 
training through many hours spent speaking with people who had been diagnosed with 
mental illnesses as part of a volunteering job for the charity, Mind; and through
20 Like the rings of Saturn, the wholeness of identity in poststructuralist terms is the product of 
historical and political movements; the current Gestalt may be seen to be an assembly of 
identity fragments which are inhabited or not in response to shifts in discourse and time.
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reading Ussher21 and Baker’s (1993) work on sexual problems, which concepetualises 
them as the products of and existing within social and political contexts. Foucault’s 
proposition that psychiatric admission is not so much about differential diagnosis as 
much as a political decision about madness, and that consequent diagnostic based 
treatment then has two functions is particularly relevant to my clinical work in an 
inpatient setting:
The official establishment of an the individual’s life as a tissue of 
pathological symptoms, as well as the establishment of the psychiatrist as a 
doctor... (Foucault, 2006, p.269)
The alternative seems to me to be the establishment of the patient -  and of me -  as a 
person.
On Becoming a Person
I have included in a footnote above a brief discussion of the appellations given to 
people who seek psychological therapy22, but it is less common (because perhaps it is 
less questioned) to find discussions about suitable appellations for people facilitating 
psychological therapy23. It is the equalisation of the two positions that I feel Rogers 
(1988) is getting at with the title I have used here -  that in order to be a therapist, one 
must become a person, who is able to empathise and listen, before using technique or 
injecting nomothetic knowledge into the relationship. To some extent, I have found 
that the perceived inequality of the relationship from the patient’s viewpoint has been
21 This view was reinforced when, coincidentally, Jane Ussher cited Madness and Civilisation 
as the ‘one book all psychologist should read’(‘One on one’, 2012, p.944) in The Psychologist 
last December.
22 Looking back over my process reports, I notice that I have made a move from using 
‘therapist/client’ to label the speech in the transcript to “therapist/patient” and then to 
‘Sam/[other’s name]’. Such a move perhaps constitutes an explicit effort to move from an 
embracing of the power differential in the therapeutic dyad to an occupation of common 
ground. It is thus a part of my effort to become a person as much as a therapist in this dyad.
23 Clearly ‘therapy’ is also a word which introduces power-relations, as Edelman (1974) 
explains.
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an invaluable tool in assessing transference24 (Hinshelwood, 1991) -  or beliefs about 
others, to use a more cognitive behavioural phraseology. However, it has been in the 
later stages of the therapeutic relationship that another node of clinical development 
has taken place. It has been through development of the therapeutic relationship that 
some interesting work with emotions has taken place.
This has been particularly the case with one client this year, Shanti, a 52-year-old 
woman diagnosed with anorexia nervosa, for whom the expression of sadness and fear 
have been signs of failure since childhood. Meta-emotions (Katz et a l, 2012) of 
embarrassment then occur in relation to me -  particularly because I am younger than 
her. However, this information, which has become essential to my formulation, has 
only been able to come out in the context of the development of a therapeutic 
relationship in which I have not only held myself from retaliating to her attacks 
(instead seeking to empathise with her anger), but also modeled a natural degree of 
imperfection. Some techniques have not worked; sometimes the understanding I have 
voiced about what she has been saying has been incomplete. Yet some progress has 
been made in spite of and because of this imperfection. In short, I believe there have 
been benefits not just from me being a therapist, but also from being a person25.
Having expounded on some of the nodes of my clinical development, I find myself 
thinking about the nature of the word ‘clinical’. It occurs to me that this is a word that 
is often used in applied psychology as one part of a biformity. The term ‘scientist- 
practitioner’, which continues to affect ideas of how a counselling psychologist should 
work (Bury & Strauss, 2006), represents a similar biformity: it implies that the 
practitioner per se is not scientific.
24 One particular patient, Diana, from my second year placement in a Community Mental 
Health Centre comes to mind, who from the outset cried and begged me to help her. She did 
not do this in subsequent sessions, but the powerful mixed urges (to save, but then to reject) 
this evoked in me gave me some indication of how others might experience her. This was 
borne out by her descriptions of past relationships in later sessions.
25 Of the many opportunities the last three years have provided me for being imperfect, the 
most potent has perhaps been fatherhood. The list of other things it has acquainted me with 
could go on for pages, but a few which I believe are relevant to the psychotherapeutic 
enterprise are: the visceral and animal entelechy of humans; the essential nature of 
relationality; and the need for a sense of humour.
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A similar biformity is manifested in counselling psychology training, and to some 
extent in the layout of this portfolio (where there are divisions between clinical work 
and research, or academic work). I feel, however, that influences outside what is 
traditionally perceived as clinical have bled into the work I describe, and thus that 
such commonplace biformities can be illusory26. To what extent can any 
psychological practitioner not be a scientist-practitioner, or a clinician not be a 
clinician-researcher27? Such dualism manifests the hegemony of the positivist 
psychological discourse in which experience, affect, reflexivity and politics play a 
nugatory role. Inasmuch as the counselling psychologist is attentive to experience, 
change and meaning, and encourages the liberation of new information (in which he 
or she plays a part), her or she exists on a spectrum of scientific endeavour: where he 
or she is on this spectrum depends on the level of attention to these processes.
Attentiveness is a quality that spans the divisions of psychotherapeutic models and is 
probably where the focus of my learning lies at the moment. It can encompass 
congruence (Rogers, 1957), the here-and-now (Yalom, 2009) and listening- 
formulating (Ivey, 2000). It can also comprise attention to detail in content and 
language as well as embodied or unconscious communication, and heedfulness of how 
speech and acts are positioned within cultural discourse. Types of attentiveness can, I 
hope, also be seen in some of the examples above.
My effort to be attentive in my clinical work has also been informed recently by a 
paper by the philosopher Galen Strawson (2006), in which he cites Arthur 
Eddington’s ideas about the nature of the physics as...
A schedule of pointer readings... We have dismissed all preconception as
to the background of our pointer readings... But in one case -  namely, for
261 have confronted the illusory divide between clinical work and research through the 
psychological analysis of my subjectivity in my research (especially in 7/ 'a not My Place... ’ 
below). Similarly, I explain how my interest in diagnosis arises in part from my own 
experience with a diabetes diagnosis in Deconstructing Diagnosis.
27 Perhaps too my apprehension about dualism is a marker of my contemporary status as a 
clinician. Much of the work I am doing at the moment with anorexic patients involves 
encouraging them not to see things in polarised terms (or black and white thinking (Beck et 
al, 1979) in cognitive behavioural terminology) particularly in terms of success or failure.
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the pointer readings of my own brain - 1 have an insight which is not 
limited to the evidence of the pointer readings. That insight shows that they 
are attached to a background of consciousness. (Eddington, 1928, pp.258- 
260)
Strawson goes on to propose that it is not unreasonable to expect this background to 
be of a similar nature to the one background which is our own experience in relation 
to the ‘physical’ matter of the brain. This proposition comes in a wider argument that 
aims to confound the Cartesian split between mind and body: Strawson contends that 
experiential phenomenal are ‘real concrete phenomena’ (2006, p.6) and that a division 
between the physical and experiential domains is false dichotomy.
My focus on realistic monism here may seem like an odd deviation. However, the 
core of Strawson’s (2006) argument that the existence of one’s experience is more 
certain than anything else has clinical resonance. By the same argument, working with 
this experience must be a valid scientific endeavour; it is commensurate with 
counselling psychology’s agenda (BPS, 2005); it is the most attentive way I can 
currently find of existing with patients28; and it also neatly reflected in Rogers’s 
aphorism that ‘ What is most personal is most generaV (1988, p.26).
Finally, I recently remarked in a supervision group that in regard to ending the course 
I feel like an adolescent: I feel the need to establish a degree of independence, yet I 
also feel reticent to leave behind an environment which has fostered the openness and 
attentiveness I have described and which has been a container for the discomfort, 
exploration and emotional ambiguity that have all been a part of training. Perhaps 
here, I should take note of the monism that I have found myself embracing above: my 
current internalised experience of these things may yet be just as real as the 
geographical and perceptual occurrences that led to it.
281 am reminded here of a medic whom I met on holiday last year. He spoke to me and my 
friends a great deal about the primacy of the evidence and how deviation from measurable 
phenomena was not scientific. In a way I agreed with him. Yet he was able to ignore for over 
an hour at dinner the experiential evidence that people had become uncomfortable with his 
bombast and were thus either ceasing to engage in conversation or getting up to leave.
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I also now find myself thinking about reaching into a hollow tree and manipulating 
the moss and pith within, an image Seamus Heaney uses to describe finding a voice as 
a poet that will enable him to ‘raid the inarticulate’ (2003, p.34). I first read this before 
my A-levels -  a time of imminent separation from school and friends -  with similarly 
mixed feelings of excitement and fragility. However, it is an image that I often think 
about when I confront ambiguity. It is an image that distills the experiential. It also 
describes a process of tentative, sensitive exploration that I think led me to training in 
counselling psychology and which I foresee continuing to centrifuge my clinical 
experience.
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When I started my doctoral training, I had a fairly good idea of the subject I wanted to 
research. The week I had interviewed for the course at the University of Surrey, I had 
received a diagnosis that had felt shattering. At that point I had been interested in 
researching secondary post-traumatic stress - 1 think because of experience a close 
friend of mine had undergone working for a humanitarian aid agency. Yet, by the time 
I started the course, the kind of experiences I had undergone had coloured my view of 
diagnosis and an investigation in the area of diagnosis seemed more urgent.
Before my training, I trusted that the little I knew about mental health diagnoses was 
because I was not yet privy to scientific knowledge that was yet to be imparted to me. 
Yet I already had an inkling of doubt that such definitive scientific knowledge was yet 
to be imparted to anyone. Through research on my literature review, through 
continued learning in qualitative research and philosophy of psychology and through 
clinical practice in which I interfaced with patients and other clinicians who talked 
about diagnosis in wildly different ways, this inkling grew into a fully-fledged 
deconstructive project.
Increasingly, I have also felt that an exploration of method has been important in this 
project. To an extent (apart from the reflective section) the exploration of subjectivity 
in Heresy, Hope and The Holy Grail could afford to be less profound because of the 
nature of the data, in whose production I did not play a part (at least not 
contemporaneously). I felt that the data in the second empirical project, however, 
merited further subjective exploration given that the data were produced partly by me 
in an interpersonal situation. I have tried to use some of the theory and practice skills 
derived from elsewhere in my training to analyse this data.
In this way, I have moved the deconstructive focus of my research beyond the object 
of investigation into the subject/researcher, in whom any investigation necessarily 
originates -  or perhaps from a discursive point of view, who is uniquely positioned to 
be the originator of such an investigation by existing as a interface for the confluence
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of the social, the theoretical and the psychic into a written stream. Perhaps this reads a 
little too much like an integrative stance. However, I write ‘stream’ not to describe the 
flow of a single substance or compound, but of a cloudy mixture of elements. For 
some, a stream might be primarily a directional feature, but for me it is something 
which seeps into marshy ground that surrounds it, which is blocked and split by 
obstacles, and which is prone to drying up. None of these facets describe a true stream 
of course, but are truths about streams.
Thus my current stance resembles pluralism more than integration. This is an 
uncomfortable position to hold: in my experience, people have generally preferred me 
to have definitive view on things. However, it is also one that I have found to be 
encompassed by Counselling Psychology -  at least in the context of the department in 
the University of Surrey. I also draw some comfort in the maintenance and future 
development of this position from philosophical arguments against anything other 
than pluralism, for example Godel’s proof of the impossibility of an all-encompassing 
theory (cited in Draghi-Lorenz, 2010) and Feyerabend’s (2011) warnings of the 
danger of abstraction and theorification without experience.
In the first paper (a literature review) here, I attempt to lay out some pertinent 
critiques of diagnosis in mental health. These culminate in the question of why 
counselling psychologists might use diagnosis. I go onto explore this question to some 
extent in the third paper, ‘I t ’s not My Place... ’, in which I examine possible reasons 
for trainee counselling psychologists positionings in relation to diagnosis through 
psychoanalytic mechanisms -  but not before I explore further what diagnosis is (or in 
post-structuralist terms, how it is constructed) in the second paper, Heresy, Hope and 
The Holy Grail.
In ‘I t ’s not My Place... ' I have attempted to position myself in the kind of overlap I 
described in the General Introduction more explicitly than anywhere else in this 
portfolio. A psychosocial method provided the possibility of using the skills and 
theoretical knowledge I had acquired in my second year in a research capacity. The 
psychoanalytic elements of the method in particular necessitated an engagement with 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity. This engagement is an essential feature of 
Counselling Psychology, which
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.. .continues to develop models of practice and research which marry the 
scientific demand for rigorous empirical enquiry with a firm value base 
grounded in the primacy of the counselling or psychotherapeutic 
relationship. (BPS, 2006, p .l)
It is perhaps significant that I have identified abstraction as a mechanism in the 
construction of mental health diagnosis in ‘I t ’s not My Place... \  The quotation I have 
used at the top of this paper was added after I wrote it29, but also happens to capture 
the alienation felt by some of the trainee counselling psychologists I talked to in order 
to create this research.
The distinction Oberheim (2011) draws between theoreticians and practitioners is 
pertinent, because it is one I am trying to dissolve. As I explain above in A 
Contemporary Assembly o f  My Clinical Identity, the practitioner must be to some 
extent a scientist because he or she extrapolates from the data of experience. The 
degree to which this experience can be conceptualised and relayed by the practitioner 
is perhaps the extent to which they are a good scientist (or theoretician). Moreover, 
the degree to which this conceptualisation of experience is recognised to be scientific 
or theoretical is in turn contingent on the hierarchical and political architecture of 
knowledge30.
Finally, in this dossier spelling conventions, format and referencing may be 
inconsistent between papers: this is because they are written with specific journals in 
mind which do not all conform to the BPS style adhered to everywhere else in this 
portfolio. Submission and format guidelines for these journals can be found in the 
appendices of each paper.
29 It comes from the introduction to Paul Feyarabend’s The Tyranny of Science (2011). See 
p. 185 below.
30 Thus with a positivism as a hegemonic force, this tends to be not very much.
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‘...violentia.../ ...exsuperat magis aegrescitque medendo.’
[His fury mounted up and he became sicker because o f the treatment]
Virgil, AeneidXIh 45-46
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Deconstructing Diagnosis: The Problems and Effects of the Use of Current 
Diagnostic Taxonomies in Mental and Behavioral Health
Counseling psychologists commonly encounter systems o f diagnostic classification in 
their workplaces. Yet these systems are ridden with problems. The literature on 
problems o f reliability, validity and etiology o f diagnoses is reviewed here, along with 
studies on the stigmatizing effects o f these diagnoses. In addition, the linguistic basis 
o f diagnosis is covered and the case o f  female sexual dysfunction is used to illustrate 
its political dimension. Overall, the literature confirms that the architecture o f  
diagnosis is built on unstable foundations and suggests that political motivations 
continue to prop it up. Further ramifications and areas for research are also 
identified.
Keywords: Diagnosis; validity; language; stigma.
[Personal reflections
I believe the concept of diagnosis in mental health is a pivotal issue in 
psychology, psychotherapy and psychiatry around which disputes rooted 
in historical, political and philosophical exist. These often lie beneath a 
veneer of integrity or policy, but seem to me to be essential to the 
reflective practice of counseling psychologists who confront systems of 
diagnosis. They manifest themselves in the classroom, the therapy room 
and the workplace in general.
Sitting in my supervisor’s office, I was urged for the first time to think 
where my interest in this subject came from. One episode from the year 
before immediately came to mind. I had recently been diagnosed with 
diabetes type II. The diagnosis had been a shock: I was 32 years old, not 
overweight, had a good diet and exercised at least three times a week. In 
my furious searches for information about diabetes on the internet, I was
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repeatedly frustrated to find that such a diagnosis was not expected for 
someone of my profile. This frustration was borne out when I went to a 
group populated by my fellow recent diagnoses a couple of weeks later. I 
seemed to be at least 20 years younger and half the weight of everyone 
else in the room. Quantitatively, we had one thing in common: we had all 
had a fasting blood sugar tests in which our blood sugar had been 
measured at above 7.0 mmol/litre on more than one occasion. However, I 
felt that my relationship to the diagnosis had to be hugely different to 
anyone else’s in the room.
My subsequent research yielded two further discoveries. First, I found out 
that if I had gone through the same tests in the United States, I might not 
have been given the same diagnosis: the diagnostic threshold was at the 
time slightly higher. I imagined myself walking out of a surgery 
somewhere in New York City with that unique feeling of relief one 
experiences when one has been given the ‘all clear’ by a physician. Yet the 
same number of glucose molecules would have been floating round my 
bloodstream as they were when I came home in Southwest London.
Second, perusing internet chatrooms about treatments for diabetes type II,
I found that the diagnosis carried a stigma. Posters had written about how 
people with diabetes type II deserved it because they were greedy or lazy. 
Perhaps this was the reason I had baulked at the diagnosis myself; why 
mother had told me on the phone not tell anyone about my diagnosis; and 
why I had made assumptions about the other people in the group.
Then I started to think about mental health diagnoses. If a diagnosis in 
endocrine health which is based on objective measurement of the organic 
makeup of the blood is not the same across two countries, what meaning 
might a mental health diagnosis have which is not based on physical 
properties? Furthermore, stigmas are attached to mental health diagnoses 
just as much -  if not more -  than physical health diagnoses: I had reacted 
differently to a group of people because of their diagnoses. Such stigmas 
are unlikely to change my blood sugar level, but they could conceivably
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affect my mental health. It occurred to me that the very process of labeling 
an individual might induce mental distress over and above the distress 
which the clinician has neatly packaged into a diagnosis. Although I had 
not been given a mental health diagnosis, I felt that in some way my 
identity had in some way shifted -  and that this shift was iatrogenic.
Retrospectively constructing a path to this area of research, my mind was 
also drawn back to a lecture theatre where I was learning about the 
psychological science of personality. A sense of frustration overcame me 
as I was instructed about enduring personality traits and ways of 
scientifically testing their reliability. I could not get past the feeling that 
the wrong questions were being asked: what were the main personality 
types; how enduring are they; how do they correlate, and so on. The 
question I asked myself was ‘why try and measure personality at all?’ It 
seemed to me a cyclical and redundant exercise to create a construct and 
then demonstrate its existence by measuring it experimentally. 
Furthermore, it seemed odd to me that a construct which is supposed to 
stand for biologically anchored characteristics should be named 
‘personality’, a word whose etymological root lies in the Latin word 
persona, meaning ‘mask’.
Around the same time I was introduced to social constructionism via the 
work of Burr (1995). I struggled with these authors and their ideas at first: 
they were counterintuitive. I felt almost stupid because of the 
psychological theories I had accepted wholesale. Ironically, the kind of 
cynicism that this reading made me adopt was the main reason I found 
myself unable to adopt social constructionism absolutely. Instead I have 
come round to a critical realist perspective, which suggests, “any social 
practice must start with the agents’ conceptions of it, but... that social 
science can go on to refute these conceptions” (Corrigan, 2004, p. 167). I 
felt that this was an ontological position which would fit with the 
assessment of empirical and qualitative research which follows, and which 
has allowed me to consider the reality of mental distress for the kinds of 
people involved in that research.
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Foucault’s archaeological approach to research (1972) also appealed to 
me, particularly the idea that displacements of thought in the past engender 
ideas which seem unquestionable in the present. Perhaps this is why I 
chose to focus in part on the historical aspects of the construction of 
mental health diagnoses. Perhaps too this appeal exists more than 
serendipitously at I time of my training when psychodynamic theory and 
my own psychoanalytic therapy are causing me to trace the archaeology of 
my own thoughts.]
Introduction
Few applied psychologists may be able to ignore the pervasiveness of diagnostic 
labels in their clinical work. On a national level, resources and interventions are 
allocated according to diagnoses, as well as social benefits (including housing and 
travel allowances). Charitable institutions are also set up to deal with specifically 
diagnosed groups, such as The National Autistic Society and Depression Alliance UK, 
as well as specialist regional units. The National Collaborating Centre for Mental 
Health’s (NCCRH) guidelines, which set out recommendations for the treatment of 
mental health and behavioral conditions, are also grouped in alignment with 
prevailing diagnostic systems. Yet a further look into many of the guideline booklets 
available on this website reveals that there is some controversy surrounding the 
reliability and often validity of diagnoses of mental and behavioral disorders.
For example, in the diagnosis section of the booklet on antisocial personality disorder 
(NCCMH, 2010) there are suggestions that previous versions of the DSM-IV-TR 
(APA, 2000) had provided diagnostic instructions that were too behavioral. The 
authors also allude to the fact that there may be diagnostic confusion between 
antisocial personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorder. Furthermore, they 
describe how the ICD-10 (WHO, 1992) contains an equivalent, but differently named 
disorder -  dissocial personality disorder. The purpose of such discussions in the 
NCCMH guidelines is proposed to be the establishment of a pragmatic path to 
effective treatment of people diagnosed with these and other mental disorders, 
explicitly acknowledging that there is debate about the validity of some diagnostic
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constructs. However, the fact that there are such debates about diagnostic categories is 
worth exploring further.
In the following sections of this review, it will be demonstrated there are problems 
with the reliability, validity and etiology of diagnoses in commonly used taxonomies 
of mental disorders. The aim has been to show that enough controversy exists to merit 
the following question -  why is there such widespread, continued use of diagnostic 
systems and their categories when such serious problems are known to exist?
Some of the political reasons for this will be covered further in the following sections 
which look at the linguistic derivation and resonances of the DSM-IV-TR diagnostic 
terms. The specific case of female sexual dysfunction is also analyzed in order to 
illustrate how political forces can be encapsulated by diagnoses. The latter sections of 
this review are concerned with the effects of diagnostic labels, in which literature on 
stigma and labeling is assessed in order to provide further evidence of the harmful 
effects of diagnosis.
Reliability of diagnostic categories
One method which has been used to demonstrate the lack of consensus in diagnosis of 
mental disorders has been assessment of data according to different diagnostic criteria. 
Brockington (1992) has resoundingly demonstrated this lack of consensus by applying 
diagnostic criteria from different systems (including the DSM-III (APA, 1980)) to data 
collected from patients at the Netheme Hospital in Birmingham. The number of 
patients diagnosed with schizophrenia varied between 163 and 19 depending on which 
system was used. Brockington concluded that the concept of schizophrenia was an 
oversimplification which was useful neither to clinicians nor patients because it did 
not mean the same thing to different people. Similar findings have been reported in a 
variety of other studies (Cooper et al., 1972; McGuffin, Farmer & Harvey, 1991; Van 
Os, Galdos, Lewis, Mann & Bourgeouis, 1993) including an analysis of 700 patients’ 
diagnoses according to three diagnostic systems (van Os et al., 1999).
Assessment of diagnostic criteria has also proved to be an unreliable process. Two 
classic studies by Ash (1949) and Hunt et al. (1953) showed that patients could end up
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with very different diagnoses according to who performed a diagnostic assessment. In 
the first of these studies, Ash found that in the process of assessing 52 patients, three 
psychiatrists agreed on a diagnosis in only 20 per cent of cases. In the second, the 
authors discovered that in a sample of 800 men discharged from naval establishments 
for mental health reasons, diagnoses given by naval clinicians were only agreed on in 
follow-up assessments in standard hospitals in 32.6 per cent of cases.
Some more recent research has suggested that reliability in diagnostic criteria has 
improved. Lehman and Campbell (2001) have suggested that there is good reliability 
for the major emotional disorders in assessment of 362 outpatients using the Anxiety 
Disorders Interview Schedule (Di Nardo, Brown & Barlow, 1994). However, in the 
same specific phobia and generalized anxiety disorder were found to be difficult to 
specify due to overlapping with other disorders, and obsessive compulsive disorder 
and social phobia diagnoses were the cause of disagreement due to complications in 
assessing the longevity and severity of symptoms.
Reliability in diagnostic categories has also been demonstrated by Solanto and Alvir 
(2009). They found that significant inter-rater reliability (based on ratings of 307 
children) existed in DSM-ZF based assessments of ADHD at 88 per cent for the 262 
parents and 90 per cent for the 251 teachers taking part in the study. Other studies 
have shown high reliability in DSM-IV diagnoses for drug dependence and alcoholism 
(Pierucci-Lagha et al., 2007) and for eating disorders (Mintz, O’Halloran, Mulholland 
& Scneider, 1995). However, Bentall (2003) suggests a caveat for such percentages. 
He suggests that they give an inflated sense of reliability since, particularly in studies 
where there are only two categories -  like ADHD present and ADHD absent, as was 
the case in the as in Solanto and Alvir’s (2009) study -  the raters of the items would in 
probabilistic terms agree 50 per cent of the time even if they tossed a coin to make 
their diagnosis.
Making the case against the reliability of ADHD as a discrete illness Timimi (Timimi 
& Taylor, 2004) argues that epidemiological differences and the lack of experimental 
controls in neuroimaging studies make it a questionable diagnosis. Its increased 
incidence may be the result of a market economy value system which lauds 
individuality, competitiveness and independence (Prout & James, 1997) as well as the
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breakdown of moral authority of adults. However, Taylor (Timimi & Taylor, 2004) 
contends that severe hyperactivity may be under diagnosed in children and that, while 
social factors probably play a role, epidemiological studies exist (Meltzer, Gatwood, 
Goodman & Ford, 2000; Taylor, Sandberg, Thorley & Giles, 1991) which do not 
show great divergence. However, Taylor does not produce an argument in favor of the 
reliability of the diagnosis, only suggests that careful diagnosis can help severely 
affected children.
Another area for debate on the reliability of diagnostic criteria has been Asperger’s 
syndrome. Woodbury-Smith, Klin and Volkmar (2005) describe how diagnoses of 
Asperger’s syndrome were taking place even before such a category was ratified by 
the DSM-IV and that even then these systems failed to include some of the salient 
features of the disorder noted by Hans Asperger, after whom the disorder was named. 
Contrary to their expectations, they found that of 48 people diagnosed with Asperger’s 
syndrome before the DSM  and ICD classifications had begun to be used, only 11 
would be reassigned a diagnosis of autism under the current criteria. However, though 
there was found to be no difference between the ICD and DSM  classifications, the 
results point to the unreliable nature of diagnostic labels in general.
Other research has also demonstrated the lack of reliability between diagnostic 
systems (Tryon, 2006; Mayes & Calhoun, 2004; Mayes et al., 2009; Mayes et al.,
2011). For example, Mayes, Calhoun and Crites (2001) performed a similar 
retroactive experiment, re-diagnosing 157 children previously diagnosed with 
Asperger’s syndrome according to the DSM-IV criteria. They found that all of the 
children would be reassigned diagnoses of autism, prompting them to ask the 
question, “Does DSM-IV Asperger’s disorder actually exist?” (p.263). This is a 
salient question: since Asperger’s syndrome is entirely dropped from the DSM-5 
(APA, 2013) and subsumed under the label ‘high functioning autism’ (First, 2008), 
then the answer might be ‘no’. If mental disorders are defined only by characteristics 
described in diagnostic manuals, this might be true in general. Moreover, if this is the 
case, it is doubtful whether the application of diagnostic labels is helpful for people 
suffering from mental distress at all.
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Validity of diagnostic categories
Even if the diagnostic categories were internally reliable (and continuing revisions of 
the taxonomic systems may be causing this to happen), there might still be problems 
with their validity. Bentall (2003) compares psychiatric diagnostic systems to 
astrology -  even though the limits and reliability of the astrological categories are 
generally agreed, it does not mean that they can actually mean anything.
One issue with validity is the applicability of diagnostic categories cross-culturally. 
Through a thematic analysis of discussions with medical students, traditional healers, 
religious leaders, counselors and health workers in Uganda, Van Duijl and her 
colleagues (2005) concluded that only some of the DSM-IV categories of dissociative 
disorders were helpful. Dissociative identity and dissociative fugue were found to be 
better understood as being due to possession by spirits or dementia. The authors 
concluded that by recognizing the shortcomings of diagnostic categories, clinicians 
might better meet the needs of people suffering from mental distress. In addition, in 
different cultural settings certain practices take on a unique importance, which can in 
turn bring about peculiar types of psychological distress, termed ‘idioms of distress’ 
by Nichter (2010, p. 405).
Cross-cultural studies on depression have found differences between populations and 
related these to social inequalities (Gonzalez, Tarraf, Whitfield & Vega, 2010; 
Kasounari, 2009). Chen, Roberts and Aday (1998) have asserted that there is no lack 
of reliability in the measurement of depression, but that quantitative differences in 
depression scores between Chinese American and Anglo American subjects are down 
to a stronger cultural immunity to depression; other research has suggested that the 
expression of depressive symptoms tends to be more somaticized in Asian populations 
(Ryder, 2005; Yoo & Skovholt, 2001). Many of the nuances captured in these studies 
are not captured in the DSM-IV-TR, which highlights the culturally biased nature of 
diagnostic classification systems and calls into question their validity.
Another problem of validity in diagnosis is comorbidity. While some critics have 
suggested that the increased reliance on comorbid diagnoses belies the DSM-IV-TR's 
failure to recognize deeper developmental problems (Jensen et al., 2006), others have
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gone further to propose that comorbid diagnoses are emblematic of the fact that many 
disorders should not be expressed categorically, but as existing along a spectrum (for 
example Tyrer, 1995).
Kreuger (2010), using Miller and Campbell’s (2008; 2010) research on the 
dimensional nature of narcissism as a personality trait and the consequences of this 
conceptualization for narcissistic personality disorder, suggests that existing 
taxonomies have created arbitrary distinctions when there are at most a few in nature. 
This may have induced the problem of comorbidity. Clark (2007) also calls for a re­
conceptualization of personality disorders which avoids the slavish adherence to 
personality traits and uses information from a broader spectrum.
In another study, grading 650 outpatients presenting with manic depressive episodes 
using the Hypomania Interview Guide (Williams, Terman, Link, Amira & Rosenthal, 
1994), Akiskal and Benazzi (2006) found that the scores, rather than being bimodally 
distributed, were normally distributed regardless of the patients’ respective diagnoses 
of manic depressive disorder and bipolar II. Furthermore, they found a dose-effect 
relationship between bipolar family history and Hypomania Interview Guide scores 
(whereby the amount of bipolar family history correlated to the score on the HIG): 
this also implied the presence of a continuum rather than a sharp divide between the 
two disorders. This evidence is contrary to the categorization of bipolar and unipolar 
depression as discrete disorders proposed by Leonhard (1979), which was then 
endorsed in the DSM-III and the ICD-10.
Further evidence of a spectrum in depressive disorders has also been reported by 
Cassano et al. (2004) in a study of 117 patients with recurrent unipolar depression and 
106 with bipolar I: they found that the manic/ hypomanie symptoms commonly 
thought of as expressions of bipolar disorders were found in patients with unipolar 
depression. Goodwin and Jamison (2007) also suggest another argument for the 
remodeling of the current categorization.
Family history studies are consistent with a model in which bipolar and
the more highly recurrent forms of unipolar depression are variants of the
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same fundamental disorder... with bipolar illness representing the more 
severe end of the spectrum. (Goodwin & Jamison, 2007, p. 9)
Akiskal and Benazzi (2006) recommend that a spectrum conceptualization should be 
incorporated into the DSM-5. This is a reminder of the fact that diagnoses may not 
only be unreliable due to different types of classification system, but also calls into 
question their validity given they change so much over time. In an innovative study 
using data from the article database Medline, McPherson and Armstrong (2006) 
explored the codification of the word ‘depression’ and its related terms over the 20th 
Century, taking into account revisions of systems of diagnostic taxonomy and social 
factors, such as the shift from inpatient to community care. They suggest that the 
integrity of psychiatry (and related disciplines which employ diagnosis) relies on the 
consistency of diagnostic categories. Classification systems may have been introduced 
in order to enforce this consistency. However, some terms which are extraneous to 
modem classification, such as ‘endogenous depression’ have continued to be used, 
while other terms which have been introduced to cement consistency, such as 
‘dysthymia’ have struggled for adoption. The authors conclude that repeated attempts 
to maintain control over the diagnostic process may be an expression of psychiatry’s 
need to justify itself as a profession. This sheds light on another potential problem 
with diagnosis: the fact that it may be politically incubated, rather than grounded in 
pathology.
Etiology of diagnostic categories
The purpose of diagnosis is to place an individual in a bracket in order to aid the 
control of or recovery from their particular affliction. Etiologically, current systems of 
diagnosis are rooted in a biomedical model proposed by Emil Kraepelin proposed at 
the beginning of the Twentieth Century (Bentall, 2003; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). In 
this model, it was proposed that there were a discreet number of mental diseases that 
had an organic and which, like physical illnesses, could be discovered. Double (2001) 
argues that consequently the concept of diagnosis has become too parochial: rather 
than becoming a process of hypothesizing a cause of a problem (whether that cause is 
social, interfamilial or developmental) it has become a process metaphorically
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categorizing a problem in a way which still implies that there is a fundamentally 
biological problem.
In order to examine the issues which surround the idea that mental disorders are 
biological in origin, it may be helpful to focus on one diagnostic category which has 
been the subject of particular controversy -  schizophrenia. The DSM-IV-TR authors 
themselves concede that experimental evidence for biological correlates of the 
disorder are spurious.
No laboratory findings have been identified that are diagnostic of 
Schizophrenia. However a variety of measures from neuroimaging, 
neuropsychological, and neurophysiological studies have shown 
differences between groups of individuals with Schizophrenia and 
appropriately matched control subjects. (APA, 2000, p.305)
It is then suggested that individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia have larger lateral 
ventricles of the than those in individuals that have not, as well as smaller 
hippocampuses, amygdalas, entorhinal cortexes and superior temporal gyruses. 
Neuropsychological deficits are also reported as being consistent across schizophrenic 
individuals particularly in perception and processing of sensory stimuli. However, 
these correlations cannot be taken to imply causation: furthermore, as the authors 
point out, confounding experimental factors might have included increased water 
intake, which can offset urine makeup and electrolyte levels, and neuroleptic intake, 
which is know to produce epiphenomenal changes in brain structure. The authors also 
admit that experiments using functional brain imaging techniques have only shown 
that functional abnormalities cannot be limited to one particular area.
Read (2004) suggests that abnormality of brain structure is just one of three arguments 
commonly used to prove the biological basis of schizophrenia. He points out that the 
kind of research cited in the DSM-IV-TR above suffers from a further problem: if  the 
diagnosis of schizophrenia is known to be unreliable, overall differences found in such 
studies may be meaningless. He also points out that the biological explanation of 
schizophrenia as a result of the abnormally high activity of the dopamine system 
originated after it was discovered that the neuroleptic drugs being used to treat
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schizophrenia inhibited the dopamine system. As Jackson (1986) points out, this 
explanation is as logical as asserting that headaches are caused by a lack of aspirin in 
the body.
The second argument which Read (2004) suggests is used to make the case for the 
biological basis of schizophrenia is that there is equal prevalence in all countries. This 
is believed to show that cultural and environmental factors have little or no effect and 
that therefore schizophrenia is a medical illness. However, in a review of the 
epidemiology of schizophrenia from over 70 studies, Torrey (1987) found a rate of 
schizophrenia to exist in one part of Sweden of 17 people per 1000, compared to 0.3 
per 1000 among the Amish people of the USA. Goldner, Hsu, Waraich and Somers 
(2002) have also more recently found notable differences in lifetime and one year 
incidence rates31. In addition, schizophrenia rates have been shown to vary widely 
within different countries between urban and rural populations and between minority 
and majority ethnic populations (van Os & McGuffin, 2003). These studies suggest 
not only the incidence of schizophrenia is not equal in all countries, but also that 
socioeconomic and cultural factors may have a part to play in its etiology.
The third argument which Read (2004) cites is that there is a genetic predisposition to 
schizophrenia. The evidence used to support this argument has traditionally come 
from twin studies. If monozygotic twins, who share 100 per cent of genetic material, 
are found to have a greater tendency towards schizophrenia than dizygotic twins, who 
share 50 percent of genetic material, then this is taken to confirm the genetic argument 
(with the caveat that each pair of twins is brought up together). Joseph (2004) pooled 
the results of 15 schizophrenia twin studies conducted before mid-2001 to show that 
pairwise concordance rates are 40.4 per cent for monozygotic twins and 7.4 per cent 
for dizygotic twins. However, he points out that there have been consistent 
methodological problems with these twin studies, such as lack of reliability of 
definition of schizophrenia; and the fact that diagnoses were often made by people 
predisposed to a genetic explanation of schizophrenia. He also suggests that there is 
an assumption made that because twins are raised in the same environment,
31 Goldner and colleagues have also found heterogeneity in similar reviews of literature on 
mood disorders (Waraich, Goldner, Somers & Hsu, 2004) and anxiety disorders (Somers, 
Goldner, Waraich & Hsu, 2006).
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environmental differences are controlled for. In fact monozygotic twins are treated 
more similarly and experience greater identity confusion (Jackson, 1960): this may 
mean that these experiments do little more than measure environmental differences.
If, as Joseph (2004) suggests, there is a problem with such studies being carried out by 
researchers who are trying to prove the genetic basis of schizophrenia, there is a more 
insidious problem. Spurious evidence may be used to further the cause of the 
biological basis of schizophrenia and ratify its continued categorization in the DSM  
and other diagnostic systems. Joseph (2004) suggests that the lack of critical analysis 
in textbooks supports this position and is understood best as an effort by psychiatry to 
maintain itself as a viable profession. Bentall (2003) also points out that these kinds of 
problems do not just appear in research on schizophrenia, but in relation to twin 
studies on other disorders (for example Farmer, McGuffin & Gottesman, 1987).
The proposition that current diagnostic categories reflect real illnesses in the body 
which can be researched and discovered has also been rejected by Szasz (1974). Szasz 
argues that an illness used to be detected by a measurable alteration in bodily 
structure. With the advent of modem psychiatry, a new conception of illness arrived -  
that it could be discerned by an alteration in behavior rather than bodily function.
.. .whereas in modem medicine new diseases were discovered, in modem
psychiatry they were invented. Paresis was proved to be a disease.
Hysteria was declared to be one. (1974, p. 12)
The effect of such a shift, Szasz suggests, has been that mental illnesses have been 
thought of as things which happen to people and for which they are not responsible.
He concludes that any behavior studied by an observer may be classified as an illness 
and therefore that clinicians who work in mental health are not in the process of 
diagnosing and treating mental illness, but dealing with personal, ethical and social 
problems. A parochial, biomedical stance to diagnosis may not be the best way to go 
about addressing such problems.
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Language and diagnosis
Language is always an intrinsic part of some particular social situation; it 
is never an independent instrument or simply a tool for description. By 
naively perceiving it as a tool, we mask its profound part in creating social 
relationships and in evoking the roles and the ‘selves’ of those involved in 
the relationships. (Edelman, 1974, p. 296)
Most physical health diagnoses describe the location or process of an illness. The 
morphology of most medical diagnostic terms comprises a word root anda prefix or a 
suffix all derived from Ancient Greek. For example, the term blepharitis (an infection 
of the eyelid) is constructed from a word root -  blepho32 -  meaning Took’, and a 
suffix -  itis -  which denotes a disease normally characterized by inflammation; 
similarly anemia (a below average level of hemoglobin in the blood) comprises a 
prefix - a n -  meaning ‘without’ and a word root -  haema -  meaning ‘blood’. The 
system for the nomenclature of processes and diseases is systematic and prescriptive 
about where the disease is located.
However, the logic is scant with mental health diagnostic classifications. These tend 
to tell us either about the absence, rather than the presence of an amorphous quality -  
for example anorexia (from an -  meaning ‘without’ and orexis -  meaning ‘appetite’), 
or they are entirely metaphorical, like schizophrenia (from schizo -  meaning ‘split’ 
andphren -  meaning ‘mind’). These terms tell us nothing about the location or cause 
of the illness, but are loosely descriptive. The word phren originally did mean the 
heart and viscera immediately around it, which were believed to be the seat of the 
emotions: the term schizophrenia is therefore not only vague, but etymologically 
undermined.
Even the broader categories of mental illness, psychosis and neurosis, tell us little 
about the nature of the disorders they name. Psychosis, meaning an abnormal 
condition of the soul or mind (from psyche -  the part of man which is immortal and
32 Blepho (BXsçco) and subsequent Ancient Greek words have been written in Latin alphabet 
format for ease of reading.
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not physical (Liddell & Scott, 1891)) is vague in the extreme; moreover, it 
etymologically signifies a clear division between mind and body, which is at odds 
with the movement at the end of the 19th Century to develop a system of diagnostic 
classification which would demonstrate a biological etiology of psychoses (Bentall, 
2003).
The terms used for mental health diagnosis are set in the same language that 
systematically labels physical diseases. Functionally, however, they do not work in 
the same way (Szasz, 1974). A clue to the rationale behind the adoption of this 
medical language in the field of mental health comes from Foucault (1965), who 
points out that in the age of the first mass-confinement of madmen, a representative of 
the medical profession had the last say about who should end up in an asylum. The 
medical profession was already a machine of authority and embraced the positivist 
ideals of the Enlightenment.
The doctor’s intervention is not made by virtue of a medical skill or power 
that he possesses in himself and that would be justified by a body of 
objective knowledge... If the medical profession is required, it is as a 
juridical and moral guarantee, not in the name of science. (Foucault, 1965, 
p.270)
If the medical profession’s presence was necessary due to its authority rather than its 
scientific utility, then its language might have been used in a similarly authoritarian 
way. A medical ideology might have been deployed in the service of power. The 
language -  particularly the associations Classical language has with ancient, 
influential knowledge -  perhaps fuels this power. Even now, as was the case then, 
access to this kind of language and the knowledge which resonates in its exotic- 
sounding syllables is restricted and privileged (Milroy & Milroy, 1985). The fact that 
many mental health diagnostic terms continue to be couched in the language of 
antiquity, even when the terms have been shown to stand for categories which are 
unreliable and lack validity (Bentall, 2003; Read, Mosher & Bentall 2004), may 
signify the medical establishment’s reticence to release this power.
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Another criticism of the DSM  taxonomies has been their increasing numbers of 
diagnostic categories (Bentall, 2003; Pincus, Frances, Davis, First & Widiger, 1992). 
Alongside this increase in categories has been an increase in the number of acronyms 
used to designate them. The acronym has been found to be useful notation for 
retaining information in medical texts (Pakhomov, 2002). It is under this guise, 
perhaps, that it has crept into the language of diagnosis. Acronyms may also help and 
encourage the proliferation of a concept: a good example of this is the acronym AIDS, 
which Malmkjaer (2004) suggests enhanced its public recognition in the 1980s, a 
decade which saw the popularization of acronyms in general.
Kirkwood and Martin (1993) suggest that acronyms are popular in the discourse of 
science writing because they usefully condense information. However, their 
widespread use in the discourse of diagnostic classification may also be to protect 
their flimsy validity. Outside the sphere of diagnostic classifications, newly coined 
models of psychotherapy have been developed since the 1980s, which may have 
sought to authenticate their scientific credentials by imitating the nomenclature of 
another broadly accepted model -  CBT. One highly embattled example (Baddeley, 
1989; Witkowski, 2010) is NLP (neuro-linguistic programming), a model which has 
been critiqued for having no basis in neuroscience whatsoever. Perhaps this lack of 
footing has been hidden shamefully behind a catchy acronym.
A similar process may be going on in the language of diagnosis. Like Ancient Greek 
derived terms for diagnostic classification, acronyms lend an authority to the labels 
and thus to the people ascribing them. While acronyms may be useful for the 
clinicians who are forced to remember whole taxonomies of diagnostic classification, 
they actively withhold information from the diagnosed: indeed medical literature has 
already started to recognize their obfuscating function (Cheng, 1994; Orlowski & 
Christensen, 2002; Patel & Rashid, 2009), with Isaacs and Fitzgerald (2000) even 
coining the term ‘acronoymophilia’. From a Foucauldian perspective this withholding 
of information reinforces the power of the clinician. In addition, acronyms’ lack of 
morphological clarity may even distance the diagnoser from the etiology and nature of 
the supposed illness he or she is diagnosing.
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From a wider perspective, Edelman (1974) proposes that the language of diagnosis in 
general has a political effect on the social situation in which the client and the 
clinician sit. Diagnostic categories may be understood to be symbols rather than 
signals: they are not neutral and descriptive, but linguistic units that have the power to 
rearrange perception and stand for historically embedded structures. Therefore, to 
label someone with a diagnosis performs two main functions. First, it establishes a 
dominant and subordinate role and sanctions the treatment or therapy which will 
happen thereafter. Second, it creates a relationship where the client and therapist 
“resist evidence that the professional competence of the one or the stigmatizing or 
exalting label of the other may be unwarranted” (Edelman, 1974, p.310). This, in turn, 
may smooth over the cracks in reliability and validity of the categorization system in 
which the diagnostic label sits.
Female sexual dysfunction
One example of the construction of a diagnosis whose emergence can transparently be 
argued to be the result of political machinations and of patriarchal and biomedical 
hegemony is female sexual dysfunction. One of the most vocal critics of female 
sexual dysfunction has been Tiefer, whose critique (1991) of Masters and Johnson’s 
‘human sexual response cycle’ on methodological grounds undermines a variety of 
sexual dysfunctions which are based on Masters and Johnson’s (1966) experimental 
work, which is entrenched at the heart of the DSM-IV-TR’s taxonomy of sexual 
disorders.
Tiefer (1995) contends that the universality of the human sexual response cycle is 
flawed. To begin with the idea of a cycle was a basis for experimentation rather than 
discovered empirically: the arrangement of the findings in a cyclical model was 
therefore a self-fulfilling prophecy. Secondly, the sample used in the experiments was 
not representative: they tested only people who had a positive history of masturbatory 
and coital orgasmic experience (Masters & Johnson, 1966) and only chose people of 
above average socio-economic status. The normal standards from which deviations in 
sexual function (or dysfunctions) are defined are therefore unreliable. Even if they 
were reliable, as Ussher proposes, “From a Foucauldian standpoint... what constitutes 
a ‘problem’ [is] not historically or culturally invariant” (1993, p. 10). Furthermore, by
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concentrating on orgasm as the ultimate point in the progression of their cycle,
Masters and Johnson (1966) preordained their results and excluded the panoply of 
non-orgasmic sexual acts from consideration in subsequent categorization.
From a feminist perspective, there are further problems with female sexual 
dysfunction. Some research (Hite, 1987; Peplau & Gordon 1985) suggests that women 
may seek emotional attachment and affection in sexual relationships as much as 
orgasm. A dysfunction which measured against an orgasm-centered norm is therefore 
biased against women. In addition, the pathologization of women who do not seek or 
derive pleasure in phallocentrically biased heterosexual relationships under the guise 
of scientific diagnosis can be seen to be “just another strategy for... pacification and 
enslavement” (Szasz, 1981, p. 8).
As well as the questionable methodology behind the categorizations of female sexual 
dysfunction and the patriarchal assumptions that underlie the labeling of a lack of 
sexual activity in women as dysfunctions, there are political powers at work in the 
construction of female sexual dysfunction. With pharmaceutical corporations having 
made over $3 billion from the sale of sildefanil citrate for the treatment of erectile 
dysfunction between 1998 and 2003 (Moynihan, 2003), it is feasible that they then set 
their sights on a new drug for women.
In order to do this, however, the pharmaceutical companies required a recognized and 
discrete diagnosis sanctioned by the medical profession: this would enable them to 
move ahead with clinical trials. Accordingly, between 1997 and 2003, the drug 
companies funded and attended a series of meetings to come up with such a diagnosis 
(Moynihan, 2003; Tiefer, 2006). Another definitive step on the way to the 
construction of this new diagnosis was the publication of an article in 1999, which 
reported that as many as 43% of women aged between 18 and 59 in the United States 
had sexual dysfunction (Laumann, Paik & Rosen, 1999). Two of the authors later 
confessed to having links to the Pfizer corporation (Moynihan, 2003).
The construction of the diagnosis of female sexual dysfunction can be seen as an 
example of the medicalization of everyday life (Tiefer, 2010). Although there is some 
evidence that a large number of women do experience mental distress as a result of
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sexual problems (Laumann et al., 1999; Siddall, 2010), Tiefer (2010) suggests that 
this process of medicalization has not helped women: rather, it has made the processes 
of menstruation, childbirth and sex more opaque. The purpose and utility of the 
female sexual dysfunction diagnosis is therefore as flawed as its construction. 
Furthermore, the entrenchment of sex in the language of medicine constitutes an issue 
of power. For Foucault (1961), the scientific treatment of the insane in the late 18th 
Century was tantamount to a brutal exercise of knowledge over them: in such a way, 
the packaging of a hegemonic idea of female sexual performance into a diagnosis may 
be seen to be a modem exercise of brutality.
Stigma and diagnosis
So far, problems in current classification systems have been examined. Some effects 
of these systems will hereafter be addressed. Goffman (1963) suggests that when we 
perceive an attribute in an individual that is unanticipated, we stigmatize this 
individual. We go on to construct a stigma ideology in order to account for this 
individual’s inferiority, which may be heuristically linked to a category the individual 
happens to belong to. Mental health diagnoses neatly provide such categories.
Mental health related stigmas are thought to be even more powerful than those related 
to physical health (Bathje & Prior, 2011; Corrigan et al., 2000; Weiner, Magnusson, & 
Perry, 1988). Some surveys suggest that as many as two thirds of people who are 
mentally ill avoid seeking help (Andrews, Issikadis & Perry., 2001; Kessler et al., 
2001; Stefl & Prosper!, 1985). Other research has proposed that stigma is one of the 
barriers to seeking out interventions (Corrigan, 2004; Komiya, Good & Sherrod,
2000; Vogel, Wade & Haake, 2006). If this is the case, the labeling of individuals with 
diagnostic categories may have a negative effect.
Dickerson, Sommerville, Origoni, Ringel & Parente (2002) describe in detail 74 
schizophrenia patients’ experiences of stigma through responses to the Consumer 
Experience of Stigma Questionnaire (Wahl, 1999). Although they reported some 
interesting findings, such as respondents from higher socioeconomic backgrounds 
reporting experiences of greater stigma, general stigma scores were lower than 
expected. Significantly, the degree to which stigma was experienced was not found to
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be correlated to the type or seriousness of mental illness. The authors’ interpretation is 
that experience of stigma is not a function of severity of mental illness. This is in line 
with previous findings (Markowitz 1998). A further interpretation might be that the 
specific diagnostic label (in this case schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder) may 
not be as important for stigmatization as the presence of a label per se. This 
proposition tallies with the findings of Link, Streuning, Rahav, Phelan and Nuttbrock 
(1997), whose sample of 84 men with dual diagnoses of mental illness and substance 
abuse was also found to suffer due to stigma in terms of wellbeing. Ben-Porath 
(2002) has also found that individuals who have been diagnosed with depression were 
stigmatized; however, individuals diagnosed with depression who were also actively 
seeking psychological help were stigmatized even more strongly.
Bathje and Prior (2011) suggest that stigma relates to reluctance to seek treatment in 
two ways. First, people wish to avoid being labeled as mentally ill: tactics for this 
have even included avoiding using medical insurance to pay for mental health services 
(Sibicky & Dovidio, 1986). Second, by seeking help for psychological problems, 
people begin to identify themselves in such a way that threatens their self-esteem.
This twofold source of avoidance allows Bathje and Prior to propose a distinction 
between self-stigma and public stigma. Self stigma is described as “the internalized 
psychological impact of possessing a stigmatizing characteristic” (2011, p. 163). 
Public stigma is made up of prejudiced cognitive, behavioral and emotional reactions: 
there is further evidence that individuals with mental illnesses experience public 
stigma in a variety of situations (Dickerson, Sommerville & Origoni, 2002; Wahl, 
1999).
People’s unwillingness to seek help for mental distress may be just one of the 
problems associated with stigmatization in mental health. Tsao, Tummala and Roberts 
(2008) suggest that, among a variety of other effects (including decreased access to 
housing and physical healthcare), stigmatization engenders a decreased chance of 
recovery from mental illness. Many of the factors encapsulated within the original 
diagnosis may be reinforced by stigma: “the added burden that stigma imposes on the 
struggle to recovery can alter behavior, generate anxiety, and ultimately cause 
isolation from the mainstream culture” (Chin & Balon, 2006, p.262). Similar 
conclusions about the relation of stigma to the ability to recover from mental illness
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have been found in other literature (Ho, Chiu, Lo & Yu, 2010; Link, Streuning, 
Neese-Todd, Asmussen & Phelan, 2001; Perese, 2007; Perlick et al., 2001). Attempts 
have also been made to discern the cognitive mechanisms which underlie this process, 
for example Yanos, Roe, Markus & Lysaker (2008) suggest that stigma specifically 
affects hope and self-esteem and that consequent interventions should focus 
accordingly.
Other studies have demonstrated that the stigma of mental illness is not just a 
European or North American phenomenon. In Hong Kong, misunderstandings about 
serious mental illness have been found to coexist with the public denigration of 
discrimination, the latter being particularly present in older generations (Chiu & Chan, 
2007). Lauber and Rossler (2007), in a comprehensive review of research on the 
database Medline, found that stigma towards mental illness existed across Asia. In 
addition, only a small proportion of people sought interventions and mental health 
professionals were often responsible for promulgating stigma. In Africa, Nigerian 
schoolchildren have been found to stigmatize mental illness, making common use of 
derogatory labels (Ronzoni, Dogra, Omigbodun, Bella & Atitola, 2010). In addition, 
Mavundla, Toth and Mphelane (2009), using qualitative interviews following the 
deinstitutionalization of mental health facilities in South Africa, found that stigma was 
pervasive in attitudes towards those afflicted by mental illness and their caregivers.
Labeling and diagnosis
While the studies above demonstrate the worldwide presence of stigma in relation to 
mental health, it has yet to be shown diagnostic procedures are responsible for these 
stigmas. After all, Ronzoni et al.’s (2010) study of Nigerian schoolchildren and 
Bradford, Newkirk and Holden’s (2009) study of stigma of mental health in the 
African American population of the USA suggest that labeling and consequent 
stigmatization occur before individuals even get as far as diagnosis.
Labeling theory proposes that the diagnostic process per se can be responsible for 
mental illness. Narrowing the widely held sociological tenet that the etiology of 
mental illness is social in nature (Cochrane, 1983), it proposes that mental illness is a
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kind of deviancy which is not generated within the individual, but by the people who 
label the associated behavior as deviant.
Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction 
constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and 
labeling them as outsiders... The deviant is one to whom that label has 
been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label. (Becker,
1963, p.9)
In labeling theory the process of labeling is directly related to stigmatization, which is 
believed to be the most powerful reaction to deviance (Scheff, 1999). Labeling is a 
prelude to the segregation of an individual, which consequently invites stigma. In the 
realm of mental illness, individuals are then believed to act out simulations or embody 
secondary deviations which are in direct reaction to their diagnoses.
One classic study (originally performed in the early 1970s), which is often used to 
demonstrate that the manifestation of mental illness is the forced fulfillment of deviant 
roles rather than the expression of biological pathology, is Rosenhan’s (2008) 
investigation of 12 stooges who gained access to mental institutions and their 
consequent treatment. The stooges were told to present themselves at the institutions 
complaining of hearing words like ‘hollow’ and ‘thud’: even though they presented no 
other symptoms, they were all admitted and most of them were diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. During their admission, they enacted no further symptoms, but were 
never suspected as being anything other than mentally ill by any of the clinical staff. 
Rosenhan took these findings to mean that even for psychiatrists, it was impossible to 
tell the difference between the mentally ill and the mentally healthy in institutions.
Rosenhan’s conclusions have been criticized on a number of grounds. For example, 
the correct interpretation of the findings has been suggested to be that a few 
psychiatrists were unable to differentiate between people who were mentally ill and 
people pretending to be mentally ill (Millon, 1975; Spitzer, 1975; Weiner, 1975).
Other criticisms are addressed by Cochrane (1983), including there being no obvious 
cause of the disappearance of the stooges’ hallucinations; he suggests that overall, the 
study shows that there might be iatrogenic effects of diagnosis and treatment by
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clinicians, but that this is different to a claim that labeling causes mental illness. 
Nevertheless, similar cases of difficulties stemming from being labeled with a 
diagnosis have come about more recently: Double (2001) describes an individual, Kay 
Sheldon, who was misdiagnosed with schizophrenia and found that no one listened to 
her when she reported that her treatment was incorrect. Her only available course of 
action was to bring a lawsuit, about which a legal representative of Mind (the mental 
health charity) commented, “once a psychiatrist has formed a diagnosis, it can be 
extremely difficult to get it reviewed or changed” (cited in Double, 2001, p.40).
Scheff (1975) cites a number of other studies which corroborate labeling theory of 
mental illness through connection of diagnosis to social attributes (Greenley, 1972; 
Linsky, 1970a; Rushing, 1971; Wenger & Fletcher, 1969; Wilde, 1968). Some of this 
material (Linsky, 1970b; Rushing, 1971) indicates that psychiatric sectioning is 
related to social class: in these studies the rate of voluntary to involuntary sections 
was measured, which controls for the possibility that higher rates in lower 
socioeconomic strata may be occurring due to a greater a priori presence of mental 
illness. Criticisms of labeling theory have come from Karmel (1969, 1970) in two 
studies which show no adoption of deviant roles by patients following diagnosis, and 
by Gove and Fain (1973), who found no significant effects of stigma on a sample of 
ex-mental patients.
More recent literature has shown how diagnostic labels can affect individuals 
negatively from media sources (Scheff, 2010) and from a longitudinal study by 
Bemburg et al. (2006) on the activities of delinquent offenders. Modified labeling 
theory, which has been developed by Link (1987) and Link, Cullen, Streuning, Shrout 
and Dohrenwend (1989), suggests that individuals diagnosed with mental disorders 
begin to identify with their new label, which engenders feelings of demoralization. 
Furthermore, the individual’s damaged self-concept brings about behavior whose 
object is to repulse social rejection: this includes withdrawal from social interaction, 
concealing previous psychiatric interventions and teaching others about mental illness. 
This behavior in turn may perpetuate a cycle of rejection and demoralization (Link, 
Mirotznik & Cullen, 1991). Sartorius (2002) also suggests that iatrogenic 
stigmatization does not stop at labeling but that diagnosis may lead to treatment by 
mental health professionals that will “produce side effects... which will mark the
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person as having a mental illness more than the original symptoms of illness did”
(p. 1471). The prospect that an adherence to diagnostic labeling in mental health 
services may be generating new illness is worrying and could even provide another 
explanation for the prevalence of comorbidity.
Charland (2004) brings an interesting question to the labeling discussion -  what 
happens when diagnostic labels change or get removed? He contends that labels can 
give people a specific iatrogenic identity and that by removing these labels, damage 
can be inflicted on a person’s sense of identity: for example, the New Zealand author 
Janet Frame describes how having had her diagnosis changed, she felt “stripped of a 
garment [she] had worn for twelve or thirteen years” (Frame, 1985, p. 103). Charland 
(2004) also identifies how the internet has enabled the balkanization of iatrogenic 
identities by group users. However, the way they have clung on to diagnoses which no 
longer exist may be evidence of the linguistic power of the diagnostic establishment 
dwindling.
This is echoed by Giles and Newbold (2011) who, in a qualitative analysis of the 
construction of diagnosis in online mental health communities, suggest that diagnoses 
are entwined with identity and that clinical professionals are associated more with 
authority than expertise. In any case, the shifting of diagnostic categories that has 
taken place in the past and that has continued with the recent revision of the DSM  
could have negative consequences for the diagnosed. The fact that these shifts may 
have happened for political reasons, rather than as a result of empirical fine-tuning 
(Joseph, 2004; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Szasz, 1981) could mean the existence of these 
negative consequences is unwarranted.
Conclusion
There are currently considerable problems with diagnostic systems in mental health. If 
we are to believe the critics of these systems, diagnosis in mental health may not be a 
process of naming of discrete pathologies with their roots in a specific organic 
aberration, but a political act. As Edelman (1974) suggests, we may assume that a 
taxonomic act is either political or scientific; however, it may be both, according to 
who performs it, rather than as an a priori function of the diagnostic term. As
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counseling psychologists, it is important to be aware of the problems with diagnosis 
and the resonance the language of diagnosis has. From a humanistic perspective, this 
could mean pathology may not be compatible with empathy.
Boyle (1990) has argued diagnostic categories should be entirely debunked and 
replaced with an alternative system. However, Double (2001) suggests that, 
pragmatically speaking, some sort of diagnostic process still needs to take place. He 
also suggests that a complete rejection of the concept of mental illness (for example 
Szasz, 1974) goes too far, because it allows biomedical psychiatry to marginalize 
critiques which, like Szsaz’s arguments, are misunderstood to be an attack on mental 
illness itself.
In the future, Bentall (2003) has argued that a psychosocial approach to mental illness 
should be used which encompasses learning from empirical biological research as 
well as an awareness of the social environment surrounding the individual who 
experiences mental distress: this is echoed by other writers (Cromby, 2004; Double, 
2001; Farrell, 1979; Kleinman, 1988). Writing about an alternative to diagnosis, 
Tynedale (1998) suggests that assessment is a better tool for psychotherapists: she 
explains that while diagnosis is concerned with illness, assessment is concerned with 
health; she asks, why should we find diagnosis helpful when (even empirically) it tells 
us so little about the individual?
This is a pertinent question. Pilgrim (2007) proposes that the main challenge for 
psychologists may now be not to account for what is wrong with psychiatric 
diagnosis, but why it has survived. Based on the literature reviewed here, it seems that 
there is a strong historical and political element in mainstream mental and behavioral 
healthcare whose aim is the preservation of power -  through unscientific 
categorization, through language and through ties to the pharmaceutical industry. This 
has been challenged by many of the authors cited here and may yet be challenged 
further by the democratizing influence of the internet. For now, labeling people with 
mental health diagnoses produces harmful stigmatizing effects that can hinder, rather 
than support their wellbeing. By taking part in this process, counseling psychologists 
and others may collude in an iatrogenic process.
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It is beyond the remit of this review to analyze current alternatives to diagnosis, such 
as person-centered psychiatric diagnosis (Mezzich et ah, 2010), or case formulation 
either in cognitive behavioral paradigms (for example Dudley & Kuyken, 2006; 
Tarrier & Calam, 2002) or in psychodynamic therapy (for example Curtis, 
Silberschatz, Sampson, Weiss & Rosenberg, 1988; Leiper, 2006). However, one 
interesting area for future research would be to understand why counseling 
psychologists choose to adhere to diagnoses; or, if they are forced to because of the 
nature of their workplace, how they experience working with diagnosis. Another gap 
which further research might fill concerns the use of language by clinicians 
(classically influenced; medical; acronyms) and peoples’ experience of it. These 
discussions would be of interest to any practitioners with an interest in their 
relationships with clients and from a social, historical and political point of view and 
could be of particular value in the context of recent DSM-5 revisions.
117
Research Dossier
References
Abdel-Khalek, A. M., & Soliman, H. H. (1999). A cross-cultural evaluation of 
depression in children in Egypt, Kuwait, and the United States. Psychological 
Reports, SJ(3), 973-980.
Akiskal, H. S., & Benazzi, F. (2006). The DSM-IV and ICD-10 categories of 
recurrent [major] depressive and bipolar II disorders: Evidence that they lie on a 
dimensional spectrum. Journal o f  Affective Disorders, 92(1), 45-54.
American Psychiatric Association (1980). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f  
Mental Disorders (3rd edn). Washington: Author.
American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f  
Mental Disorders (4th edn, text revision). Washington: Author.
American Psychiatric Association (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f  
Mental Disorders (5th edn). Washington: Author.
Andrews, G., Issakidis, C., & Carter, G. (2001). Shortfall in mental health service 
utilisation. British Journal o f Psychiatry, 179 (5), 417-425.
Ash, P. (1949). The reliability of psychiatric diagnosis. Journal o f  Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 44, 272-276.
Baddeley, M. (1989). Neurolinguistic programming: The academic verdict so far. 
Australian Journal o f  Clinical Hypnotherapy and Hypnosis, 10(2), 73-81.
Bathje, G. J., & Pryor, J. B. (2011). The relationships of public and self-stigma to 
seeking mental health services. Journal o f  Mental Health Counseling, 33(2), 161-176.
Becker, H. S. (1963). Outsiders. New York: Free Press.
Ben-Porath, D. D. (2002). Stigmatization of individuals who receive psychotherapy: 
An interaction between help-seeking behavior and the presence of depression. Journal 
o f Social and Clinical Psychology, 21(4), 400-413.
Bentall, R. P. (2003). Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human Nature. ePenguin.
Bemburg, J., Krohn, M. D., & Rivera, C. J. (2006). Official labeling, criminal 
embeddedness, and subsequent delinquency: A longitudinal test of labeling theory. 
Journal o f Research in Crime and Delinquency, 43(1), 67-88.
Bomstein, R. F. (2011). Reconceptualizing personality pathology in DSM-5: 
Limitations in evidence for eliminating dependent personality disorder and other 
DSM-IV syndromes. Journal o f Personality Disorders, 25(2), 235-247.
Boyle, M. (1990). Schizophrenia: A Scientific Delusion? London: Routledge.
118
Research Dossier
Bradford, L., Newkirk, C., & Holden, K. (2009). Stigma and mental health in African 
Americans. In R. L. Braithwaite, S. E. Taylor, H. M. Treadwell, R. L. Braithwaite, S. 
E. Taylor, H. M. Treadwell (Eds.), Health issues in the Black community (3rd ed.) (pp. 
119-131). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Brockington, I. F. (1992). Schizophrenia: Yesterday's concept. European Psychiatry, 
7(5), 203-207.
Burr, V. (1995). An Introduction to Social Constructionism. London: Routledge.
Cassano, G. B., Rucci, P., Frank, E., Fagiolini, A., Dell'Osso, L., Shear, M., & Kupfer, 
D. J. (2004). The mood spectrum in unipolar and bipolar disorder: Arguments for a 
unitary approach. The American Journal o f Psychiatry, 7 (57(7), 1264-1269.
Charland, L. C. (2004). A madness for identity: Psychiatric labels, consumer 
autonomy, and the perils of the internet. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 77, 
335-349.
Chen, I., Roberts, R. E., & Aday, L. (1998). Ethnicity and adolescent depression: The 
case of Chinese Americans. Journal o f  Nervous and Mental Disease, 7 #6(10), 623- 
630.
Cheng T. O. (1994). Acronym aggravation. British Heart Journal, 71, 107-109.
Chin S. H., & Balon R. (2006). Attitudes and perceptions toward depression and 
schizophrenia among residents in different medical specialties. Academic Psychiatry 
30, 262-263.
Chiu, M. Y. L., & Chan, K. K. L. (2007). Community attitudes towards discriminatory 
practice against people with severe mental illness in Hong Kong. International 
Journal o f  Social Psychiatry 53(2), 159-74.
Clark, L. (2007). Assessment and diagnosis of personality disorder: perennial issues 
and an emerging reconceptualization. Annual Review O f Psychology, 58, 227-257.
Cochrane, R. (1983). The Social Creation o f Mental Illness. London: Longman.
Collier, A. (1994). Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy. 
London: Verso.
Cooper, 1, Kendell, R., Gurland, E., Sharpe, L., Copeland, J., & Simon, R. (1972). 
Psychiatric Diagnosis in New York and London (Maudsley Monograph No.20).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Corrigan, P. (2004). How stigma interferes with mental health care. American 
Psychologist, 59(7), 614-625.
Cromby, J. (2004). Depression: Embodying social inequality. Journal o f  Critical 
Psychology, Counselling and Psychotherapy, 4(3), 176-187.
119
Research Dossier
Curtis, J. T., Silberschatz, G., Sampson, H., Weiss, J., Rosenberg, S. E. (1988). 
Developing reliable psychodynamic case formulations: An illustration of the plan 
diagnosis method. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 25(2), 256- 
265.
Di Nardo, P. A., Brown, T. A., & Barlow, D. H. (1994). Anxiety Disorders Interview 
Schedule fo r  DSM-IV: Lifetime version (ADIS-1V-L). San Antonio, TX: Psychological 
Corporation.
Dickerson, F. B., Sommerville, J. L., & Origoni, A. E. (2002). Mental illness stigma: 
An impediment to psychiatric rehabilitation. Psychiatric Rehabilitation Skills, 6, 186- 
200.
Dickerson, F. B., Sommerville, J. L., Origoni, A. E., Ringel, N. B., & Parente, F.
(2002). Experiences of stigma among outpatients with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 25(1), 143-155.
Double, D. B. (2001). The overemphasis on biomedical diagnosis in psychiatry. 
Journal o f  Critical Psychology, Counselling and Psychotherapy, 2, 40-47.
Dudley, R., & Kuyken, W. (2006). Formulation in cognitive-behavioural therapy: 
‘There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so’. In L. Johnstone & R. 
Dallos (Eds.), Formulation in Psychology and Psychotherapy (pp. 17-46). Hove: 
Routledge.
Edelman, M. (1974) The political language of the helping professions. Politics and
4(3), 295-310.
Farmer, A. E., McGuffin, O., & Gottesman, 1.1. (1987). Twin concordance for DSM- 
III schizophrenia: scrutinizing the validity of the definition. Archives o f General 
Psychiatry, 44, 634-641.
Farrell, B. A. (1979). Mental illness: A conceptual analysis. Psychological Medicine, 
9,21-35.
First, M. B. (2008, February) Autism and Other Pervasive Developmental Disorders 
Conference. Minutes from APA Conference at M.I.N.D. Institute in Sacramento, CA. 
Retrieved 9 June 2011 from dsm5.org / research / pages / 
autismandotherpervasivedevelopmentaldisordersconference%28february3- 
5,2008%29.aspx
Foucault, M. (1965). Madness and Civilisation. Toronto: Random House.
Frame, J. (1985). An Autobiography. The Envoy from Mirror City. New York: George 
Braziller.
Giles, D. C., & Newbold, J. (2011). Self- and other-diagnosis in user-led mental 
health online communities. Qualitative Health Research 27(3), 419-428.
120
Research Dossier
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the Management o f  Spoiled Identity.
Harmonds worth : Penguin.
Goldner, E., Hsu, L., Waraich, P., & Somers, J. (2002). Prevalence and incidence 
studies of schizophrenic disorders: A systematic review of the literature. Canadian 
Journal o f Psychiatry 47, 833-843.
Gonzalez, H., Tarraf, W., Whitfield, K., & Vega, W. (2010). The epidemiology of 
major depression and ethnicity in the United States. Journal O f Psychiatric Research, 
44(15), 1043-1051.
Goodwin, F. K., & Jamison, K. R. (2007). Manic-Depressive Illness: Bipolar 
Disorders and Recurrent Depression (2nd edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gove, W. R., & Fain. T. (1973). The stigma of mental hospitalization: An attempt to 
evaluate its consequences. Archives O f General Psychiatry 25(4), 494-500.
Greenley, J. R. (1972). The psychiatric patient’s family and length of hospitalization. 
Journal o f Health and Social Behavior, 73(1), 25-37.
Halliday, M. A. K., & Martin, J. R. (1993). Writing Science: Literacy and Discursive 
Power.
Hite, S. (1987). The Hite Report: Women and Love: A Cultural Revolution in 
Progress. New York: Knopf.
Ho, W. N., Chiu, M. L., Lo, W. L., & Yiu, M. C. (2010). Recovery components as 
determinants of the health-related quality of life among patients with schizophrenia: 
structural equation modelling analysis. Australian & New Zealand Journal o f  
Psychiatry, 44(1), 71-84.
Hunt, W. A., Wittson, C. L., & Hunt, E. B. (1953). A theoretical and practical analysis 
of the diagnostic process. In P. H. Hoch and J. Zubon (Eds.), Current Problems o f  
Psychiatric Diagnosis. New York: Grune & Stratton.
Isaacs, D, & Fitzgerald, D. (2000). Acronymophilia: an update. Archives o f  Disease in 
Childhood, 83, 517-518.
Jackson, D. (1960). The Etiology o f Schizophrenia. New York: Basic Books.
Jackson, H. (1986). Is there a schizotoxin? In N. Eisenberg and D. Glasgow (Eds.), 
Current Issues in Clinical Psychology (pp. 126-140). Aldershot: Gower.
Jensen, P. S., Knapp, P., & Mrazek, D. A. (2006) Toward a New Diagnostic System 
For Child Psychopathology: Moving Beyond the DSM. New York: Guilford Press.
Joseph, (2004). Schizophrenia and heredity: Why the emperor has no genes. In J.
Read, L. R. Mosher & R. P. Bentall (Eds.), Models o f Madness: Psychological, Social 
and Biological Approaches to Schizophrenia (pp.67-84). Hove: Routledge.
121
Research Dossier
Katsounari, L (2009). Self-esteem, depression and eating disordered attitudes: a cross- 
cultural comparison between Cypriot and British young women. European Eating 
Disorders Review, 17(6), 455-461.
Kessler, R., Berglund, P., Bruce, M., Koch, J., Laska, E., Leaf, P., & ... Wang, P. 
(2001). The prevalence and correlates of untreated serious mental illness. Health 
Services Research, 36(6), 987-1007.
Kirk, S. A., & Kutchins, H. (1992). The Selling o f the DSM: The Rhetoric o f Science 
in Psychiatry. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Kleinman, A. (1988). Rethinking Psychiatry: From cultural category to personal 
experience. New York: Free Press.
Komiya, N., Good, G. E., & Sherrod, N. B. (2000). Emotional openness as a predictor 
of college students’ attitudes toward seeking psychological help. Journal o f  
Counseling Psychology, 47(1), 138-143.
Krueger, R. F. (2010). Personality pathology is dimensional, so what shall we do with 
the DSM-IV personality disorder categories? The case of narcissistic personality 
disorder: Comment on Miller and Campbell (2010). Personality Disorders: Theory, 
Research, and Treatment, 1(3), 195-196.
Lauber, C., & Rossler, W. (2007). Stigma towards people with mental illness in 
developing countries in Asia. International Review o f  Psychiatry, 19(2), 157-178.
Laumann, E., Paik, A., & Rosen, R. (1999). Sexual dysfunction in the United States: 
Prevalence and predictors. Journal o f the American Medical Association, 281, 537- 
544.
Leiper, R. (2006). Psychodynamic formulation: A prince betrayed and disinherited. In 
L. Johnstone & R. Dallos (Eds.), Formulation in Psychology and Psychotherapy 
(pp.47-71). Hove: Routledge.
Leonhard, K. (1979). The Classification o f  Endogenous Psychoses (5th edn). New 
York: Irvington Publishers.
Liddell, H. G., & Scott, R. (1891). A Lexicon: Abridgedfrom Liddell and Scott’s 
Greek-English Lexicon (9th edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Link, B. (1987). Understanding labeling effects in the area of mental disorders: An 
assessment of the effects of expectations of rejection. American Sociological Review 
52(1), 96-112.
Link, B., Cullen, F., Struening, E., Shrout, P. & Dohrenwend, B. (1989). A modified 
labeling theory approach to mental disorders: An empirical assessment. American 
Sociological Review 54(3), 400-23.
122
Research Dossier
Link, B., Mirotznik, J., & Cullen, F. (1991). The effectiveness of stigma coping 
orientations: Can negative consequences of mental illness labeling be avoided? 
Journal o f Health and Social Behavior 32(3), 302-20.
Link, B., Struening, E., Neese-Todd, S., Asmussen, S., & Phelan, J. (2001). Stigma as 
a barrier to recovery: The consequences of stigma for the self-esteem of people with 
mental illnesses. Psychiatric Services, 52(12), 1621-1626.
Link, B. G., Struening, E. L., Rahav, M., Phelan, J., & Nuttbrock, L. (1997). On 
stigma and its consequences: Evidence from a longitudinal study of men with dual 
diagnoses of mental illness and substance abuse. Journal o f Health and Social 
Behavior, 38, 177-190.
Link, B. G., Yang, L. H., Phelan, J. C., & Collins, P. Y. (2004). Measuring mental 
illness stigma. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 30(3), 511-541.
Linsky, A. S. (1970a). Community homogeneity and exclusion of the mentally ill: 
Rejection versus consensus about deviance. Journal o f Health and Social Behavior, 
11(A), 304-311.
Linsky, A. S. (1970b). Who shall be excluded: The influence of personal attributes in 
community reaction to the mentally ill. Social Psychiatry, 5(3), 166-171.
Malmkjaer, K. (2004). The Linguistics Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge.
Markowitz, F. E. (1998). The effects of stigma on the psychological well-being and 
life satisfaction of persons with mental illness. Journal o f Health and Social Behavior, 
34, 335-347.
Masters, W. H., & Johnson, V. E. (1966). Human Sexual Response. Oxford: Little, 
Brown.
Mavundla, T. T., Toth, F. F., & Mphelane, M. M. (2009). Caregiver experience in 
mental illness: a perspective from a rural community in South Africa. International 
Journal of Mental Health Nursing, 18(5), 357-367.
Mayes, S., & Calhoun, S. L. (2004). Influence of IQ and Age in Childhood Autism: 
Lack of Support for DSM-IV Asperger's Disorder. Journal o f Developmental and 
Physical Disabilities, 16(3), 257-272.
Mayes, S., Calhoun, S., & Crites, D. (2001). Does DSM-IV Asperger’s disorder exist? 
Journal o f Abnormal Child Psychology, 3, 263-271.
Mayes, S., Calhoun, S. L., Murray, M. J., Morrow, J. D., Yurich, K. L., Cothren, S., & 
... Bouder, J. N. (2011). Use of Gilliam Asperger's Disorder Scale in differentiating 
high and low functioning autism and ADHD. Psychological Reports, 108(\), 3-13.
123
Research Dossier
Mayes, S., Calhoun, S. L., Murray, M. J., Morrow, J. D., Yurich, K. L., Mahr, F., & ... 
Petersen, C. (2009). Comparison of Scores on the Checklist for Autism Spectrum 
Disorder, Childhood Autism Rating Scale, and Gilliam Asperger’s Disorder Scale for 
Children with Low Functioning Autism, High Functioning Autism, Asperger’s 
Disorder, ADHD, and.. Journal o f Autism & Developmental Disorders, 39(12), 1682- 
1693.
McGuffin, P., Farmer, A., & Harvey, I. (1991). A polydiagnostic application of 
operational criteria in studies of psychotic illness. Development and reliability of the 
OPCRJT system. Archives o f  General Psychiatry, 48, 764-770.
McPherson, S., & Armstrong, D. (2005). Social determinants of diagnostic labels in 
depression. Social Science & Medicine 62, 50-58.
Meltzer, H., Gatwood, R., Goodman, R., & Ford, T. (2000). Mental Health o f  
Children and Adolescents in Great Britain. London: Office for National Statistics.
Mezzich, J. E., Salloum, I. M., C., R., Salvador-Carulla, L., Kirmayer, L. J., Banzato, 
C. M., & ... Botbol, M. (2010). Person-centred Integrative Diagnosis: Conceptual 
Bases and Structural Model. Canadian Journal o f Psychiatry, 55(11), 701-708.
Miller, J. D., & Campbell, W. K. (2008). Comparing clinical and social-personality 
conceptualizations of narcissism. Journal o f Personality, 76,449-476.
Miller, J. D., & Campbell, W. K. (2010). The case for using research on trait 
narcissism as a building block for understanding narcissistic personality disorder. 
Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 1, 180-191.
Millon, T. (1975). Reflections on Rosenhan's ‘On being sane in insane places’.
Journal o f Abnormal Psychology, 84(5), 456-461.
Milroy, J., & Milroy, M. (1985). Authority and Language: Investigating Language, 
Precision and Standardisation. New York: Routledge & Keegan Paul, Inc.
Mintz, L. B., O'Halloran, M., Mulholland, A. M., & Schneider, P. A. (1997). 
Questionnaire for Eating Disorder Diagnoses: Reliability and validity of 
operationalizing DSM-IV criteria into a self-report format. Journal o f  Counseling 
Psychology, 44(1), 63-79.
Moynihan, R. (2003). The making of a disease: Female sexual dysfunction. British 
Medical Journal, 326, 45-47.
National Collaborating Centre For Mental Health (2010). Antisocial Personality 
Disorder: Treatment, Management and Prevention. London: British Psychological 
Society & The Royal College of Psychiatrists.
Nichter, M. (2010). Idioms of Distress Revisited. Culture, Medicine & Psychiatry, 
34(2), 401-416.
124
Research Dossier
Orlowski J. P., Christensen J. A. (2002). The potentially coercive nature of some 
clinical research trial acronyms. Chest, 121,2023-2028.
Pakhomov, S. (2002). Semi-supervised maximum entropy based approach to acronym 
and abbreviation normalization in medical texts. Proceedings o f the 40th Annual 
Meeting o f the Association fo r  Computational Linguistics, 160-167.
Patel C. B., & Rashid R. M. (2009). Averting the proliferation of acronymophilia in 
dermatology: effectively avoiding ADCOMSUBORDCOMPHIBSPAC. Journal o f  
American Academic Dermatolology 60(2), 340^4.
Peplau, L. A., & Gordon, S. L. (1985). Women and men in love: Gender differences 
in close heterosexual relationships. In V. E. O’Leary, R. K. Unger & B. S. Wallston 
(Eds.), Women, Gender, and Social Psychology (pp. 257-292). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Perese, E. F. (2007). Stigma, poverty, and victimization: Roadblocks to recovery for 
individuals with severe mental illness. Journal o f the American Psychiatric Nurses 
Association, 13(5), 285-295.
Perlick, D., Rosenheck, R., Clarkin, J., Sirey, J., Salahi, J., Struening, E., & Link, B. 
(2001). Stigma as a barrier to recovery: Adverse effects of perceived stigma on social 
adaptation of persons diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder. Psychiatric Services 
52(12), 1627-1632.
Pierucci-Lagha, A., Gelemter, J., Chan, G., Arias, A., Cubells, J: F., Fairer, L., & 
Kranzler, H. R. (2007). Reliability of DSM-IV diagnostic criteria using the semi­
structured assessment for drug dependence and alcoholism (SSADDA). Drug and 
Alcohol Dependence, 97(1), 85-90.
Pilgrim, D. (2007). The survival of psychiatric diagnosis. Social Science & Medicine, 
65(3), 536-547.
Pincus, H. A., Frances, A., Davis, W. W., First, M. B., & Widiger, T. A. (1992). 
DSM-IV and new diagnostic categories: holding the line on proliferation. American 
Journal o f Psychiatry, 149( 1), 112-117.
Prout, A., & James, A. (1997). Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: 
Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study o f  Childhood. London: Falmer Press.
Read, J. (2004). Biological psychiatry’s lost cause. In J. Read, L. R. Mosher & R. P. 
Bentall (Eds.), Models o f Madness: Psychological, Social and Biological Approaches 
to Schizophrenia (pp.57-66). Hove: Routledge.
Read, J., Mosher, L. R., & Bentall, R. P. (Eds.) (2004). Models o f Madness: 
Psychological, Social and Biological Approaches to Schizophrenia. Hove: Routledge.
Ronzoni, P., Dogra, N., Omigbodun, O., Bella, T., & Atitola, O. (2010).
Stigmatization of mental illness among Nigerian schoolchildren. International Journal 
o f Social Psychiatry, 56(5), 507-514.
125
Research Dossier
Rosenhan, D. L. (2008). On being sane in insane places. In R. Heiner, R. Heiner 
(Eds.), Deviance Across Cultures (pp. 235-242). New York: Oxford University Press.
Rushing, W. (1971). Individual resources, social reaction, and hospital commitment. 
American Journal O f Sociology, 77(3), 511-526.
Ryder, A. (2005). Cross-cultural differences in the presentation of depression: Chinese 
somatization and Western psychologization. Dissertation Abstracts International, 66, 
Retrieved from EBSCOhost.
Sartorius, N. (2002). Iatrogenic stigma of mental illness. British Medical Journal, 324, 
1470-1.
Scheff T. J. (1975). The labelling theory of mental illness. In T. J. Scheff (Ed.), 
Labelling Madness (pp. 21-34). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
Scheff, T. J. (1999). Being Mentally III: A Sociological Theory (3rd edn). New York: 
Aldine de Gruyter.
Scheff, T. (2010). Normalizing Symptoms: Neither Labeling nor Enabling. Ethical 
Human Psychology & Psychiatry, 12(3), 232-237.
Sibicky, M., & Dovidio, J. F. (1986). Stigma of psychological therapy: Stereotypes, 
interpersonal reactions, and the self-fulfilling prophecy. Journal o f Counseling 
Psychology, 33(2), 148-154.
Solanto, M. V., & Alvir, J. (2009). Reliability of DSM-IV symptom ratings of ADHD: 
Implications for DSM-V. Journal o f Attention Disorders, 13(2), 107-116.
Somers, J. M., Goldner, E. M., Waraich, P., & Hsu, L. (2006). Prevalence and 
incidence studies of anxiety disorders: A systematic review of the literature. Canadian 
Journal o f Psychiatry, 51 (2), 100-113.
Spitzer, R. L. (1975). On pseudoscience in science, logic in remission, and psychiatric 
diagnosis: A critique of Rosenhan's ‘On being sane in insane places’. Journal o f  
Abnormal Psychology, 84(5), 442-452.
Stefl, M. E., & Prosper!, D. C. (1985). Barriers to mental health service utilization. 
Community Mental Health Journal, 21(3), 167-178.
Strawbridge, S., & Woolfe, R. (2010). Counselling Psychology: Origins,
Developments and Changes. In R. Woolfe, S. Strawbridge, B. Douglas & W. Dryden 
(Eds.), Handbook o f Counselling Psychology (3rd edn., pp.3-22). London: Sage.
Szasz, T. (1974). The Myth o f Mental Illness: Foundations o f a Theory o f Personal 
Conduct (1st Harper Perennial edn). New York: Harper Perennial.
Szasz, T. (1981). Sex: Facts, Frauds and Follies. Oxford: Blackwell.
126
Research Dossier
Tarrier, N., & Calam, R. (2002). New developments in cognitive-behavioural case 
formulation. Epidemiological, systemic and social context: An integrative approach. 
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 30, 311-328.
Taylor, E. Sandberg, S., Thorley, G., & Giles, S. (1991). The Epidemiology o f  
Childhood Hyperactivity (Maudsley Monograph No.33). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Tiefer, L. (1991). Historical, scientific, clinical and feminist criticisms of ‘the human 
sexual response cycle’ model. Annual Review o f Sex Research, 2, 1-23.
Tiefer, L. (1995). Sex is Not a Natural Act and Other Essays: Psychology, Gender, 
and Theory. Boulder: Westview Press.
Tiefer, L.(2006). Female sexual dysfunction: A case study of disease mongering and 
activist resistance. Public Library o f Science Medicine 3(4), 436-440.
Tiefer, L. (2010). Beyond the medical problem of women’s sexual problems: A 
campaign to resist the promotion of ‘female sexual dysfunction’. Sexual and 
Relationship Therapy, 25(2), 197-205.
Timimi, S., & Taylor, E. (2004). ADHD is best understood as a cultural construct. 
British Medical Journal, 184, 8-9.
Tsao, C. I. P., Tummala, A., & Roberts, L. W. (2008). Stigma in mental health care. 
Academic Psychiatry, 32(2), 70-72.
Torrey, E. (1987). Prevalence studies in schizophrenia. British Journal o f  Psychiatry, 
150, 598-608.
Tryon, P. A., Mayes, S. D., Rhodes, R. L., & Waldo, M. (2006). Can Asperger's 
disorder be differentiated from autism using DSM-IV criteria? Focus on Autism & 
Other Developmental Disabilities, 27(1), 2-6.
Tynedale, A. (1998). The difference between diagnosis and assessment in 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy. In J. Cooper & H. Alfillé (Eds.), Assessment in 
Psychotherapy (pp.47-62). London: Kamac.
Tyrer, P. (1995). Are personality disorders well classified in DSM-IV? In W. J. 
Livesley (Ed.), The DSM-IV Personality Disorders (pp.29-48). New York: The 
Guildford Press.
Ussher, J. M., & Baker, C. D. (Eds.) (1993). Psychological Perspectives on Sexual 
Problems: New Directions in Theory and Practice. London: Routledge.
van Duijl, M., Cardena, E., & de Jong, J. (2005). The validity of DSM-IV dissociative 
disorders categories in south-west Uganda. Transcultural Psychiatry, 42(2), 219-241.
van Os, J., Galdos, P. M., Lewis, G., Mann, A., & Bourgeois, M. (1993). 
Schizophrenia sans frontières. British Medical Journal, 307, 489-492.
127
Research Dossier
van Os, 1 , Gilvarry, G., Bale, R., van Horn, E., Tattan, T., White, L, & Murray, R.
(1999). A comparison of the utility of dimensional and categorical representations of 
psychosis. Psychological Medicine, 29, 595-606.
van Os, J., & McGuffm, P. (2003). Can the social environment cause schizophrenia? 
British Journal o f Psychiatry, 182, 191-192.
Vogel, D. L., Wade, N. G., & Haake, S. (2006). Measuring the self-stigma associated 
with seeking psychological help. Journal o f Counseling Psychology, 53(3), 325-337.
Wahl, O. F. (1999). Mental health consumers’ experience of stigma. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 25, 467-478.
Waraich, P., Goldner, E. M., Somers, J. M., & Hsu, L. (2004). Prevalence and 
incidence studies of mood disorders: A systematic review of the literature. Canadian 
Journal o f Psychiatry, 49(2), 124-138.
Weiner, B. (1975). ‘On being sane in insane places’: A process (attributional) analysis 
and critique. Journal o f Abnormal Psychology, 84(5), 433-441.
Wenger, D. L., & Fletcher, C. (1969). The effect of legal counsel on admissions to a 
state mental hospital: A confrontation of professions. Journal o f Health and Social 
Behavior, 10(\), 66-72.
Wilde, W. A. (1968). Decision-making in a psychiatric screening agency. Journal o f  
Health and Social Behavior, 9(3), 215-221.
Williams, J. B. W., Terman, M., Link, M. J., Amira, L., & Rosenthal, N. E. (1994). 
Hypomania Interview Guide (including hyperthymia). Norwood, NJ: Center for 
Environmental Therapeutics.
Witkowski, T. (2010). Thirty-five years of research on Neuro-Linguistic 
Programming. NLP research data base. State of the art or pseudoscientific decoration? 
Polish Psychological Bulletin, 41(2), 58-66.
Woodbury-Smith, M., Klin, A., & Volkmar, F. (2005). Asperger’s syndrome: A 
comparison of clinical diagnoses and those made according to the ICD-10 and DSM- 
IV. Journal o f  Autism and Developmental Disorders, 35(2), 235-240.
World Health Organisation (1992). The ICD-10 Classification o f Mental and 
Behavioural Disorders: Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines. Geneva: 
Author.
Yanos, P. T., Roe, D., Markus, K., & Lysaker, P. H. (2008). Pathways between 
internalized stigma and outcomes related to recovery in schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders. Psychiatric Services, 59(12), 1437-1442.
128
Research Dossier
Yoo, S., & Skovholt, T. M. (2001). Cross-cultural examination of depression 
expression and help-seeking behavior: A comparative study of American and Korean 
college students. Journal o f College Counseling, 4(1), 10-19.
129
Research Dossier
Appendix A: Submission guidelines from The Journal o f  Critical Psychology, 
Counselling and Psychotherapy
GUIDELINES to CONTRIBUTORS for JCPCP
When considering submitting a paper to The Journal o f Critical Psychology, 
Counselling and Psychotherapy authors need to follow the guidelines that can be 
found in the inside cover: Length (4000 words MAX inc refs), summary (25 words 
MAX), brief sentence for author biog/biogs. Please check the references before 
submission and do not include complicated diagrams.
The paper should be critical i.e., does it use a recognized perspective to critique PSY 
in its various guises and does it abjure medicalized descriptions of conduct e.g., 
ADHD, Depression etc. If there is a suggestion for how to do things better, is that 
suggestion humane and does it avoid the pitfall of assuming that there is something 
wrong with people who are referred to services?
Authors should avoid jargon (except when critiquing labels), sexist and racist 
terminology and shouldn’t cluster people (e.g. “the” elderly) when describing those 
who receive services.
Submissions will be sent for review if these guidelines are followed. Authors should 
receive a response in less than six weeks.
Submissions to: craignewnes76@gmail.com
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‘The historical sense compels a man [sic] to write not merely with his own generation 
in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer 
and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous 
existence and composes a simultaneous order.’
T. S. Eliot, Tradition and the Individual Talent
‘Since we got the net... people are learning how to exercise their own rights. It is a 
unique, treasured moment. People have started to feel the breeze. The internet is a 
wild land with its own games, languages and gestures through which we are starting to
share common feelings.’
Ai Weiwei, The Guardian: 16 April 2012
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Heresy, Hope and the Holy Grail: A Critical Exploration of Constructions of 
Diagnosis on Internet Mental Health Forums
Abstract
This study explored constructions of mental health diagnosis in user-led internet 
mental forums. Using Edley’s (2001b) approach, a critical discursive psychological 
framework was used to analyse 21 forums from three different websites. Interpretative 
repertoires were identified that conserved the hegemonic practice of diagnosis, while 
others contained constructions of diagnosis that challenged the prevailing realist 
paradigm. In addition, as in some previous literature, diagnosis was often found to 
define identity. The interaction between the more polarised interpretative repertoires 
also produced ideological dilemmas and afforded a variety of positions -  the apostle, 
the heretic, the suppliant and the oracle -  from which subjects could take meaning. 
The findings were examined in the light of previous research and the ramifications for 
counselling psychologists and other mental health professionals were discussed.
Keywords
Diagnosis, DSM, counselling, discourse
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Introduction
Counselling psychology has historically had a problem with psychiatric diagnosis. 
Officially recognised by the British Psychological Society (BPS) in 1994, the Division 
of Counselling Psychology effort to mark its unique domain in psychotherapeutic 
practice and research (Pugh and Coyle, 2000) entailed a move away from the 
prevailing paradigms of behaviourism and psychoanalysis (Rizq, 2008) in order to 
embrace ‘the personal, subjective experience of the client over and above notions of 
diagnosis...’ (Lane and Corrie, 2006:17).
Larsson et al. (2012) argue that this move also challenged the medical model of 
pathology and the use of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders, 
4th Edition, Text revision (APA, 2000). Certainly counselling psychology’s 
skepticism towards diagnosis is enshrined in the BPS’s Division o f  Counselling 
Psychology Professional Practice Guidelines (2006: 1-2), which encourage 
practitioners to ‘respect first person accounts as valid in their own terms’ and ‘to work 
always in ways that empower rather than control’.
The purpose of this study is to explore how diagnosis is constructed by users of 
internet forums. However, in keeping with the historical seam that underlies critical 
discursive psychology (Edley, 2001a), the evolving context and antecedents of 
counselling psychology’s critical stance in relation to diagnosis are first examined.
This examination does not aim to be exhaustive, but rather to encapsulate some of the 
ways diagnosis is talked about in existing literature.
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Realist approaches to diagnosis
Aetiologically, current systems of diagnosis are rooted in a biomedical model 
formulated by Emil Kraepelin at the beginning of the Twentieth Century (Bentall, 
2003; Kirk and Kutchins, 1992). In this model, it was proposed that there were a 
discreet number of mental diseases that had an organic basis and that like physical 
illnesses, could be discovered.
The continued belief in and search for discrete psychological abnormalities may now 
be seen to be continued by the dominant force of biological psychiatry (Moncreiff, 
2007). For example, Schulsinger (1980: 585) claims that ‘diagnosis or classification 
becomes more precise when a biological (or in this case physiological) criterion is 
added to the purely descriptive criteria’. The search for the organic foundation of 
psychopathology is continued by research into its genetic origins (Schulsinger, 1980), 
investigations into its hormonal bases (Sachar, 1976), and more recently by 
neuropsychological research using magnetic resonance imaging technology (for 
example Burklund and Lieberman, 2011; Pan, 2009).
Another instance of the continued drive for a canonical taxonomy for mental illness 
has been the enterprise of personality psychology, which has attempted to classify 
enduring traits in individual behavior. The ‘big five’ (Costa and McCrae, 1992) for 
instance can be traced back to early psychometric work (Shrout and Fiske, 1995) -  
itself an effort to capture population trends rather than individual nuances. Personality 
dimensions are used to predict behaviour and psychopathology -  particularly 
personality disorders (Costa and McCrae, 2005). In the measures used to identify
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these traits, language is thought to signify and be subservient to underlying personality 
structures (Wiggins, 1992).
The DSM -V(APA, 2013), published in March this year, perhaps represents the 
pinnacle in the development of the realist diagnostic paradigm. The DSM-V website 
explains that the overall aim of the new revision has been ‘...to expand the scientific 
basis for diagnosis and classification’ and that working groups would concentrate on 
‘nomenclature’ (APA, 2012). In other words, there is a continuation of emphasis on 
classification per se, which necessarily must be founded on an epistemological 
position where mental illnesses are thought to be things in themselves and able to be 
discovered through scientific advances.
Critical approaches to diagnosis
The proposition that current diagnostic categories reflect real illnesses in the body 
which can be researched and discovered has been rejected by Szasz (1974), who 
argued that illnesses used to be detected by a measurable alteration in bodily structure, 
but with the advent of modem psychiatry they began to be detected by alterations in 
behaviour. Szasz concluded that clinicians who work in mental health do not diagnose 
and treat illnesses, but grapple with personal, ethical and social problems. This shift 
allowed a leap forward in the application of a realist paradigm to psychological 
difficulties.
Similarly Foucault (1965) suggested that medicine’s involvement in madness was not 
a scientific endeavour, but a political one -  an endeavour that Read (2004) argues 
could only have taken place in the context of the Enlightenment, where one inhumane 
authority (the church) came to be replaced by another (medical science).
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Edelman (1974) has also made daims about the political function of language in the 
diagnostic process -  that diagnostic categories may be understood not as descriptive, 
but as having the power to rearrange perception and stand for historically embedded 
structures. Therefore, to label someone with a diagnosis performs two main functions: 
it establishes a dominant and subordinate role and thus sanctions treatment thereafter; 
and it creates a relationship where the client and therapist ‘resist evidence that the 
professional competence of the one or the stigmatizing or exalting label of the other 
may be unwarranted’ (Edelman, 1974: 310).
Other recent critical accounts of diagnosis have concentrated on arguments of 
reliability and validity, through which current diagnostic categories can be shown to 
be faulty even within the same positivist, pseudo-medical logic which they purport to 
uphold. For example, inter-rater reliability of diagnosis has been questioned in classic 
studies by Ash (1949) and Hunt et al. (1953) and a more recent review by Bentall
(2003).
In terms of construct validity, quantitative criticism has focused on comorbidity: while 
some critics have suggested that the increased reliance on comorbid diagnoses belies 
the DSM-IV-TR’s failure to recognise deeper developmental problems (Jensen et al., 
2006), others have proposed that comorbid diagnoses are emblematic of the fact that 
disorders cannot be expressed categorically, but as existing along a spectrum (for 
example Tyrer, 1995). Akiskal and Benazzi (2006) also recommend that a spectrum 
conceptualisation should be incorporated into the new DSM-5 -  a reminder of the fact 
that diagnoses have evolved historically rather than remaining static.
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In one innovative study using data from the database Medline, McPherson and 
Armstrong (2006) explored the codification of the word ‘depression’ and its related 
terms over the 20th Century. They proposed that the integrity of psychiatry (and 
related disciplines which employ diagnosis) relies on the consistency of diagnostic 
categories and that classification systems may have been introduced in order to 
enforce this consistency. However, some terms which are extraneous to modem 
classification such as ‘endogenous depression’ have continued to be used, while other 
terms that have been deliberately introduced such as ‘dysthymia’, have struggled for 
adoption. This brings into question the consistency of meaning and use of diagnoses 
and thus psychiatry’s integrity. Repeated attempts to maintain control over the 
diagnostic process may be an expression of psychiatry’s need to justify itself as a 
profession and may also signal a fear of the démocratisation of the language of 
diagnosis.
Social constructionism and diagnosis
One particular theoretical position that has yielded fruitful ideas about diagnosis is 
social constructionism. Gergen (1985) describes social constructionism as a 
framework of understanding in which phenomena historically, socially and culturally 
rooted; knowledge is understood as being sustained by social processes rather arrived 
at by empirical validation, and explanations of phenomena are political rather than 
neutral. In such a framework, knowledge is ‘... not... something that a person has (or 
does not have), but as something people do together’ (Burr, 1995: 8). Brown explains 
social constructionism’s interest with diagnosis as follows:
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Diagnostic discovery is frequently laden with dispute, which provides a 
lens for viewing many of the social conflicts which revolve around issues 
of medicine and health. (1995: 38)
Social constructionism is far from a unitary framework (Brown, 1995; Danziger, 
1997; Edley, 2001a; Hacking, 1998) and an analysis of its balkanisation is beyond the 
scope of this study. However, within its broad church certain comprehensions of 
diagnosis have moved beyond a simple pathological understanding of mental illness. 
For example, Conrad (1992) has identified diagnosis as a tool of social control, citing 
the pathologisation of behaviours such as homosexuality, gambling and over-/ under­
eating; he sees social control through diagnosis in the historical context of a complex 
pattern of diminution of religion and increased moral authority of medical science.
Brown (1995) sees current systems of diagnosis in the context of the high esteem in 
which diagnosis is held in the medical profession: for medical students differential 
diagnosis -  the ability to objectively formulate a disorganised problem into an 
organised illness -  is the most rewarded skill in their training. Developments in the 
DSM  might be designed to fit with existing training practices.
The internet and diagnosis
Online mental health forums have been fertile for the exploration of pathological 
identity and in the context of the internet have had a relatively long history (Salem et 
al., 1997). Bargh and McKenna (2004) suggest that because of its anonymity the 
internet represents a relatively safe place for people, especially those who feel 
stigmatised, to explore their identities. However, rather than individuals adopting
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normalised personas in order to avoid the stigmatisation that they might encounter in 
their lives as Turkic (1995) predicted, Giles and Newbold (2011: 420) have affirmed 
that ‘the status of having been diagnosed with the particular syndrome that 
characterizes the community’ is essential for authentication of online identity.
In a qualitative study on identity in the pro-Ana community, Giles (2006) identifies 
people with various eating disorders and ‘normals’ -  people who were classed 
according to their lack of diagnostic label. Likewise, Home and Wiggins’s (2009) 
discursive psychological analysis suggests that chatroom posters were likely to be 
excluded from interactions if they could not gather sufficient rhetorical ballast behind 
their claims to be ‘authentically suicidal’. Thus, rather than freeing up positions or 
identities which are unblemished by the political language of diagnosis, the internet 
has perhaps provided forums in which diagnostic identities have become more 
entrenched.
The view of much of the critical literature on diagnosis is that in its current form it is 
harmful. However, the embracing of diagnosis in online mental health communites 
may also be empowering (Giles and Newbold, 2011). Pilgrim (2007) has suggested 
that the enduring power of psychiatric diagnosis may be that it provides a cause 
outside of the individual and thus alleviates people from responsibility. The credence 
of this account has some evidence in LaFrance’s (2007) discourse analysis of 
women’s accounts of depression in which biomedical discourse engendered a degree 
of legitimisation, although it could not encompass feelings of stigmatisation.
Fox and Ward (2006: 462) argue that illness arises from ‘physical and cultural 
possibilities and constraints surrounding a person’s body as with any characteristic of 
the body itself and that in the context of their ethnographic work ‘identities emerge
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within the contexts of these possibilities and constraints’. One of these identities was 
‘resisting consumer’, seeking empowerment through democratic experience, in 
contrast to the ‘expert patient’ who adopted biomedical perceptions of the body and 
health.
For Charland (2004: 339) the internet raises the possibility of a new form of 
‘iatrogenic identity’, made dangerous first because of the démocratisation of internet 
diagnosis and its lack of control by psychiatric regulatory bodies, and second because 
of the fact that diagnostic labels can be kept alive even when they have ceased to be 
used by these regulatory bodies. In fact, the new diagnostic guidelines and labels that 
have arrived with the DSM-V may, Charland argues, have iatrogenic properties per se. 
In turn, such losses may have repercussions for mental health professionals -  
especially counselling psychologists, who are to some extent defined by their 
adherence to the subjective experiences of their clients (Lane and Corrie, 2006; 
Strawbridge and Woolfe, 2010).
The aim of this study was to explore how users of latest technology make sense of 
‘diagnosis’ -  specifically how mental health diagnosis is considered in user-led 
internet forums. Some previous literature has analysed diagnosis critically in general, 
such as Harper (1995), Parker et al. (1995) and Read et al. (2004), while other internet 
based research has focused on the effects of specific diagnoses, such as anorexia 
nervosa (Fox et al., 2005; Gavin et al., 2008; Giles, 2006). Like Giles and Newbold’s 
(2011) study, the objective of this research was to conduct a discursive analysis of 
multiple forms of diagnosis, since it was believed that focus on one diagnostic 
category might unnecessarily restrict exploration of diagnostic practice; it might also 
represent ‘a false reliance on existing structures’ (Brown, 1995: 36), rather than an 
attempt to explore the concept of diagnosis in a broader sense. This study might also
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depart from previous research through its focus not just on the effects of diagnosis on 
subjectivity, but also on the wider practices and discourses in which diagnosis is 
enmeshed.
A qualitative approach was taken in order that diagnosis might be explored intricately 
and fully, rather than specific predictions made about its nature. Also, as Yardley
(2000) suggests, qualitative methods may be more suitable for addressing 
inconsistencies and conflicts -  like those found in the literature on diagnosis. 
Furthermore the emergence in the literature of multiple realities (Burr, 1995) of 
diagnosis meant that a method rooted in a social constructionist epistemology was 
necessitated.
Within this framework, critical discursive psychology (Edley, 2001b; Edley and 
Wetherell, 2001) emerged as the most apt approach, being a synthesis of relativist 
approaches and critical realist ideas (Wetherell, 1998), in which discourse is the object 
of analysis, but not at the cost of an acceptance of the possibility of reality outside 
language; its three tier (Edley, 2001b) analytical approach was also considered to be a 
good fit for the multiple levels at which diagnosis acts -  from the cultural to the 
individual. In addition, its focus on subjectivity (which is not common to all varieties 
of discourse analysis (Willig, 2008)) was felt to be particularly relevant to the 
discipline of counselling psychology, whose emphasis is on understanding individual 
experience. The research question was, how is diagnosis constructed in user-led 
internet mental health forums'}.
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Method 
Data collection
The data analysed came from 21 forums which were filtered from a large base of 
chatrooms and websites surveyed between March and July 2012. Websites were 
identified using an open internet search with terms such as ‘diagnosis’, ‘mental 
health’, ‘forum’ and various diagnostic labels like ‘schizophrenia’, ‘anorexia’ and 
‘personality disorder’. In addition, websites relating to specific mental health 
diagnoses were also visited in the hope that suitable forums might be found. User-led 
forums were sought out specifically and also those which pertained to diagnostic 
issues rather than more general discussions of symptoms or treatment.
Procedure
Starting from the research question, the initial stage of data collection began with very 
general internet searches. Eventually it became clear that the richest material could be 
found on forums from three main websites, one of which exclusively dealt with 
psychiatric issues, while the other two dealt with a broader range of health issues -  
some physical, some mental. Literature on diagnosis was also regularly consulted 
along the way in order that thought was stimulated and connections made between it 
and the data on the computer screen.
Over time, a degree of proficiency was felt to be gained at looking for suitable 
material using these websites’ search tools. The 21 forums finally chosen for analysis 
were therefore the result of some months’ thought and searching and deemed to be
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‘saturated’ (Yardley, 2000) enough for multiple levels of analysis. Given that critical 
discursive psychology was the chosen methodology and in view of the weight of 
existing critical literature, the data chosen were also felt to need to challenge naive 
realist assumptions about diagnosis -  a feeling that, significantly, chimes with the 
counselling psychology’s position (Larsson et a l, 2012).
The forums were copied and pasted into Microsoft Word documents. At this stage, 
some of the visual data was lost from the web pages such as advertisements, page 
headers, times of posts and so on. If the individual posts were not already numbered, 
this was done. In addition, individual comments were coded by the person who had 
posted them (or ‘poster’ as they shall be referred to hereafter). Personal information 
such as avatars, dates of posts and pseudonyms were not removed until a later date 
when the extracts came to be copied into this report. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet 
was also made up early on which detailed the Forums in columns; then information 
such as URLs, themes, points of interest and the details of the analytic strata described 
below were written into the rows.
Moreover, having followed Yardley’s (2000) four steps for effective qualitative 
research, attention was also paid to the possible impact and usefulness of the research 
throughout the process. Data were chosen and a style of analysis matched which 
might hopefully explore constructions of diagnosis in such a way that ideas about 
ramifications for practice were seeded early.
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Analysis
Having identified themes and points of interest in the selected forums, these were 
more strictly conceptualised according to Edley’s (2001b) three tier model for critical 
discursive psychological analysis. First, interpretative repertoires were identified: 
these are ‘relatively coherent ways of talking about objects and events in the world’ 
(Edley, 2001b: 198) which may be traced to wider discourses. Second, ideological 
dilemmas were identified: these are differences in constructions of the same object, 
which indicate the presence of opposed discourses and which are manifested in 
competing rhetoric. Third, subject positionings were analysed: these refer to ways in 
which subjects are embodied by the interpretative repertoires and how they are able to 
construct themselves within the boundaries of coexisting discourses.
Ethics
The analysis of online data has been the subject of some ethical debate (Flicker et al., 
2004). Giles and Newbold (2011) note that the threat of intruding on private 
communications, where participants are not aware that their posts may be analysed is 
of particular concern. Such ethical concerns arose in this study. However, since the 
forums used here were all in the public domain rather than password protected, there 
was no infringement on privacy believed to be taking place. As an added ethical 
insurance, it was decided that the posters’ avatars, usernames, post dates and 
signatures would not be included in the analysis -  even though, as Willig (2008) 
points out, such things constitute discourse and should not automatically be excluded 
from discursive appraisal.
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[Reflections
In my literature review last year, I explained some of the reasons for my 
interest in diagnosis, which had grown from my own experience of 
medical diagnosis and the feelings that created. In this project, I found 
myself addressing the same topic, but with a more forensic gaze towards 
the organisations in which diagnosis is couched.
This change of focus to the organisational level has led me to a view that, 
regardless of their explicit agenda -  scientific, spiritual or otherwise -  
organisations dictate implicit ideologies that some people adhere to and 
some people do not. My experience of one particular organisation led me 
to this view -  the Christian church. Thinking about the data in this study, I 
found myself transported back to my adolescence, when cracks began to 
appear in the Christian edifice that I had internalised. These cracks then 
groaned wider with the inconsistencies in logic that I experienced 
influenced by my learning in other areas, particularly history and science. 
Yet elements of the Christian ideology still continued to have a hold on 
me -  its rituals and its music. The more I read and thought, the less clear 
things became -  but I still searched in vain for some definitive position. 
Now my focus is on different organisations. However, this experience has 
helped me to draw useful inferences and I have made reference to 
prototypical religious concepts and terms to encapsulate my findings. 
Furthermore, the parallels between religion and biomedical/ psychological 
organisations (I have discovered) have some grounding in historical 
accounts of the evolution of power (Brown, 1990; Foucault, 1965, 1981;
145
Research Dossier
Rose, 1986). Yet, even with a critical view of diagnosis I still feel an 
attraction to the idea of a classifiable set of mental illnesses with 
discoverable cures; I also find the symbols of diagnosis alluring -  
taxonomies, instruments of measurement and handbooks full of terms rich 
in Classical language. At the same time I sometimes find myself 
uncomfortable with being identified by my own diagnosis and worried 
about the effect it will have on other peoples’ view of me. So, in both 
religious and diagnostic terms, I find myself identifying with different 
ideological positions according to my situation.
Social constructionism has provided a possible ontological answer to these 
ideological quandaries. It can encompass conflicting views; no definitive 
reality needs to be sought. Indeed reality can understood to be a construct 
itself: thus organisations which set out to find reality may in fact be 
defining it, rather than locating it. This still remains to me an exciting 
prospect.
It is worth acknowledging that social constructionism is also a different 
ontological position to that which I employed in my literature review. At 
that point I felt that critical realism would best serve my research, a 
philosophy which proposes a dualist view of the natural physical world 
and the realm produced by human interactions (Collier, 1994). My 
thinking then was that there must be some objective reality and that it was 
crucial to acknowledge that reality in peoples’ distress. Now I have 
gravitated more towards Harper’s (1995: 348) view that even though 
‘psychiatric categories... are produced entirely within language’ this does 
not mean that in some way they do not exist, or are not real.
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If these two stances are logically distinct, that is a tension which at this 
stage of my training I can live with. I am reminded of Keats’s assertion 
that, ‘The only means of strengthening one’s intellect is to make up one’s 
mind about nothing’: perhaps this could be a useful axiom for anyone 
struggling to get to grips with methodological pluralism and indeed with 
counselling psychology’s identification with pluralism in general and 
which Rizq (2006) notes is a common worry amongst trainees.
However, much of the difficulty in training as a counselling psychologist 
so far has not just been solely on its pluralism, but in bridging the gap 
between practice and theory. In this respect I have worried that this study, 
on account of the nature of the data, has kept me at a distance from the 
interpersonal relationships that are at the heart of counselling psychology. 
Had I chosen a different method of qualitative data collection -  for 
example interviews - 1 might have had to analyse very immediate 
interpersonal dynamics in a way that training in the therapeutic encounter 
would perhaps have prepared me to do.
Nevertheless, I have found myself thinking about diagnostic discourse 
directly in relation to my practice. One client with whom I currently work 
has for some months been fixated on getting a correct diagnosis, and has 
expressed her belief that once she acquires it then everything will fall into 
place and her distress will vanish. This experience has, I am sure, had a 
bearing on my thinking in this study. More importantly I believe my 
continued analysis of diagnosis, of political structures that control 
diagnostic discourse, and of the ensuing effects on subjectivity have
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informed my work with this client. It has enabled me to consider her belief 
-  and my reaction to her belief -  in greater depth and with greater 
attention to the relational and social context in which they are both 
embedded.]
Results
The findings are arranged according to Edley’s (2001b) tripartite critical discursive 
approach. Extracts from the data have been used to illustrate the findings, which have 
been numbered in the order that they appear. Additional quotations from the data have 
also been used: these are italicised. In order to clarify where quotations and extracts 
come from, forums have been designated Roman numerals and posts Arabic numerals 
(for example, if a quotation comes from the fourth post in Forum Three, it is labelled 
TII.4’). In some of the extracts below, posters have also been coded by letters of the 
alphabet in order to clarify when a new poster makes a comment within the extract.
Interpretative repertoires
Diagnosis as a holy grail. The first pervasive pattern embedded in the talk across the 
various forums was diagnosis as a holy grail. In this interpretative repertoire, 
diagnosis was linked to salvation from mental illness that would not come without 
faith and perseverance.
Extract 1. (1.13)
Look at the reality on the ground, there is no investment across the country 
in mental health. People are constantly coming on forums like these to say
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that there loved one is ranting and raving and digging holes in the walls 
for devices but they can't get them help.
And my own experience of waiting six years to get diagnosed from the 
initial breakdown. I had to move 300 miles to get diagnosed.
The reality is, its difficult to get help and treatment and mh services are 
completely run down and under-funded.
Diagnosis here is constructed as something worth waiting for; it is also sufficiently 
important that the talk of problems ends once diagnosis is mentioned. This is 
rhetorically mimetic of an idea that is central to diagnosis as a holy grail - that once 
diagnosis is acquired, the road to recovery is complete. The‘300 miles’' may also be 
seen as a symbolic pilgrimage to reach the holy grail of diagnosis. In addition, the 
language of rarity and lack of funding fit into the diagnosis as a holy grail repertoire: 
it constructs diagnosis as something of value (like the Holy Grail) since it has the 
power to stop people ranting and raving’ in a manner that is reminiscent of biblical 
unbelievers34.
The interpretative repertoire of diagnosis as a holy grail was also commonly evoked 
through talk of the search for a revised, true diagnosis.
Extract 2. (IV. 1, 8)
A: Bit confused with his diagnosis is it an initial one??
34 ‘Ranting and raving’ happens to be a direct quotation from 1 Kings 18:29.
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...What am I? How do I know what books to read if I'm an itzabitza???
H: ...Hi I was given a bipolar 2 dx first and then 5 years later BPD was 
added to it... The journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.
In Extract 2, if the Holy Grail of diagnosis is to be found, then the quest must be 
followed according to ‘’books’. These books are themselves constructed as containing 
answers and thus are symbols of salvation; the act of reading them may bring poster 
nearer salvation, but not without being matched to a correct diagnosis. Finally, the 
apothegm in the last line of the extract emphasises the hardship of the quest for the 
holy grail of diagnosis: it is a oracular pronouncement that invites reflection rather 
than response and lends a degree of gravitas and mysticism to diagnosis as a holy 
grail that perhaps harks back to the religious discourse from which the biomedical 
discourse is suggested (Brown, 1995) to have succeeded.
Diagnosis as the status quo. This interpretative repertoire contained largely 
unquestioning and conservative constructions of diagnosis. Although language which 
purported to be neutral or apolitical was used in this repertoire, its effect was to 
maintain what can be seen as the status quo of current diagnostic practices within 
traditional doctor/ patient relationships.
Extract 3. (XXI.4-6)
A: Thank you... Could all of these things truly be caused by a slight case 
of OCD? How do you handle it? How do you get through it? Is there any 
way to stop doing and thinking these things? I appreciate your help so far. 
Thank you.
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D: I was diagnosted earlier this year with a slight case of OCD by both a 
psychiatrist and a psychologist.
...Go as soon as possible to a psychologist and tell him/her everything you 
think or feel. Only this will lead to an accurate analysis of your 
personality.
In this extract psychiatrists and psychologists are constructed as being the 
gatekeepers of the privy knowledge of diagnosis. It is the knowledge that the 
psychiatrist or psychologist has that enables them to hand out the diagnostic 
label ‘OCD’. Even though there is no explicitly political language here, 
knowledge may be thought of as power (Foucault, 1965) as it maintains the 
status quo of the unequal doctor/ patient relationship. The acronym that serves to 
designate the diagnosis might also appear valueless but, as Wodak (1989) 
suggests, jargon may serve to maintain prestige and be a covert tool for 
expressing political meanings. Here it serves as a symbol of power of the 
organisations which diagnose.
Another way in which the language of diagnosis maintains the status quo is via the 
implication that diagnosis labels a condition which resides within the individual. This 
stance has historically guided much research into psychopathology (Bentall, 2003; 
Parker et al., 1995) and continues to underpin reclassification efforts (APA, 2012). 
The inference above that symptoms might "be caused by a slight case o f  OCD’ reifies 
OCD as if it is a exogenous virus causing a sore throat, rather than depicting it as 
constituted in a social and political context.
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Diagnosis as identity. This repertoire contained language which, like the language in 
Extract 2, constructed diagnosis as equivalent to identity. It was commonly evoked 
was when individuals were personified by their diagnostic label alone, such as 'one is 
a sure fire NPD' (XIII. 15) and ‘7 dont want Nons to go out at defraud women, which 
is what HPD’s often do’ (XIII.26). The insertion of the indefinite article before an 
acronym that denotes a diagnostic category (or the pluralisation of such an acronym) 
changes the acronym’s meaning from a disorder to a person. Thus the person is 
constructed as a disorder.
In other forums, a change of diagnosis was portrayed as problematic, thus recalling 
Charland’s (2004) worries about successive diagnostic revisions. For example, the 
description of a change of diagnosis which preceded the phrase */ think ive forgotten 
who i am' (IV.4) equated diagnosis with identity.
Extract 4. (XIV.5-6)
I think he's looking for a proper PD label so he can ‘understand’ why he 
does what he does. Weak sex drive will not suffice! Sounds like rich-kid 
syndrome to me (it's a thing).
In Extract 4, diagnosis as identity is manifested through the implication that self- 
discovery is not possible without a diagnostic label. This interpretative repertoire 
allows the poster to restrict the original poster’s identity by withholding the PD 
diagnosis. The word 'proper' also intimates that kosher diagnosis is in the power of 
the medical establishment (which hints at diagnosis as the status o f  quo). The power 
diagnosis has to determine identity can also be seen in the playful coining of the 
quasi-pathological 'rich-kidsyndrome': yxst as 'PD' strengthens Poster E’s
152
Research Dossier
pathological identity in the forum, so ‘rich-kidsyndrome' authenticates the outgroup 
identity.
Diagnosis as a prison sentence. This interpretative repertoire was characterised by 
constructions of diagnosis as the cause of stigmatisation or other unassailable 
problems. Expressions of fear of the future resulting from diagnosis were one way in 
which it was manifested, for example ‘I  hope this isnt gonna be my life' (XVI.67) and 
‘Sometimes putting a label on someone makes it more scary' (XIII.25).
Extract 5. (III.l)
Following the diagnosis I was placed on many different psychiatric 
medicines and coincidentally became more and more sick...
...Anyway, I stopped taking psychiatric medications, took better care of 
my body and all of my 'bipolar' symptoms cleared up... I rarely feel 
stressed out and am generally pretty optimistic and happy.
But now I have a diagnosis for Bipolar I made while I was a minor, and I 
do not believe I'm Bipolar. I'm trying to apply for the Peace Corps, but 
Bipolar I automatically would disqualify me. And they will look into all 
my medical background, so I cannot decline to answer.
Extract 5 captures the inescapability that is a feature of this interpretative repertoire. 
Like a criminal record, diagnosis is constructed as restrictive even without the bonds 
medication. It is also talked about in terms of iatrogenic side effects. Indeed, the 
quotation marks around the word ‘bipolar' allude to a construction of the diagnosis
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not as an illness at all, but as nothing more than a stigmatising label. Moreover, even 
though terms of optimism are used, individual strength is constructed as being futile in 
the shadow of this enduring sentence.
Extract 6. (IX. 1)
Post 1 : So those of us with personality disorders have a bit of a harder 
wrap than those without, especially those with other mental disorders. 
Counselors will always look at us very differently, and we might always 
be seen as 'challenging' because we don't buy everything we are told...
Post 3: PD's are often stigmatised and discriminated against by the very 
people who are supposed to provide care, support and treatment. Yeah it 
sucks.
In Extract 5, diagnosis as a prison sentence comes across through the language of lack 
of support at the hands of therapists. The prison sentence is one of stigmatisation and 
hopelessness35. This interpretative repertoire’s provenance may be in what Foucault 
(1965) describes as the end of the dialogue between madness and reason in the 
Eighteenth Century. Such a break in dialogue is contemporarily replayed here.
Diagnosis as a technology o f  power. In this final interpretative repertoire diagnosis 
was talked about as serving the political objectives of various parties, especially 
psychiatry and related disciplines.
35 The word '‘wrap ’ means ‘prison sentence’ in slang.
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Extract 7. (1.19)
...Is really about the genuine and therapeutic assistance with the best 
approaches of helping people in emotional and mental confusion and 
distress - and nothing to do with politics, money, power and control?
I suppose that the psychiatric system is totally unbiased; and is totally 
focused primarily on the genuine healing and best therapeutic approaches, 
help and support for such people?????????? and is nothing to do with 
stamping labels on people and drugging them up for life!?
The language here explicitly exposes the political machinations behind the act of 
diagnosis. The words ‘drugging them up fo r  life!?' construct psychiatry as an 
organisation which gets power and money from the drugs that diagnosis enables it to 
sell; the punctuation invites a reactionary sense of incredulity and adds an adversarial 
flavour to the repertoire.
Diagnosis as a technology o f  power was also evoked by the use of critical or cynical 
language in relation to diagnosis. For example, a discussion about the clustering of 
mental health diagnoses provided the following statement: 6 We are being sold this as 
a positive thiing. I ’m not so sure' (VII. 1). This language is reminiscent of Kirk and 
Kutchins’s The Selling o f the DSM  (1992), a book whose title also alludes to the 
subjection of diagnostic systems to the forces of capitalism and consumerism.
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Ideological dilemmas
Edley (2001b) describes how ideological dilemmas can arise in data when 
interpretative repertoires rub up against one another. Two main dilemmas were 
identified in the data and are illustrated below.
E xtracts . (1.11-13)
F: My utopia would be where people are treated as people on an individual 
basis, in partnership with a ’wise one' of their choosing and in a wholistic 
manner, taking into account the totality of their situation and ALL of their 
needs, and not choosing a particular dx ( unless they wanted too)...
G: If some of my views are then so what! ! ! ???
Why all this labelling and polarity argument?
I personally think that such terms are very daft; for a number of complex 
reasons.
B: Seriously the anti-psychiatry hysteria on this forum is amazing. Now 
psychiatry is some well oiled machine in cohorts with the government and 
big pharma and is an agent of social control....give me a break!
The ideological problem here is that diagnosis is constructed as impersonal and ‘daff 
on the one hand and meaningful on the other. Poster F and G’s language manifests the 
diagnosis as a prison sentence repertoire. The word ‘labelling' perhaps even evokes 
Scheff s (1975) Labeling Theory of mental illness in which, once labelled, people are
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committed to an existence in the mode of the illness that their label describes. 
Similarly, the word 'utopia' creates a sense of its opposite -  a loss of individuality 
and freedom.
In contrast, Poster B’s language evokes the diagnosis as a holy grail interpretative 
repertoire. Interestingly, as part of the dynamic between the two interpretative 
repertoires, the language of diagnosis as a prison sentence in the first post is made to 
look extreme. As Edley and Wetherell (2001) point out, the notion of extremism is 
illicit in most Western cultures and this has further implications for how individual 
posters are able to take meaning from the interpretative repertoires of diagnosis. This 
being so, these two interpretative repertoires are antagonistically juxtaposed.
Their jostling for position may also reflect their two different genealogies -  one in the 
critical work of Laing (1972) and Szasz (1974) and even in the humanistic outlook of 
Rogers (1961), who encouraged the disavowal of diagnostic categories in 
psychotherapy entirely; the other harking back to the Kraepelian view of mental 
disorders as organically based and discreet (described in Bentall, 2003) -  a view still 
pervades modem bio-psychiatry (Moncreiff, 2007; Read, 2004).
The entanglement of diagnosis as a technology o f  power and diagnosis as the status 
quo also produced ideological dilemmas.
Extract 9. (XIII.5,6)
E: Our society (whether for genetic or society norm reasons) still strongly 
promotes the stereotypical image of the promiscuous Alpha Male as 
something to be aspired too, and this image is rarely thought of as HPD
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(though sometimes thought of as ASPD, the emotionless player). The 
promiscuous female is still strongly looked down upon (by both men and 
women), and our tendency as a society is to react more strongly when a 
female is promiscuous...
C: ...However, [Poster D ’s namej's argument for at least the HPD pre­
determinants existing back into middle childhood (maybe even pre-school 
childhood) seems robust.
Perhaps the reason HPD is not said to appear until early adulthood is 
simply the reluctance to label anyone with a PD before they reach age 18 
(which does seems wise). Interesting to note in the case of AsPD there is 
an 'under 18' version called Conduct Disorder...if they don't want to label a 
16 year old girl as HPD wonder what parallel 'childhood PD' might exist?
PD of childhood NOS?
The dilemma here is that diagnosis is portrayed as being politically motivated by 
gender and a marker of an endogenous trait in the space of two posts. The second post 
about personality disorder’s origins being before 1 pre-school childhood’ bolsters a 
construction of diagnosis as autochthonous and falls into the diagnosis as the status 
quo repertoire. However, in E’s post diagnosis is constructed as something that is 
socially manufactured as a result of gender politics and thus comes into the repertoire 
diagnosis as a technology o f power.
Additionally, there is a rhetorical shift in the second half of C’s post which also 
heralds a subtler ideological impasse: moving from the construction of HPD is an 
entrenched part of identity, C’s langauge then alludes to possible problems of a
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personality disorder diagnosis being applied to a minor. In this way, while the logic of 
the poster’s language remains linear at a surface level, the discursive object has 
slipped into the interpretative repertoire of diagnosis as a technology o f  power: thus 
C’s positioning also shifts and constructions of diagnosis become conflicting.
Subject positionings
The apostle. The interaction of the interpretive repertoires and ensuing ideological 
dilemmas afford subjects certain positionings -  nodes of meaning with which people 
can identify. The apostle position was taken in deference to hegemonic constructions 
of diagnosis as trustworthy and as worth aspiring to, and was often opened up by 
diagnosis as the status quo and diagnosis as a holy grail.
For example, the assertion that ‘The reality is, its difficult to get help and treatment 
and mh services are completely run down and under funded’ (1.13) positioned the 
poster as a follower of the organisations who diagnose in the context of an ideological 
opposition of diagnosis as a holy grail and diagnosis as a technology o f  power. In 
Extract 10, it is the interrelation of diagnosis as the status quo and diagnosis as a 
holy grail which has opened up the apostle position.
Extract 10. (XII. 1,8)
A: I saw my Psychiatrist today who said a lot of people get wrongly 
diagnosed in the beginning with BPD...
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F: When I first got my diagnosis it totally shook me up and triggered a 
really dark mood, but in the long run it has been so beneficial and helped 
so much... I hope this happens for you. Keep talking
Poster F ’s language here acts to defend the enterprise of diagnosis and is authenticated 
by the interpretative repertoire of diagnosis as a holy grail. The possibility of this 
position is also exploited to lend the language a degree of expertise and authority and 
even to convert poster A to poster F’s way of thinking: 'I  hope this happens fo r  you1 
acts like a declaration of faith in the salvation of diagnosis.
The suppliant. In the search for self that is commonly portrayed by language in the 
diagnosis as identity interpretative repertoire, the suppliant position was exploited. 
This position also arose because of the power that was portrayed as held by 
psychiatric professionals in the diagnosis as the status quo repertoire.
Extract 11. (XXI. 1)
A: I don’t know what’s wrong with me... please help...
...Am I just messed up? Or is there actually something wrong with me?
I can't talk to my parents about any of this. I wouldn't even know where to 
start in terms of talking to a doctor/psychiatrist. Plus, there is no way I 
would be able to pay for that. So I don't know what I am supposed to do.
Any insight, advice, or help you could provide would be greatly 
appreciated.
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C: ...It sounds like a case of OCD.
In this extract, the first line immediately casts the poster in the suppliant position. The 
interpretative repertoire diagnosis as the status quo makes this position possible: a 
symbolic doctor is evoked, which brings with it traditional discourses of the inequality 
of the doctor-patient relationship. Interestingly, the question in the middle line 
constructs diagnosis as legitimate, as if the poster’s symptoms without an diagnosis 
from a doctor are merely ‘demented’. In this context, the suppliant’s function may 
also be viewed as a way of eliciting comfort and help from other posters -  a function 
which is performed by Poster C taking the position of the oracle. The use of the 
diagnostic label, ‘OCD’ here serves to strengthen the previous poster’s suppliant 
position in a way that preserves the status quo of the traditional doctor/ patient 
relationship as well as the poster’s own oracle positioning.
The oracle. In the oracle positioning, subjects exploited discursive opportunities to 
reveal truths as if by divination. Ensuing language often appeared to be aloof and had 
allegiance to either traditional or critical repertoires. For example, in Forum 2, an 
academic article which expounds a detailed critique of biological psychiatry was 
posted in its entirety (Kaiser, 1996). The academic language and its author’s status as 
a psychiatrist positioned the poster to be oracular and in ownership of an indisputable 
truth. Elsewhere the oracle position functioned to defend biomedical constructions of 
diagnosis, as at the end of Extract 1. ‘The reality is...’ is a phrase which elevates the 
poster above the general discussion and makes other constructions of diagnosis seem 
naïve.
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Extract 12. (XV.91)
I am a doctor, and I'm telling you, you can be overweight and anorexic... 
[anorexia is] an eating disorder that is primarily psychological and 
manifests physically as the disease progresses. Posters such as eleven who 
would refer to overweight patients as ‘fat’ is part of the problem.
Extract 12 exemplifies how the poster is able to occupy the oracle position as a 
result of the existence of the interpretative repertoire of diagnosis as the status 
quo. The statement of profession gives them access to the knowledge that allows 
them to rebuff claims made by other posters, who do not possess the same 
authority. The fact that the poster uses the word 'disease' and corrects the other 
poster’s use of the word 'fa f  with the more medical 'overweight' is also 
significant. The word 'overweight' pays homage to an inert diagnostic system in 
which some weights are deemed normal and others are abnormal.
The heretic. This subject positioning was commonly made available by the diagnosis 
as a technology o f  power and diagnosis as a prison sentence interpretative repertoires. 
Occupying this position, subjects employed language which railed against the 
restrictions and injustices of diagnosis. For example, in Extract 8 above, Poster F and 
G’s posts include expressions of ridicule and dismissal.
Extract 13. (1.5-7)
E: T haven't taken a good look at the site you linked [Poster C’s name] but 
bloody hell Parental Alienation Syndrome? There making this shit up as
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they go along.’ A lot of the DSM is all about making shit up as they go 
along.
My 'favorite* diagnosis is ‘Oppositional Defiant Disorder’...
Last edited by [Poster E’s name]; [Date and time] Reason: removing 
smilie. Because really, it's not funny.
E: I also agree with Oppositional Defiance syndrome being the biggest 
load of shit around. My daughter would have had to be drugged to the 
gunnels if I had taken her to an American pdoc. She defied me and pushed 
the boundaries every single bloody day! I called it stubborn.
In Extract 13, the heretic positioning allows for satirical language. However, the 
poignancy created by the register shift at the end of D’s comment ‘...removing smilie: 
Because really i t’s not funny' functions to impress the seriousness of the heretic's, 
cause. The strong language, like 'shit', ‘bloody’ and ‘bloody hell' are perhaps able to 
go unchecked because the heretic position invites no recourse; it functions to suppress 
antithetical language in a way that is mimetic of the oppressive images that occur in 
the diagnosis as a prison sentence repertoire.
Discussion
The objective of this study was to explore constructions of diagnosis in user-led 
internet forums. Strikingly, even in user-led discussion forums with no explicit 
authoritarian presence, biomedical discourses were seen to extend their hegemony 
through the interpretative repertoires diagnosis as a holy grail and diagnosis as the
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status quo. This prevalence of biomedical discourses has also been recognised in 
some of the previous literature, for example Giles and Newbold (2011), Home and 
Wiggins (2009) and LaFrance (2007). However, in this study there seemed to be an 
extra dimension to the language of these two repertoires.
That religious language was employed a lot in this study was no accident. Like the 
religious social regime that preceded it (Brown, 1995; Foucault, 1965), the biomedical 
regime in which diagnosis sits seemed in the data to be tantamount to a religious 
ideology -  with its attendant believers, dissenters, jargon and emphasis on faith. In the 
same way as the church in pre-Enlightenment Europe had pervaded every comer of 
society -  including the control of madmen (Foucault, 1965), the influence of 
biomedical psychiatric discourse has spread from hospitals to the community (Rose, 
1986). Perhaps it has now stretched beyond the physical community to the internet.
The expression of helplessness that tended to came across from the suppliant position 
also tied into traditional diagnostic dynamics that construct the healthcare professional 
as the expert and the patient as the victim. One facet of this was the use of acronyms 
for diagnostic labels can be thought to occlude meaning (Orlowski and Christensen, 
2002) rather than open it up. However, traditional ways of talking about diagnosis 
were balanced by more antagonistic, challenging repertoires. It may also be that the 
internet is a forum which is peculiar in its ability to host two such diametrically 
opposed interpretative repertoires as diagnosis as a prison sentence and diagnosis as 
the status quo: it is difficult perhaps to imagine such inflammatory language being 
used in discussions based in consulting rooms or hospitals. Voices of dissent often 
tend either to be nullified via their extremity (Edley and Wetherell, 2001), or silenced 
by incarceration (Foucault, 1965).
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Charland (2004) has proposed that iatrogenic effects may follow a change of 
diagnosis. Certainly, language relating to confusion about diagnosis and ensuing 
identity was commonplace in these data. Moreover, other research has indicated that 
the search for diagnostic identity is an important feature of online discussion 
communities (Brownlow and O’Dell, 2006; Giles and Newbold, 2011; Home and 
Wiggins, 2009) and this too was found to be the case. Furthermore, the oracle subject 
positioning which surfaced in these data is akin in some ways to the ‘expert patient’ in 
Fox and Ward’s (2006) research. However, one way in which it differed was its lack 
of allegiance to critical or conservative discourse. Its comparatively non-reactionary 
nature (as opposed to the heretic) perhaps reflects a confidence that posters can 
express in the context of diverse, rather than simply bilateral, interpretative 
repertoires.
In addition, the inclusion of an academic article (Kaiser, 1996) and references to other 
sources may reflect a breaking down of boundaries between academic and public and 
between professional and amateur which Charland (2004) sees as the cause of 
potential problems, but which can equally be seen as a diffraction of power. The 
internet may be a platform where, in McPherson and Armstrong’s (2006) terms, the 
psychiatric establishment may have trouble justifying its position through dictating the 
language of diagnosis.
It was stated above that this research’s potential practical efficacy was kept in 
mind throughout the process. One potential ramification of this analysis is that 
diagnosis cannot be considered as a unitary concept, nor to have a unitary 
function. The discourse has revealed a range of often conflicting ways of talking 
about diagnosis which have been shown to create meaning for subjects in a
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variety of ways. While the DSM-5 committee has attempted to iron out 
irregularities and searched for distinct pathologies on an ever more atomic level 
(APA, 2012), the discourse in these forums poses different questions. In 
particular, ideological dilemmas can be seen to present problems for unitary 
understandings of pathology: if pathology is diagnosed through behaviour like 
promiscuity (see Extract 7 above) -  whether this behaviour is autochthonous or 
not, it takes place in political and social circumstances which dictate what 
promiscuity is.
Secondly, strong language for and against diagnosis occurs in these forums; 
diagnosis is also portrayed to elevate some and imprison others. If this is the 
case, mental health professionals should think twice before using diagnostic 
terms. Previous research (Moeke-Maxwell et al., 2008; Laird et al., 2010) 
suggests that cultural differences may have an impact on the meaning people 
may take from diagnosis, but this critical discursive analysis suggests that 
differences may be even more nuanced. In fact, subjects may change their 
position towards diagnosis depending on what interpretative repertoires of 
diagnosis are available at any one time.
Akin to its iatrogenic effects (Sartorius, 2002; Scheff, 1975) and potentially 
more damaging is the quasi-religious esteem in which diagnosis is held -  
evidenced by the prevalence of diagnosis as the holy grail repertoire. If 
diagnosis is perceived as an endpoint in the search for alleviation from mental 
distress, this may engender unrealistic expectations about psychotherapeutic 
interventions, many of which (particularly in a humanistic framework) do not 
unfold according to diagnostic labels. Accordingly, the prevalence of discourses 
which locate mental illness in the body (in these data reinforced by diagnosis as
166
Research Dossier
the status quo) may encourage people to stop looking for answers in their 
relational interactions.
Regarding these ramifications, a proviso should be made: only internet data has been 
explored here. In physical interpersonal situations like those in which mental health 
professionals tend to work, additional discourses (for example age, class and race 
(Waitzkin, 1989; Waitzkin and Britt, 1989) may have an effect on how the process of 
diagnosis is constructed. In addition, the subjectivity of this research should be 
acknowledged: it is not the aim to represent a definitive picture of the ways people 
write about diagnosis on internet forums because no credence is given to the idea that 
such a picture can exist. Neither is the account of patterns found in the data a neutral 
one: it is filtered through counselling psychology -  an organisation which explicitly 
holds an ambivalent stance towards diagnosis (Lane and Corrie, 2006); and it is 
written in terms (for example religious and historical) from Which the researcher 
derives and hopes to impart meaning.
One limitation of this study was that, with the plethora of data available, only three 
websites could be explored in any depth. Perhaps with a larger base of material more 
dilemmas, subject positionings and interpretative repertoires would have emerged. 
Certainly it is believed that more research in this area would be worthwhile. In 
addition, given that user-led forums were examined it might be interesting to explore 
the meaning that diagnosis holds for mental health professionals -  especially after 
more prosaic research that has uncovered the different reasons professionals have for 
diagnosing (Lillis et al., 2008; Mellsop, 2007). Indeed, in the light of the findings 
from this study and in view of counselling psychology’s commitment to individual
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experience of distress (Lane and Corrie, 2006; Strawbridge and Woolfe, 2003), the 
question might be asked, ‘why use diagnosis at all?’
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Appendix 1: Submission guidelines for Discourse and Society36
Discourse & Society is a multidisciplinary peer-reviewed journal whose major aim is to 
publish outstanding research at the boundaries of discourse analysis and the social sciences. It 
focuses on explicit theory formation and analysis of the relationships between the structures 
of text, talk, language use, verbal interaction or communication, on the one hand, and societal, 
political or cultural micro- and macrostructures and cognitive social representations, on the 
other hand. That is, D&S studies society through discourse and discourse through an analysis 
of its socio-political and cultural functions or implications. Its contributions are based on 
advanced theory formation and methodologies of several disciplines in the humanities and 
social sciences
1. Peer review policy
Discourse & Society operates a conventional single-blind reviewing policy in which the 
reviewer’s name is always concealed from the submitting author.
2. Article types
The recommended length of articles is 7000 words, including footnotes and references with an 
abstract of up to 150 words and up to 10 key words.
Contributions to Discourse & Society should satisfy the following criteria:
1. Systematic discourse analysis. Discourse & Society is primarily a discourse analytical 
journal. That is, articles should provide a detailed, systematic and theoretically based analysis 
of text and talk. It is insufficient to merely quote, summarize or paraphrase such discourse. 
Articles should focus on specific structures or strategies of discourse that are not self-evident 
to the casual reader. These may include grammatical, stylistic, rhetorical, narrative or 
argumentative structures; cognitive processes and mental representations; pragmatic, 
conversational or interactional dimensions of socially situated talk; or the political or cultural 
functions or implications of such discourses, among many other properties of communicative 
events. Discourse & Society does not publish exclusively theoretical papers, but each paper 
should feature a prominent theoretical section and a critical review of the relevant literature as 
a foundation for empirical research. Theoretical notes or short discussion pieces are welcome 
for the D&S Forum section. It goes without saying that both theory and analysis should make 
an original contribution to the field.
36 These can be found online with accompanying documents at
http ://www.uk. sagepub .com/msg/das .htm#HO WTOSUBMIT Y OURMANUSCRIPT
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2. Explicit social analysis. As its title suggests, Discourse & Society particularly welcomes 
articles that study the social contexts of discourse, the discursive dimensions of social 
structures or any other relation between discourse and society (including politics and culture). 
Social and political analyses should be explicit and theoretically based. Ideally, D&S articles 
should provide a unique integration of discourse analysis and social analysis. Among other 
aims, Discourse & Society encourages work that critically studies relevant social, political or 
cultural issues and problems, such as the discursive aspects of various types of domination, 
inequality and resistance.
3. A sizeable corpus of data. Articles are preferred that are based on a sizeable corpus of 
interesting texts or talk collected by the author(s) themselves, and not merely on a few 
discourses. Authors are expected to have a thorough knowledge of, and experience with, the 
corpus, domain or genre of discourse being analysed, for instance as a result of an extended 
research project, so as to facilitate empirical generalizations. Analyses should be illustrated by 
several extracts quoted in the text.
4. Multidisciplinary, multicultural, international. The study of the relations between discourse 
and society takes place in several disciplines, in many countries and by women and men from 
many different cultural backgrounds. Discourse & Society highly values this diversity and 
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methods, data and the use of scholarly literature.
5. Accessibility. Discourse & Society aims to be accessible to readers from a broad range of 
disciplines, and of various levels of specialization and expertise, especially including students. 
For theoretical, methodological, pedagogical and social reasons, therefore, contributions 
should be well-organized, have a clear style, avoid esoteric jargon, and explain unfamiliar or 
new technical concept.
3. How to submit your manuscript
Before submitting your manuscript, please ensure you carefully read and adhere to all the 
guidelines and instructions to authors provided below. Manuscripts not conforming to these 
guidelines may be returned.
The paper should have a ‘cover sheet’ with the following information: full name; institutional, 
private and email address; address for proofs and offprints; telephone and fax numbers; short 
title and size in words and bytes. The cover sheet should be part of the same file as the paper, 
as is the case for the abstract and an autobiographical note of 50-100 words.
Papers should be sent by email only, in one file (including abstract, biographical note, figures, 
tables, and appendices) preferably in WORD (formats .doc or .rtf), to the editor at the 
following address: joumals@discourses.org. Please write on the subject line: Paper for 
DISCOURSE & SOCIETY. The file should be attached to an accompanying message, in 
which you should identify yourself with your full name and address, and address the editor by
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name, one of the ways to distinguish your submission from — unfortunately all too frequent — 
SPAM. For the same reason, it is also strongly recommended that you add your full name to 
your e-mail address in the header of your message when that address does not clearly identify 
who you are; if necessary please edit the settings of your e-mail program accordingly. Do not 
attach your paper to a message without a personalized letter to the editor.
Important Notice: Authors who submit a paper to the joumals@discourses.org address should 
immediately receive an automatic reply asking them to pre-review their own paper by careful 
self-evaluation on the basis of the criteria of each journal. Unfortunately, some universities 
and other organizations block automatic replies and discard them as SPAM, so that authors 
never receive a confirmation of receipt. If you do not receive an automatic reply, please check 
the instructions directly at the following internet address:
http://www.discourses.org/joumals/Pre-Review.pdf. Actually, it would be very useful to 
check these criteria even before submitting your paper, so as to make sure that your paper fits 
the criteria of the journals - especially the criterion that any paper for the discourse journals 
should engage in detailed, systematic and theory-based analyses of text or talk.
Submitting a book review: Book reviews should be submitted by email to the Book Reviews 
Editor, Ingrid Piller: ingrid.piller@mq.edu.au
Further information: For questions about submissions and editorial policy, write to the editor: 
vandijk@discourses.org
4. Journal contributor’s publishing agreement
Before publication SAGE requires the author as the rights holder to sign a Journal 
Contributor’s Publishing Agreement. SAGE’s Journal Contributor’s Publishing Agreement is 
an exclusive licence agreement which means that the author retains copyright in the work but 
grants SAGE the sole and exclusive right and licence to publish for the full legal term of 
copyright. Exceptions may exist where an assignment of copyright is required or preferred by 
a proprietor other than SAGE. In this case copyright in the work will be assigned from the 
author to the society. For more information please visit our Frequently Asked Questions on 
the SAGE Journal Author Gateway.
Discourse & Society and SAGE take issues of copyright infringement, plagiarism or other 
breaches of best practice in publication very seriously. We seek to protect the rights of our 
authors and we always investigate claims of plagiarism or misuse of articles published in the 
journal. Equally, we seek to protect the reputation of the journal against malpractice.
Submitted articles may be checked using duplication-checking software. Where an article is 
found to have plagiarised other work or included third-party copyright material without 
permission or with insufficient acknowledgement, or where authorship of the article is 
contested, we reserve the right to take action including, but not limited to: publishing an 
erratum or corrigendum (correction); retracting the article (removing it from the journal); 
taking up the matter with the head of department or dean of the author’s institution and/or
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relevant academic bodies or societies; banning the author from publication in the journal or all 
SAGE journals, or appropriate legal action.
5. Declaration of conflicting interests
Within your Journal Contributor’s Publishing Agreement you will be required to make a 
certification with respect to a declaration of conflicting interests. Animation does not require a 
declaration of conflicting interests but recommends you review the good practice guidelines 
on the SAGE Journal Author Gateway.
6. Other conventions
None applicable.
7. Acknowledgements
Any acknowledgements should appear first at the end of your article prior to your Declaration 
of Conflicting Interests (if applicable), any notes and your References.
All contributors who do not meet the criteria for authorship should be listed in an 
‘Acknowledgements’ section. Examples of those who might be acknowledged include a 
person who provided purely technical help, writing assistance, or a department chair who 
provided only general support. Authors should disclose whether they had any writing 
assistance and identify the entity that paid for this assistance.
7.1 Funding Acknowledgement
To comply with the guidance for Research Funders, Authors and Publishers issued by the 
Research Information Network (RIN), Discourse & Society additionally requires all Authors 
to acknowledge their funding in a consistent fashion under a separate heading. All research 
articles should have a funding acknowledgement in the form of a sentence as follows, with the 
funding agency written out in full, followed by the grant number in square brackets:
This work was supported by the Medical Research Council [grant number xxx].
Multiple grant numbers should be separated by comma and space. Where the research was 
supported by more than one agency, the different agencies should be separated by semi-colon, 
with ‘and’ before the final funder. Thus:
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Environment Research Council [grant number zzzz]; and the Economic and Social Research 
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In some cases, research is not funded by a specific project grant, but rather from the block 
grant and other resources available to a university, college or other research institution. Where
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no specific funding has been provided for the research we ask that corresponding authors use 
the following sentence:
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, 
or not-for-profit sectors.
Please include this information under a separate heading entitled ‘Funding’ directly after any 
other Acknowledgements prior to your ‘Declaration of Conflicting Interests’ (if applicable), 
any Notes and your References.
For more information on the guidance for Research Funders, Authors and Publishers, please 
visit: http://www.rin.ac.uk/funders-acknowledgement.
8. Permissions
Authors are responsible for obtaining permission from copyright holders for reproducing any 
illustrations, tables, figures or lengthy quotations previously published elsewhere. For further 
information including guidance on fair dealing for criticism and review, please visit our 
Frequently Asked Questions on the SAGE Journal Author Gateway..
9. Manuscript style
9.1 File types
Only electronic files conforming to the journal's guidelines will be accepted. Preferred 
formats for the text and tables of your manuscript are Word DOC or RTF. Please also refer to 
additional guideline on submitting artwork and supplemental files below.
9.2 Journal Style
Discourse & Society conforms to the SAGE house style. Click here to review guidelines on 
SAGE UK House Style
9.3 Reference Style
Discourse & Society adheres to the SAGE Harvard reference style. Click here to review the 
guidelines on SAGE Harvard to ensure your manuscript conforms to this reference style.
If you use EndNote to manage references, download the SAGE Harvard output style by 
following this link and save to the appropriate folder (normally for Windows C:\Program 
Files\EndNote\Styles and for Mac OS X Harddrive:Applications:EndNote:Styles). Once 
you’ve done this, open EndNote and choose ‘Select Another Style...’ from the dropdown 
menu in the menu bar; locate and choose this new style from the following screen.
9.4. Manuscript Preparation
The text should be double-spaced throughout and with a minimum of 3 cm for left and right 
hand margins and 5cm at head and foot. Text should be standard 10 or 12 point.
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9.4.1 Your Title, Keywords and Abstracts: Helping readers find your article online
The title, keywords and abstract are key to ensuring readers find your article online through 
online search engines such as Google. Please refer to the information and guidance on how 
best to title your article, write your abstract and select your keywords by visiting SAGE’s 
Journal Author Gateway Guidelines on How to Help Readers Find Your Article Online.
9.4.2 Corresponding Author Contact details
Provide full contact details for the corresponding author including email, mailing address and 
telephone numbers. Academic affiliations are required for all co-authors. These details should 
be presented separately to the main text of the article to facilitate anonymous peer review.
9.4.3 Guidelines for submitting artwork, figures and other graphics
For guidance on the preparation of illustrations, pictures and graphs in electronic format, 
please visit SAGE’s Manuscript Submission Guidelines.
If, together with your accepted article, you submit usable colour figures, these figures will 
appear in colour online regardless of whether or not these illustrations are reproduced in 
colour in the printed version. If a charge applies you will be informed by your SAGE 
Production Editor. For specifically requested colour reproduction in print, you will receive 
information regarding the costs from SAGE after receipt of your accepted article.
Tables and figures should have short descriptive titles and all artwork should be at least 300 
dpi.
9.4.4 Guidelines for submitting supplemental files
This journal is able to host approved supplemental materials online, alongside the full-text of 
articles. Supplemental files will be subjected to peer-review alongside the article. For more 
information please refer to SAGE’s Guidelines for Authors on Supplemental Files.
9.4.5 English Language Editing services
Non-English speaking authors who would like to refine their use of language in their 
manuscripts might consider using a professional editing service. Visit 
http://www.uk.sagepub.com/joumalgateway/msg.htm for further information.
10. After acceptance
10.1 Proofs
We will email a PDF of the proofs to the corresponding author.
10.2 E-Prints and Complimentary Copies
SAGE provides authors with access to a PDF of their final article. For further information 
please visit Offprints and Reprints. We additionally provide the corresponding author with a
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complimentary copy of the print issue in which the article appears up to a maximum of 5 
copies for onward supply by the corresponding author to co-authors.
10.3 SAGE Production
At SAGE we place an extremely strong emphasis on the highest production standards 
possible. We attach high importance to our quality service levels in copy-editing, typesetting, 
printing, and online publication (http://online.sagepub.com/). We also seek to uphold 
excellent author relations throughout the publication process.
We value your feedback to ensure we continue to improve our author service levels. On 
publication all corresponding authors will receive a brief survey questionnaire on your 
experience of publishing in Discourse & Society with SAGE.
11. Further information
Any correspondence, queries or additional requests for information on the Manuscript 
Submission process should be sent to the Editorial Office as follows:
The Editor
Discourse & Society
E-mail: vandijk@discourses.org
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‘Abstraction drives a wedge between our thoughts and experience, 
resulting in the degeneration of both. Theoreticians, as opposed to 
practitioners, tend to impose tyranny through the concepts they use, which 
abstract away from the subjective experiences that make life meaningful’.
Eric Oberheim, from Editor’s Introduction in Feyarabend’s The Tyranny o f
Science
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“It’s not My Place...”: A Psychosocial Analysis of Trainee Counselling 
Psychologists’ Accounts of Diagnosis in Mental Health
Abstract
Objectives: to investigate ways in which trainee counselling37 
psychologists talked about health diagnosis; also to assess the impact that 
had on their subjectivity in combination with psychic interpersonal 
dynamics.
Design: Five trainee counselling psychologists were engaged in 
unstructured dialogues based around nine key questions derived from 
previous research. My two research supervisors also asked these questions 
of me.
Methods: A psychosocial method was used to analyse discourse using 
transcriptions of the recordings and also to interpret interpersonal and 
biographical data.
Results: Three discursive motifs were identified: diagnosis as necessary 
evil, diagnosis as an abstract code and diagnosis as a barrier. Together 
with interpersonal and biographical data, these were found to position 
counselling psychology trainees as outsiders and by limiting their ability 
to speak out.
Conclusions: Diagnosis has multiple meanings for different clinicians. 
These are a product of their idiosyncratic psychic life as well as 
increasingly democratizing discourses.
371 have kept to the British spelling of “counselling” (in contrast to the American spellings of 
other words) because I am referring specifically to British counselling psychologists.
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Practitioner points
• Organizations should pay attention to the multiple non-taxonomic meanings 
diagnosis has for clinicians for the sake of clinicians’ communication as well as 
clients.
• Clinical supervisors may need address the anxieties that this can bring for trainees. 
Introduction
The diagnostic enterprise
Current diagnosistic taxonomies in mental health originated in a biomedical model 
formulated by Emil Kraepelin at the beginning of the Twentieth Century (Bentall, 
2003; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). In this model, it was proposed that there are a discreet 
number of mental diseases that have an organic basis and that, like physical illnesses, 
could be discovered. The practice of diagnosis and continued research into discrete 
mental illnesses are practices which are underpinned by an ideological belief in 
mental illness as the expression of organic psychopathology. This has particularly 
been the case in biological psychiatry (Moncreiff, 2007). However, counselling 
psychologists who work in mental health settings may be encouraged to whistle to the 
same tune, even if their ideological stance stands in opposition (Larsson, Loewenthal 
& Brooks, 2012).
In addition, while psychiatric diagnosis continues to guide research and treatment in 
mental health services, some literature suggests that the diagnoses themselves attract 
stigma (Bathje & Prior, 2011; Ben-Porath, 2002) and may even be iatrogenic 
(Sartorius, 2002); that people form identities around diagnoses (Charland, 2004; Giles 
& Newbold, 2011); and that people given diagnoses may have diverse and often 
unhelpful ideas about its meaning (Spedding, Brown & Draghi-Lorenz, 2013).
One critical theoretical position that has yielded fruitful ideas about diagnosis is social 
constructionism. Gergen (1985) describes social constructionism as a framework of 
understanding in which phenomena are historically, socially and culturally rooted.
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Knowledge is understood as being sustained by social processes rather discovered by 
empirical validation, and explanations of phenomena are political rather than neutral. 
In such a framework, knowledge is "... not... something that a person has (or does not 
have), but as something people do together” (Burr, 1995, p.8).
Social constructionist comprehensions of diagnosis have moved beyond a simple 
pathological understanding of mental illness. For example, Conrad (1992) has 
identified diagnosis as a tool of social control, citing the pathologization of behaviors 
such as homosexuality, gambling and under-eating. In a critical discursive analytical 
study, Crowe (2000) has challenged the DSM-IV-TR’s (APA, 2000) assumptions 
about psychopathology being based in the individual and situates diagnostic systems 
in organizations of power which seek to define normal experience. Other literature has 
linked the construction of diagnostic categories directly to psychiatric power by 
looking at financial and other power-related institutional interests (Brown, 1995; Kirk 
& Kutchins, 1992; Tiefer, 2006; Harper, 2013).
Of particular relevance for this study Larsson (2012), in a critical literature review of 
diagnostic categories, suggests that diagnosis presents a conflict for counselling 
psychologists, who need to interface with it on the one hand, but who feel a resistance 
to it on the other because of the harm it can cause their clients and because of the risk 
it poses for their own identity. Additionally, Craven and Coyle (2007) used discourse 
analysis to mark out two discursive repertoires in which counselling psychologists 
talked about ‘psychopathology’38 and diagnostic categories -  one in which it was 
naïvely constructed as a real entity, and another more fraught with clinical dilemmas 
in relation to realism and the humanistic value base at the heart of the discipline 
(Strawbridge and Woolfe, 2003). Harper (1994) has also found similar ways of 
speaking about diagnosis and paranoia which have served to legitimize the 
professional status of the psychiatrists and clinical psychologists he interviewed.
38 The authors use inverted commas to imply that this is a constructed term rather than a 
linguistic reflection of an a priori reality.
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Experience and the psychological subject
Craven and Coyle (2007) write about the danger in discourse analysis of writing too 
long an introduction, because it indelibly pre-constructs the discursive object before 
the analysis. I am aware that I have engaged in such a construction of diagnosis and to 
a lesser extent of counselling psychologists -  and for this reason perhaps I now turn to 
methodology. However, my aim has been in this study is to give the role of the 
researcher due space: this introduction serves as a summary of what I consider to be 
pertinent literature and theories of diagnosis in order to reflect openly my subjective 
starting point.
It has also been my aim to move away from naïve interview-based qualitative 
methods, in which accounts derived from research are taken to equal experience and 
in which this experience is taken to be representative of a singular psychological 
stance. Hollway (1989) describes how such methods are contained within a wider 
view of the unitary subject in Western psychology, and how this view actively 
promulgates the desire for participants in research to produce consistent and integrated 
narratives.
These aims have also necessitated a move away from the humanistic view of the 
sovereign individual to a psychology of multiple subjectivities (Henriques, Hollway, 
Irwin, Venn & Walkerdine, 1984). A relatively integrated narrative about diagnosis 
produced in an interview situation with a clinician might, if taken at face value, 
provide us on one level with a great deal of information about diagnosis. However, it 
would tell us nothing about what ‘diagnosis’ and ‘clinician’ are, or what meanings can 
be ascribed to these terms.
The need to move beyond a face value understanding of experience has also been 
demonstrated by previous research. Marshall (1986), researching the experience of 
women managers, describes how she found consistently that her participants were not 
affected by their status as women. Yet, the effects were clear to the researcher and 
perhaps might have been drawn out in a different environment. Hollway concludes of 
Marshall’s (1986) study that if, “as social scientists we elicit such accounts and
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reproduce them as fact legitimated by out ‘scientific practices’ we are reproducing 
sexist regimes of truth” (1989, p.45).
If it is to be accepted that narrated experiences in research interactions present only 
one possible subjectivity -  and that this subjectivity is governed by the discourses in 
which the research participant is situated, what then are the possibilities for a research 
method that aims to take these dynamics into account? Furthermore, following the 
rationale of the discourse sensitive nature of the research subject, the researcher is also 
implicated in the production of the data that come to be analyzed. I am occupying a 
tranche of subjectivity that is not my totality, but contingent on the nature of the 
research questions that I am trying to answer. My questions, grunts of assertion and 
silences co-create an inter-subjective corpus of data. The consideration of such 
dynamics will necessarily blur the lines that have been traditionally drawn between 
researcher and participant when it comes to the analysis. But what tools are at my 
disposal to examine them?
A psychosocial synthesis
The questions posed above relate to the possibility of understanding data produced in 
dialogues that is contingent on two ideas: the non-unitary, non-rational subject and the 
researcher as a relational co-producer of data in the dialogue. Psychosocial39 research 
has been proposed to be able to incorporate such ideas, being a synthesis of 
psychoanalytic (the ‘psycho-’) and critical social science (the ‘-social’) methods 
(Hollway & Jefferson, 2013). Psychosocial research is an umbrella term for methods 
in which “human subjects... [are], simultaneously, the products of their own unique 
psychic worlds and a shared social world” (Gadd & Jefferson, 2007, p.4).
Such a synthesis creates an ontological problem regarding the nature of the 
psychological subject. While the discursive subject tends to be conceptualized as a 
non-agent produced entirely within discourse, the psychoanalytic subject is not. 
Lapping presents the problem as follows:
39 This usage, as Hollway and Jefferson (2013) point out, is distinct from the ‘psychosocial’ 
that is used atheoretically in medical and health research.
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The reduction of everything to discourse can appear as a denial of 
significant forces that need to be differentiated from totalizing structures of 
discursivity, while the insistence on the psyche can appear to relegate 
resistance to an inaccessible, individualized unconscious. (2011, p.77)
Lapping (2011) also contends that there is common ground between discourse and 
psyche in the form of resistance and repetition. By elaborating on some of the tensions 
in Foucault’s accounts of the subject (1965; 1981), she suggests that a discursive 
subject may have its own extra- (or pre-) discursive power that is analogous to the 
psyche. In this study, I have wanted to give some focus to this pre-discursive portion 
of subjectivity without which the psychological subject is rendered passive in a 
constructionist form of determinism (McNay, 2000).
Such an ontological synthesis also benefits my question about the nature of mental 
health diagnosis: while keeping an open discursive view of the object (diagnosis), 
psychoanalytic thinking might allow me to address some of the lack of focus 
discursive analysis has historically given to the psychological subject (Hollway,
1989). I believe this is a necessary shift, given that the data in this study produced in 
an interpersonal situation. Furthermore, a focus on the psychological subject and 
psychodynamic practice has been at the core of my clinical training as a counselling 
psychologist; I see a similar focus in the research relationship as a natural 
continuation.
The extent to which -  and what kind of -  psychoanalytic theory should be applied in 
psychosocial research have been topics of debate, in which opposing theoretical 
positions are to some extent mimetic of the schisms within the field of psychoanalysis 
itself (Lapping, 2011). A full description of this debate is beyond the remit of this 
study. However, Lapping (2011) usefully organizes her description of the debate 
round the subject of counter-transference, a concept whose clinical application tends 
to be eschewed by the Lacanian school, but encompassed by the British object 
relations and Kleinian schools. For the purposes of this study it has suited me to align 
myself mostly with the latter mode of inquiry, since I am interested in interpreting 
emotional data that arises in the dialogues. Hollway and Jefferson’s (2013) free 
association narrative interview has also been instructive in this regard.
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Another crucial aspect of the psychosocial approach is that, rather than taking 
accounts as manifesting experience, it proposes a “defended subject” (Hollway & 
Jefferson, 2013, p. 17), whose narrative in an interview situation will reflect her or his 
position in relation to the unconscious conflicts that are activated in reaction to that 
specific environment (including the interviewer). A degree of reflexivity and self- 
analysis is thus needed to judge what is being defended through looking for content- 
related inconsistencies and felt movements in the process of the dialogue.
For Hollway and Jefferson (2013), the synthesis of the social and the psychic into the 
psychosocial is also guided by the research question. They aim to analyze not only the 
social processes which account for the production of peoples’ positioning in relation 
to the discursive object (in their case, fear of crime), but also to investigate the 
idiosyncratic nature of peoples’ psychic experience beyond the text. This then 
provides a social account which moves beyond broad categorizations like ‘men’ and 
‘women’ that are used in more traditional social research. Similarly, to have broadly 
categorized the construction of diagnosis in this study would have been a valid 
exercise, but one that would have been impoverished without a further attempt to 
understand the more nuanced and idiosyncratic effects on trainee psychologists that I 
noticed in the dialogues.
This research project
Although the literature has been informative about some of the ways in which 
clinicians use and talk about diagnosis, no current research adequately explored how 
they are positioned by diagnosis discursively and psychically. While there is generally 
skepticism towards psychiatric diagnoses within Counselling Psychology (for 
example Milton, 2013; Larsson et al., 2012), I believe that further investigation is 
needed to articulate some of the nuances in how trainee counselling psychologists talk 
about diagnosis, the kinds of interpersonal and intrapsychic anxieties it presents, and 
how these might relate to being in training (which itself has been indicated to be a 
stressful stage (Kumary & Baker, 2008)).
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Furthermore, the recent publication of the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) is currently the cause 
of much debate about the value of diagnosis in the midst of which Division of Clinical 
Psychology has taken a definite stance (BPS, 2013). I believe counselling psychology 
trainees will have something valuable to add here, being at a stage where perhaps our 
ideas about diagnosis are arguably less crystallized by the cultures in which we 
practice than those of more seasoned clinicians. My research questions are how is 
diagnosis constructed by trainee counselling psychologists! and what psychosocial 
positions o f anxiety do they inhabit!
I hope to give a voice to and to do justice to the other trainees I have talked to: I 
believe they deserve a voice in the current debate about diagnosis. Finally, I hope that 
this research will represent fairly and sympathetically the clients I and the other 
trainees talk about, whom -  like Guilfoyle - 1 have experienced as “significantly 
different from the complexity-reducing and knowledge-conserving ways in which the 
DSM and its practitioners describe them” (2013, p.89).
Method
Participants
The data were collected by recording dialogues with other clinicians. Initial dialogues 
had been arranged through emailing colleagues at the University of Surrey and 
through my clinical placement. I also displayed a poster in two locations at the 
hospital where I work -  one in a training facility and one in a common room.
Some other clinicians whom I had spoken to about my research expressed an interest 
in taking part. In other cases, I had pre-existing personal relationships with the people 
I engaged in dialogues. My aim was to produce rich data and my method is able to 
account for and analyze interpersonal dynamics. Similar to Hollway’s (1989) 
research, it was essential that I identified people who would able to talk about their 
experiences with diagnosis freely; in addition, I was keen to find people who did not 
have a naïve view of diagnosis, so that some of the conflicts I experience and which 
are described in counselling psychology literature might be explored further.
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In the first round of dialogues, I engaged three clinicians in conversation about 
diagnosis: one clinical psychologist and two trainee counseling psychologists. At this 
point, I decided that I should only use one of these professional groups40. The research 
question comes from me and I realized was embedded to some extent in my identity 
as a trainee counselling psychologist: with other trainee counselling psychologists, I 
felt I would be able to produce a more refined, less unwieldy and more subjectively 
nuanced analysis. In addition, the breadth of experience and discourse articulated in 
the first two dialogues with trainee counselling psychologists had, I felt, been 
sufficiently rich (Yardley, 2000) to merit further scrutiny with this professional 
identity alone.
Three more dialogues were then recorded with trainee counselling psychologists who 
were found either through my own university contacts, or through emailing 
information sheets (see Appendix A) to trainees at other universities.
Procedure
I met the participants in a variety of places according to where they were most 
comfortable: this included one person’s home, rooms I had booked in libraries and a 
secluded comer of a local café. At this stage I gave consent forms to the participants 
(see Appendix B), informed them about anonymity, invited them to read the 
information about the project and to ask me any questions they had. I noted 
demographic details (as in Table 1 below on p.218) and then used the interview 
schedule attached in Appendix C as a frame for the dialogues, but was attentive to 
information that did not fit into it and encouraged people to talk freely. My estimate 
had been that the dialogues would run for approximately one hour and this was 
actually how they turned out, the shortest being 49 minutes and the longest being one 
hour and 15 minutes.
As soon as possible after, I recorded some of my experience of the dialogues -  
including my level of alertness, the feelings I had experienced during the dialogue and 
other thoughts that immediately occurred to me. I also wrote down a brief summary of
40 Although one dialogue has not ended up being analyzed here, my plan is to employ it in a 
future project that explores a different professional identity.
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some of the content covered not in the interview schedule. I included these details on 
the same sheet as the demographic information along with the length of the dialogue 
and its location. I have included a sample one of these sketches in Appendix D.
Self-analysis
Around the first stage of recording dialogues, I asked my two research supervisors to 
engage me in dialogue on the same topics that I have asked other people about. This 
was done with the same interview schedule as a guide. The purpose of these dialogues 
was to explore my subjective positioning in relation to diagnostic discourses as a 
counselling psychology trainee and to some extent to test my idea that in the different 
dialogues I might also be positioned in different ways by the interpersonal dynamics 
of the dialogues. Each supervisor was also asked to provide a brief summary of the 
dialogue from their point of view similar in format to the sketches I wrote about each 
dialogue with the other participants.
Transcription and data analysis
The dialogues (including those in which I was interviewed) were transcribed in their 
totality. At this stage, I made no extra formal categorizations or notes, but rather tried 
to become familiar with the content and overall impression of each. I also made sure 
that names and references to other people or work places were changed. Having 
transcribed each recording, I then listened twice to each again. During the first 
iteration, I made notes about my experience and my sense of interpersonal dynamics. 
In the second iteration, I made notes of a more discursive nature about how the subject 
was being positioned by the language, and what discourses might be being evoked to 
what ends. This then gave me -  with the addition of the sketches I had written -  a 
three tier portfolio of preliminary analytic data: one tier focusing on the interpersonal 
(and to a degree in the intrapsychic); the second focusing on the discursive; and the 
third tier focusing on the Gestalt of each dialogue. I found it helpful to make my notes 
at each tier on different sizes of paper (A5, A4 and A6 respectively).
Subsequently, listening to the recordings many times over and thinking about the 
whole corpus of data, I began to organize the data by discursive motifs (akin to what
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Edley (2001) calls ‘interpretative repertoires’ in his critical discursive method) which 
seemed to naturally emerge. These were relatively pithy and coherent ways of 
constructing diagnosis across the data. I write the word ‘seemed’ here being aware 
that this emergence was also clearly the product of my interaction with the data. My 
analysis and categorizations reflect this. Hollway and Jefferson (2013) warn of the 
dangers of categorization in psychosocial research because it can take away from the 
Gestalt of the individual psychic analysis. I have categorized in order to make sense of 
my analysis for the reader, being aware of Hollway and Jefferson’s (2013) assertion 
that the creation of intelligible and compelling narratives is essential for qualitative 
research.
The second stage of the analysis was to find a way of evincing psychic experience 
(comprising discursive conflicts at the personal level, biographical data and 
experiential data) in a meaningful way that reflects the psychosocial subject’s 
idiosyncratic nature while linking her or him to diagnostic discourse. Again, Edley’s 
(2001) concept of ‘subject positionings’ was useful here: these are ways in which 
subjects are embodied by the discourse and constructions of themselves within the 
boundaries of coexisting discourses. However, recalling Lapping’s (2011) concept of 
the extra-discursive self, I have widened the scope of critical discursive subjectivity to 
encompass a psychoanalytic form of defended subjectivity that is interpersonal and 
developmental as well as social. Also recalling Klein’s use o f ‘positions’ to describe 
poles of psychic anxiety between which subjects are in flux (Segal, 2004) I have 
called these units of analysis ‘psychosocial positionings’.
Ethical considerations
One ethical problem which Hollway and Jefferson (2013) raise for psychosocial 
research is one power, particularly with regard to informed consent. They found in 
their research that the people they interviewed often had little idea of what they would 
talk about and how they would be affected as a result until after the interviews. With a 
form of qualitative research which encourages a degree of free association and an 
environment in which personal and interpersonal conflicts around diagnosis are 
explored, the notion of informed consent as it is used in traditional psychological
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research may not be a good fit — indeed it may be antithetic to psychoanalytic research 
per se (Frosh, 2010).
However, people who took part in the dialogues were made aware of the fact that to 
some extent the dialogues would be allowed to go where they guided them and were 
given information about what they could do if they found this unmanageable. I also 
felt that the trainee counselling psychologists I spoke to would have a degree of 
familiarity with self-reflection and that this would not be unusual territory for them. 
Also, I felt that the parity of our professional status would defuse the power dynamics 
that are inherent in many interview relationships where the researcher is the guardian 
of knowledge and the participant her or his instrument. In addition, I have tried to 
manifest Hollway and Jefferson’s (2013) three principles for handling psychosocial 
subjects at all stages of the research: honesty, sympathy and respect. This has 
particularly been part of the process in the analysis of the data, because I am aware 
that I am making inferences about unconscious interpersonal dynamics that (by their 
nature) have not been explicitly spoken about in the dialogues.
The anonymity of the research participants has been protected by changing their 
names and the names of any people, places or organizations that they speak about. 
Recordings of out dialogues have been stored securely and removed from the portable 
recording device that was used during to gather them. Additionally, I was aware that 
some of people I interviewed knew each other. Therefore, I have taken care to present 
short excerpts below that do not manifest any specific or recognizable dialect patterns.
I have quoted only content that mentions specifics such as type of placement that is 
specifically necessary to the elaboration of my discussion. I have also not referred to 
peoples’ ages. I use the word ‘anonymity’ here rather than ‘confidentiality’ because, 
as Parker argues, the aim of research is “always to ‘discover’ something new and 
show it to others” (2005, p. 17). Being aware of this, I have attempted -  also as Parker 
(2005) suggests — to be faithful to the data, to be transparent about my part in its 
production and analysis and to accept responsibility all of this by writing in the first 
person. Ethical approval for this study was granted by the University of Surrey 
Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences ethics committee.
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Results
I have organized the results here into two sections. In the first, I have delineated some 
discursive motifs that emerged from the dialogues and which I have used to organize 
the constellation of ways people talked about diagnosis. These have, I hope, situated 
the second section, in which I have presented ways in which these discourses 
positioned the people who engaged in the dialogues. Additionally here -  and this is 
where I have diverged from a traditional discourse analytic account of subjectivity - 1 
have elaborated the psychic (or extra-discursive) elements of these positionings from 
the experiential and historical data gathered in the dialogues. I have focused on some 
accounts more fully than others in order to give a sense of at least some of the Gestalts 
of these trainee counselling psychologists, and rather than producing a single case 
study as in other psychosocial research (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013).
I have drawn from all the dialogues (including those in which I was being 
interviewed). Extracts and quotations have been labeled by the dialogue numbers 
show below in Table 1 (p.218). Square brackets are used to denote either my inclusion 
of words whose sense is carried on from outside the extracts, or to denote instances 
where I have edited out lines of speech for the sake of clarity or anonymity.
Discursive motifs
Diagnosis as a necessary evil. One prevalent discursive construction of diagnosis was 
that it was abstracted the human and idiosyncratic into a functional and necessary set 
of terms. For example, anorexia nervosa, a diagnosis with which Cassie had interfaced 
in one of her clinical placements is constructed as a functional label that channels 
people into a specific service.
Extract 1. (#3)
Cassie: ...I mean, there’s little consideration to their life outside of this 
diagnosis.
Sam: Mm.
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Cassie: Um, and I kind of think that by understanding more of that and 
working with some of that to some degree that that could also 
have an impact... on that too.
Sam: So ... and ... and does that feel like something you are not able
to do as much as you want to, then, that’s the kind of, er, sense I get?
Cassie: It... it... it... it.... it... it’s, um...
Sam: Yeah.
Cassie: ... it is because it’s ju s t ... it all boils down to money to some 
degree as well.
However, this service is then talked about as a culture whose goal was to rid patients 
of the symptoms that are specific to the diagnosis that admits them. This completes a 
cycle of functional abstraction -  the psychiatric culture cures that which it creates with 
little room for her as a trainee psychologist to work relationally and with an emphasis 
on individual meaning other than through her own creativity within the manualized 
treatments that were prescribed.
Evoking the same motif, Dan cited some research he had done into generalized 
anxiety disorder as “helpful for me... being able to target my reading” and that ‘it 
helped and it fitted with the client and she found it “helpful”(5). However, he talked 
also about how he had not wanted to tell her the diagnosis because it might be harmful 
to her. Similarly Cassie talked to me about one case where the behavior of a client 
began to resemble the facets she associated with borderline personality disorder, a 
diagnosis that had been given to one of this client’s close relatives. She explained how 
the diagnosis had in some way prepared her for the kind of activity she might expect, 
but that is should not be taken at face value.
In my dialogue with Abigail borderline personality disorder diagnosis was talked 
about less comfortably than some other diagnoses -  such as those more 
phenomenologically named, like ‘eating disorders’ which “[describe] a problem with 
eating”(l). In our utterances about borderline personality disorder, the diagnosis was 
constructed as something that was abstracted from its idiosyncratic, developmental 
and social dimensions. Nevertheless it was also constructed as a functional entity.
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Extract 2. (#1)
Abigail: Um, but I have found myself while speaking to, let’s say
colleagues or work contacts or peers [...] to try and summarise 
and give the idea of what I’m talking about quickly ...
Sam: Mm, mm.
Abigail: ... I have found myself using words like borderline [...] traits, 
which I don’t like it when I do but it does kind of make it faster 
to convey something.
Sam: Yeah, and i t ... and it, I suppose i t ... it feels like there’s some
tension there in a way th a t... that you don’t like doing it but at 
the same time, it kind o f ... there’s something kind of functional 
and maybe there isn’t a different way to do it or th a t... that 
you’re ...[...] kind of caught in a bit of a conflict about that.
Abigail: Yeah. Yeah. Um (long pause) yeah.
Sam: Mm.
Abigail: Unresolved conflict (laughs)
Sam: (laughs)
Diagnosis as an abstract code» Elsewhere diagnosis was constructed as being at even 
further levels of abstraction from individual psychiatric needs. Both Abigail and Dan 
talked about mental health diagnoses as having a meaning beyond the DSM  diagnostic 
criteria. For example, in dialogue 1 personality disorder diagnoses were constructed as 
evoking a degree of severity that would be difficult to get across without using a 
diagnostic term. Schizophrenia was also spoken about as a label “so laden with 
meaning... it kind of distorts the perception of the person”(l). This diagnosis was thus 
constructed as having a powerful layer of meaning outside its taxonomic criteria.
Similarly, the borderline personality disorder diagnosis was constructed as a 
legitimate clinical translation of “pain in the arse” in dialogue 4; Dan continued:
“there is a communication in the word [borderline] that is unspoken, but understood”. 
This abstraction of diagnosis from its taxonomic base is also evoked in Dan’s talk of
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the fragmentation and proliferation of diagnostic meanings on the internet in Extract 
3, which is constructed as a relatively new process.
Extract 3. (#4)
Dan: .. .because I think if you introduce a diagnostic term, you have to
do that on the understanding that the probability is that that 
person is going to go away and Google that and he’s going to 
find all sorts of stuff.
Sam: Yeah, yeah.
Dan: All sorts of stuff, some of which might be very damaging.
Sam: Yeah.
Dan: So I think that there’s a load of extra complexity there now that
makes life very difficult where diagnosis is concerned.
Diagnoses were also constructed as abstracted specifically from their taxonomic 
origins: for example Benjamin suggested that the balkanization of individual 
diagnostic categories into a composite diagnosis of traits “basically... doesn’t mean 
anything”(2). This was then linked to a construction of diagnostic language as a tool 
to legitimize the psychiatric establishment.
Extract 4. (#2)
Benjamin: I think the language and the training are quite wrapped up 
together, aren’t they? Um, I’m talking particularly with 
psychiatrists [...] I know this psychiatrist quite well. That’s part 
of the reason why I’d like it if... the psychiatrist to feel more 
free... erm, because actually when we talk about particular 
clients, very often we come to quite similar sort of, er, 
conclusions 
[...]
Sam: Yeah, yeah.
Benjamin: Um, and it sort of feels in this particular example, it feels like 
that would be quite useful if, um, she didn’t fee l... I do feel a
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bit like, because of the training and the need to put somebody in 
an ICD-10 box it’s very difficult actually for a psychiatrist to, 
um, to say... um, actually this is something developmentally 
related...
Such constructions of legitimization were also evoked in the dialogues 4 and 5, and to 
an extent in dialogue 6, where I talked about the dissemination of published diagnostic 
manuals being “a good way of... raising lots of money”(6) for the American 
Psychiatric Association. In addition, in dialogue 5, diagnosis was talked about in 
terms of legitimization when it became the focus of multidisciplinary team meetings 
per se: “the idiosyncrasies get a bit lost and that really you’re talking about the 
diagnosis rather than the actual person”(5). In my dialogue with Benjamin, this kind 
of professional diagnostic discussion was talked about in terms of legitimizing many 
years spent learning and solidifying the clinical/ patient divide.
Finally, I found that answers to the question “what, in your view, is diagnosis?” (more 
or less formerly posed) were commonly met with ambiguity. Abigail, Erik, Benjamin 
and I (when I was asked in dialogues 6 and 7) produced answers about what it 
purported to be -  a functional and organizational system. However, in our 
explanations (or perhaps in our difficulty uttering explanations) was an implicit 
construction of something abstract and evanescent, which was encapsulated by 
Abigail’s initial reaction to my question: “Er, well, what they’re meant to be.. .”(1).
Diagnosis as a barrier. The analysis above has largely focused on constructions of 
diagnosis that arose out of trainee counselling psychologists’ reflections on their own 
clinical work. The next discursive motif that arose in the dialogues, however, was 
evoked in talk whose content described the connection between clients, clinicians and 
organizations to anxiety and pain. In Cassie’s account, the construction of diagnosis a 
as a barrier worked in two ways.
Extract 5. (#3)
Cassie: When you get patients who sometimes feel overly responsible, 
um, it can be something that is quite useful [...]
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Sam: ... like if someone thinks, if someone is ... tends to think like
“everything is my fault?”
Cassie: Yeah.
Sam: ... like, then it can be quite helpful just to think of, just to sort of
not have everything your fault (laughs) yeah.
[...]
Cassie: This is something that happens, it is a product of experiences 
you’ve been through [...].
Sam: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
Cassie: Other people, I’ve seen them use it to absolutely, what... kind of, 
not have any sense of responsibility ...
Sam: I see.
Cassie: ... for their recovery.
Sam: Yeah, I see, ok.
Cassie: So it’s the [diagnosis], it’s happened. “This diagnosis has 
happened to me, therefore I’m not responsible...”
Interestingly, the constructions of diagnosis here bring with them the concept of 
responsibility. In the first example Cassie gives, diagnosis is seen to alleviate a sense 
of responsibility that is “overly” active, whereas in the second scenario she described, 
diagnosis is constructed as something which allows an underly active sense of 
personal responsibility.
In the following extract, diagnosis is constructed as a barrier which guards both the 
therapist and the client from pain and anxiety: the following extract followed his 
description of personal experience in therapy and experience of other clinicians in his 
clinical work.
Extract 6. (#5)
Erik: I think it’s also there really to, um, safeguard the layperson who
doesn’t truly understand [...] some of the reasons behind, um, 
mental health difficulties, psychic pain, whatever you want to. ..
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call it. Because I actually personally believe that a true 
exploration into, um, some of the... (pause) mental health 
difficulties that people have is actually incredibly painful...
[...]
Sam: Do you think... (pause) who do you, who, who is it protecting
then, do you think? Do you think it’s protecting the clients or do 
you think it’s protecting the clinicians to some extent?
Erik: (long pause) I think to, er, I think both.
Sam: Yeah.
Erik: I think that predominantly, um (pause) I guess within Western, er,
society, we feel as if we need to have an answer. [...] We need to 
have a reductionist, simplistic... answer to things.
Sam: Mm.
Erik: And I suppose, you know, diagnoses are seen, um -  and health
difficulties -  as diseases, um, and that... that provides some, er, 
level of explanation, and I think some comfort to the medical 
profession.
In this extract, Erik’s use of the words “safeguard” and “comfort” establish diagnosis 
as a buffer between a painful psychic truth, which either the layperson might have 
difficulty handling, or which the medical establishment needs some protection from. 
The nature of diagnosis as a technology of extemalization is constructed here as 
simplifying and reductionist and embedded in wider discourses of realist Western 
practices.
It is worth noting here also that the discursive motif of extemalization emerges from 
the dialogue, rather than from the ‘participant’ (as Erik might be characterized in more 
traditional research where the researcher’s role is less transparent). In the extracts I 
have included so far I have tried to give a sense of my role in the dialogues. In Extract 
6, for example, I am aware that I am the one who shifts the focus of talk towards the 
protection of clinicians as well as clients and it is thus our co-produced language 
which evokes the discursive motif of diagnosis as a barrier.
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In the following extract, diagnosis is constructed as a form of self-comfort that 
protects against an ambiguity, or an ineffable anxiety.
Extract 7. (#1)
Abigail: I unfortunately think that, um, they can also be used as trying to 
get a handle on something which might be hard to hold or hard 
to, um, bear or hard to make sense of. So somehow by putting a 
label on it, can say, “Right, well, we know what it is and this is 
what we’re going to do about it.”
Sam: A shutting down of... meaning or?
Abigail: Yeah, of meaning or of trying to understand, of being heard, [...] 
of helping, trying to make sense of (sigh)...[...] And I think that 
there is probably an element of (long pause) um (long pause) 
there being certain things which are difficult to bear. Um (long 
pause) and... and not knowing what to do...[...] about it.
Sam: Right.
[...]
Abigail: Um, but I also think that there’s the more ... which the
psychotherapies are, um, good at tapping into is ... is the kind of 
count... counter-transference or... [...] the transference and all 
the stuff which goes on... [...] which we can’t, um, necessarily 
identify or put, you know, be able to speak about or know what it 
is straight away.
Sam: Mm.
Abigail: And I think there’s that element which then gets pushed away and 
out and onto the next person and onto the next service and into 
the next group...
Interestingly, diagnosis here is also constructed as something available, as opposed to 
the less immediate psychotherapeutic dynamics of transference and counter­
transference. Crucially the externalising nature of diagnosis is further evoked further 
through the talk of clients being forever passed on. Diagnosis is thus constructed as 
externalising clinicians and clinics not only from true contact with clients, but also
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from the anxiety of not knowing what this true contact would entail. For clients, 
diagnosis is constructed as a block to effective treatment -  an idea that was 
reproduced elsewhere in the data when Erik said, “I think they actually provide a 
barrier... for exploration of what some of the... fundamental reasons are that clients 
experience... the psychic pain that they do”(5).
Psychosocial positionings
The outsider. In Extract 6 above, Erik’s talk of an alternative view of distress to that 
encapsulated by diagnosis (or at least how diagnosis is constructed in our dialogue) 
positions him as an opposing force to the diagnostic/psychiatric establishment. This 
oppositional positioning occurred elsewhere, for example when Benjamin imagined 
an ideal relationship with psychiatrists he works with -  “we should disagree about... 
their diagnosis as a whole and the individual diagnosis and what’s useful”(2) -  albeit 
in a more optimistic way. It also came up in dialogues 6 and 7, for example when I 
talked proudly about my practice of writing “such and such has been diagnosed with 
anorexia” rather than “such and such is anorexic” and that it “introduces... an 
ambiguity [laughs]... deliberately”(6).
The discursive motifs described above were prevalent in my dialogue with Erik and 
afforded him a number of different subject positionings. However, some interpersonal 
and historic context may give some clues about how he came to occupy these 
positionings. Going back to Extract 6, the word “true” puts a particular spin on his 
oppositional positioning. It positions the kind of treatments that are contingent on 
diagnosis and embroiled the psychiatric system as zmtrue.
Erik has good reason to position himself and diagnosis in this way: he has described 
how earlier on in his life he has “[spoken to] a psychiatrist and that experience 
together with a diagnosis that [he] received, er, was actually probably detrimental”^ ) . 
Moreover in our dialogue I have also experienced increasingly a slight sense of 
estrangement from Erik (in comparison to other dialogues) and even a sense of his 
impenetrability as he explains his position in relation to the other people he works 
with and with whom he has talked about “switching o ff’(5) when they speak
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abstractedly about diagnosis. This leads me to name this sense of isolation later in the 
dialogue, to which he replies:
Extract 8 (#5)
Erik: There’s no doubt that it’s, um, isolating and [ .. .] !  think that if I
were to share some of my theoretical thoughts with other 
clinicians [ .. .] !  think that people become very threatened... if 
you start to, um, challenge their way of thinking.
From a Kleinian point of view, it is possible that the impenetrability and estrangement 
are a defense against the threat of attack from the bad object (Sharp & Faulkner,
2008). I believe I have experienced this interpersonally at this point in the dialogue: 
the threat of intimidation has been transferentially projected into me and been 
manifested in my anxiety about being too threatening or invasive in my questioning.
To an extent, the sense of being threatened may also have been projected into the 
“other clinicians” too as part of a process of narcissistic identification -  or at least this 
might be a hypothesis in purely psychoanalytic terms. However, having built up a 
corpus of discursive social data, the credence of this account alone seems insufficient. 
The positioning Erik occupies (that is characterized by externality and by anxiety) 
may be necessitated by a combination of the current diagnosis-related discourses of 
abstraction and extemalization together with his biography.
Certainly at other times during the dialogue Erik exhibited a more accepting 
positioning that was akin to the ‘depressive position’ in Kleinian terms (Segal, 2004). 
Again the shifting terrain of diagnostic discourses may have played a part in the 
construction of these different positionings. For example, the move he articulated 
between “despair”(5) at the nomothetic view of distress to being comfortable with his 
position within the institution where he works became available through the discursive 
construction of counselling psychology training as a journey of self-discovery and of 
diagnosis as an abstraction that has pragmatic utility.
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In Extract 2, Abigail described an unresolved conflict about the use of diagnostic 
terms in her clinical work. To some extent this irresolution can be seen to be a 
function of the irresolvable constructions of diagnosis that occurred in the dialogue -  
that it is a functional, but abstracted language at the same time as having an 
irresponsible protective function for clinicians. How Abigail came to be positioned in 
this way can perhaps be conceptualized more richly again if some of her biographical 
material and interpersonal data are taken into account.
She has implicitly described biographical experience related to anxiety through which 
she can normalize and empathizes clients’ distress by looking at them 
developmentally, rather than labeling them a way that pathologizes and externalizes 
distress and reinforces the sanity of the clinician. That the conflict created by these 
discursive constructions of diagnosis were available may in part have been related to 
her situation as a trainee counselling psychologist, but I felt were also connected to a 
more essential anxiety about her own positioning. Here she describes moving away 
from the country in which she grew up:
Extract 9 (#1)
Abigail: .. .Moving away from kind of what I knew... to seeing things
slightly as an outsider [...] um, has very much played its part... I 
mean, maybe the outsider kind of thing [...] has played a big 
part, um (long pause) because I remember reading a paper [...] 
and it was ‘the counselling psychologist as a maverick’.
In this way, something about Abigail’s makeup at an extra-discursive level may 
encourage her into an outsider’s positioning in relation to diagnosis.
There were also elements of the outsider positioning in the way I was positioned in 
the dialogues led by my supervisors. For example, I caricatured my talk about 
diagnosis variously as “preaching”(7) and “[getting] on a soap box”(6). From a 
psychoanalytic perspective, there may have been something of an idealistic projection 
about myself here, where I was investing myself with power in reaction to clinical
206
Research Dossier
situations in which I feel impotent. These are also isolated images of my condition, 
spoken about in the same hour as I have talked about the isolation I have felt as a 
result of being given a diagnosis of a physical illness that encapsulated neither my 
symptoms nor my experience. This psychic positioning was also coded in the 
interpersonal dynamics of these dialogues: I felt frustration in one, and relief and 
excitement in the other when my supervisor seemed to empathize with this position.
I t ’s not my place.,. Another psychosocial positioning arose in more than one dialogue 
in which people were constructed as not being able to speak freely about diagnosis -  
in relation to their clients and in relation to the organizations in which they were 
working. To some degree this psychosocial positioning was contingent on people’s 
constructions of themselves as trainee counselling psychologists (in addition to the 
discursive motifs of abstraction and extemalization). However, by focusing on some 
of the idiosyncratic elements surrounding this position, I hope to demonstrate the 
different ways in which people came to occupy it.
In the following extract Dan has been talking about a situation in which he used a 
diagnosis to guide his treatment of a client, but did not tell the client about the 
diagnosis for fear of the harm it might do.
Extract 10. (#4)
Dan: .. .You can’t really say, “would you like to know my diagnosis?”
It’s too late once you’ve asked the question. So I... it’s a very 
difficult one because I think I, I don’t really know the answer 
to... is this in the client’s interest?
During the dialogue, Dan has talked about his move from singular opposition to 
diagnosis before training as a counselling psychologist to interfacing with the reality 
of his clinical placements in which diagnosis is used. To some extent this mirrors the 
theoretical shift Klein describes from the paranoid/schizoid to the depressive position 
(Sharp & Faulkner, 2008). Yet, the awareness of diagnostic discourses that had come 
as a result of his training now positioned him at one end of a power differential 
between him and his client where I sensed he felt some anxiety. His imagined
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question above is perhaps one which he would like to ask his client and engage her in 
the same kind of dialogue that we were having, but his sensitivity towards the 
ambiguity that might surround her understanding of the diagnosis prevented him from 
doing so. I sensed a similar sensitivity and protectiveness, I think, earlier on in our 
dialogue where I found myself making negative inferences about a psychiatrist’s 
decision that her had talked about, but he had invited me to consider alternative 
inferences.
For Benjamin, this positioning came about in a similar vein of talk about protecting 
clients from diagnostic discussions that might not be useful to them. However, there 
was an added dimension of his anxiety about talking about distress in terms that he 
wanted to other clinicians. The dialogue with Benjamin lasted for about 15 minutes 
longer than any of the others I recorded, during which I found myself buoyed by an 
excited energy. I think I identified with a sense of frustration that came across in 
Benjamin’s invitations to ridicule (at some points) the way diagnostic language was 
used. Coming to this positioning from a slightly more combative stance, he imagined 
himself in the future having healthy, heated discussions with psychiatrists. This, by 
implication, constructed his present period of training as a situation in which such 
combat was less possible.
Abigail also occupied a similar position towards the end of our dialogue:
Extract 11. (#1)
Abigail: Sometimes I think... well, who am I to say th a t... say that, that’s 
not my view in relation to a psychiatrist who’s ... been working 
there for quite a long time.
Sam: And [...]... you said the psychiatrist who sort of has got lots of
years’ experience that it sounds like that’s kind of related in some 
way to ... to your level of experience or th a t... that your 
confidence in ... um, in the way that you think about things at the 
moment?
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Abigail: I hope that with more years of experience [...] I'd, um, kind of 
trust... my voice a bit more. Um, but I also think there’s the 
kind of dynamics of status ...
I have delineated some of the psychic factors that might have been at play in her 
positioning as an outsider, but perhaps the i t ’s not my place positioning brings out a 
different type of anxiety in Extract 11.1 have found myself in our dialogue trying to 
pin down (even diagnose) her general position in a way that she seems to find 
uncomfortable and for a couple of minutes I felt a sense of being a little lost. Perhaps I 
am embodying the psychiatrist with his concrete agenda and experience, and the 
unfixed collection of elements in her subjective makeup (such as the outsider 
positioning) have become uncomfortable. This discomfort may also exist within the 
context of a discourse of status in which the trainee counselling psychologist has less 
of a voice than the experienced psychiatrist.
Finally, In order to illustrate further the i t ’s not my place psychosocial positioning, 
Cassie’s response to my final question in Extract 1 may be instructive. I felt here that 
Cassie was wary about saying what she thought. Perhaps something transferential 
about my role in the dialogue made it difficult for her to speak her mind (I found 
myself in this dialogue having to stop myself from talking too much); perhaps also 
there was a degree of repression of anger which was transferred to a phantasized anger 
(Segal, 2004) from the organizational (and diagnostic) authority.
Discussion
In the analysis above I do not profess to exhibit an exhaustive list of either discursive 
motifs or psychosocial positionings. Instead it has been my intention to provide an 
account of the dialogues that demonstrates and organizes the discursive constructions 
of diagnosis and the intricate continuity between the social and the psychic and also to 
give a sense of the Gestalts of these trainee counselling psychologists.
The three discursive motifs I identified do to some extent tally with previous discourse 
analytic work on diagnosis. Diagnosis as a necessary evil is similar to Craven and 
Coyle’s (2007) ‘contingent’ repertoire in that functions of diagnosis are evoked. 
However, although sometimes the trainee counselling psychologists did refer to
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diagnostic terms naïvely, this did not constitute enough of a seam to be designated a 
repertoire. Rather, people were aware that they did use these terms and this tended to 
be the source for some anxiety. In addition the legitimization that Harper (1994) 
identifies was echoed in this study within the diagnosis as an abstract code motif.
In line with Yardley’s (2000) suggestion that qualitative research should be concerned 
with practicality, I have tried to keep an eye on in ways the data might be clinically 
useful at organized my analysis in ways that brings out this utility. The discourses 
suggest that there are anxieties for counselling psychologists in training, who are 
positioned by established clinical discourses as outsiders and as not having the ability 
to say what they think about diagnosis. The findings also suggest that there are 
multiple ways I which these positions get played out in an interpersonal context -  
where the trainee counselling psychologist is experienced as withdrawn, excitable, 
defensive or even “radical”(6) (as one of the research supervisors wrote about their 
experience of me in dialogue).
The generalizability of the findings is more difficult: in fact Hollway and Jefferson 
(2013) suggest that generalizability is difficult for psychosocial research because of 
the strong idiosyncratic focus. Accordingly, it can be seen through the psychic 
struggles described above that that, even though the dialogues are conducted with a 
relatively homogenous group in terms of demographics, peoples’ account of how they 
come to be where they are quite different -  even within the context of the same 
discursive forces. To some extent, this is to be expected in psychosocial research, 
whose agenda is to change the nomothetic focus of much social psychological 
research (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013).
Nevertheless the findings could have ramifications for how counselling psychologists 
are trained (Dan suggests that the issues covered in out dialogue are only implicitly 
covered in training); in particular, it could have strong implications for trainees’ 
clinical supervisors -  particularly those working in services where naïve views of 
diagnosis are met head on and where trainees need to be encouraged to have a voice. 
Also, interesting questions have been raised in this study about how much clinicians 
should share discussion about diagnosis: this too merits further investigation.
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For me one of the most compelling findings, encapsulated by diagnosis as an abstract 
code, is that idea that diagnosis may have multiple meanings (and psychic 
consequences) for clinicians ranging from functional, to alienating, to legitimizing. 
The latter recalls Foucault’s assertion that diagnosis establishes “the individual’s life 
as a tissue of pathological symptoms, as well as the establishment of the psychiatrist 
as a doctor” (2006, p.269) -  an idea that is relayed in Cassie’s talk about diagnosis 
and consequent treatment in Extract 1.
This adds to other research in which diagnosis has been shown to have multiple 
meanings for clients (Spedding et ah, 2013) and to the overall concept that -  
particularly via the internet - diagnosis may be undergoing a process of 
democratization (Charland, 2004) in a way that cannot be controlled by the psychiatric 
establishment. By ignoring this process, we risk alienating (or maybe protecting) 
ourselves from our clients’ understandings of diagnosis. This should be of particular 
interest be counselling psychologists, with our emphasis on attention to individual 
meanings (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2003).
Finally, I want to say something about my role in this study. I have tried to be 
transparent about subjectivity in a way that has sometimes felt counterintuitive while I 
have been conducting this study. It has been my agenda to explore the nature of 
subjectivity in qualitative research -  an area that I think may be suited to exploration 
by counselling psychologists, and an aim that has perhaps highlighted other aspects of 
my agenda in a way that is helpful for readers of this study.
I think some further refinement of the method is necessary, particularly in the area of 
continuity between discourse and psyche, and in the way this kind of study is laid out.
I believe further research in this area might continue to help trainee counselling 
psychologists navigate the anxieties produced by diagnostic plurality in their clinical 
placements. I also think further research into other clinicians’ constructions of and 
anxieties around diagnosis would be illuminating. Accordingly, this is something I 
intend to do.
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Table 1: Demographic details of research participants and researcher
Name Age range Gender Ethnicity Dialogue number
Abigail Early 30s Female White British #1
Benjamin Late 30s Male White British #2
Cassie Early 30s Female Indian British #3
Dan Early 40s Male White British #4
Erik Early 30s Male White British #5
Sam (researcher) Mid 30s Male White British #6, #7
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Appendix A: Information sheet
UNIVERSITY OF
INFORMATION SHEET
Project title:
A Psychosocial Exploration of Clinicians’ Constructions of Diagnosis in Mental 
Health
Researcher:
Sam Spedding; contact email - s.spedding@surrev.ac.uk 
Research supervisors:
Dr. Dora Brown; contact email - d.brown@surrev.ac.uk
Dr. Riccardo Draghi-Lorenz; contact email - r.draghi-lorenz@surrev.ac.uk
About this project:
This project aims to explore how clinicians talk about mental health diagnoses. The 
data for this research is being gathered from recorded dialogues with clinicians. It will 
be anlaysed in a way that explores the narratives that are produced when people talk 
about their clinical work and diagnosis. The data will also be analysed with attention 
to how the talk around diagnosis fit into participants’ clinical work and wider 
experience, in addition to how this talk is produced in a situation of which the 
researcher is a part.
This research project is being conducted as part of the researcher’s doctoral training 
programme in Counselling and Psychotherapeutic Psychology.
Your part in this project:
You will have been asked to take part in this research either because you use diagnosis 
as part of your practice or because you come into contact with mental health 
diagnoses as part of your clinical work or research. It is hoped that the researcher will
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aim to make you feel comfortable during the dialogue and create an environment in 
which you will be able to reflect and voice your thoughts freely about mental health 
diagnoses and your clinical work.
Although no specific agenda will be set for the interview, the following areas (at least 
for the first three) might be expected to be covered, as dictated by the dilemmas 
surrounding diagnosis that have arisen in existing literature and their applicability for 
counselling psychology: a little bit about your clinical work; whether diagnosis has 
come up/ been an issue; diagnosis in the therapeutic relationship. However, your 
particular experience and dilemmas are of most interest, and you should not feel that it 
is necessary to stick to these topics. Anecdotes, impromptu thoughts and discussion 
are all welcome. The interview is expected to take between 30 and 45 minutes.
In talking and thinking about mental health diagnoses, you may end up talking about 
interpersonal situations in your clinical work which bring about strong emotions. If 
you feel you do not want to continue the interview for this or any other reason, please 
let the researcher know. You are under no obligation to continue if you feel 
uncomfortable. Similarly, if you feel at any time during or after the interview that you 
do not want the recorded material to be included in the research then also feel free to 
let the researcher know. The researcher has also set aside 1/2 hour after the end of the 
interview for you to ask any questions or talk about any residual feelings. You are not 
required to use the full extent of this 1/2 hour period. If you feel anxious for any 
reason at the end of this period, the researcher is ready to give you advice about any 
further supervision or counselling you might want.
Confidentiality:
In the transcript of your interview, your name and the name of any place of work or 
names of other people you mention will be changed. You may also wish to protect the 
identities of people and organisations during the interview. In addition, recorded 
material will be kept securely and not played to anyone else. When the project is 
completed, it will be deleted.
Other information:
Your participation is valued greatly and it is hoped you will be interested in reading 
the research once it complete. Therefore you will be sent a copy if you wish. If you 
would like to give feedback after reading, or at any stage please get in touch with the 
researcher.
This project has been approved by the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics 
Committee at the University of Surrey.
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Appendix B: Consent form
§  UNIVERSITY OFSURREY
School of Psychology 
Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences 
University of Surrey 
Guildford 
Surrey 
GU2 7XH
CONSENT FORM
Project title:
A Psychosocial Exploration of Clinicians’ Constructions of Diagnosis in Mental 
Health
Researcher:
Sam Spedding; contact email - s.spedding@surrev.ac.uk
Research supervisors:
Dr. Dora Brown; contact email - d.brown@surrev.ac.uk
Dr. Riccardo Draghi-Lorenz; contact email -  r.draghi-lorenz@surrev.ac.uk
Participant’s agreement:
• I am aware that my participation in this interview is voluntary. I understand 
the intent and purpose of this research and have been given two Participant 
Information Sheets for my perusal.
• I have been given a full explanation by the investigator of the nature, purpose, 
location and likely duration of the study, and of what I will be expected to do. 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions on all aspects of the study 
and have understood the advice and information given as a result.
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• If, for any reason, at any time, I wish to stop the interview, I may do so and 
any information collected in relation to me will be removed.
• I give permission for the researcher to audio-record our interview.
• I am aware the data will be used in a doctoral research project, and that this 
research may eventually be published. I am happy for my data to be published 
on the understanding that confidentiality is preserved.
• I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study without having 
to give any explanation. I understand that as this project must be submitted 
shortly after this deadline it would therefore not be possible to withdraw from 
the project following this date.
• I understand that the data gathered in this study is confidential with respect to 
my personal identity and that of my colleagues, patients and employer.
• I have been informed that my interview will be transcribed with all personal 
details treated in the strictest confidence in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act (1998).
• If I have any questions about this study, I am free to contact the student 
researcher and/or his research supervisors (contact information given above).
• I have been offered a copy of this consent form that I may keep for my own 
reference. I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely 
consent to participating in this study.
• I have been given adequate time to consider my participation.
Participant’s signature: 
Date:
Researcher’s signature: 
Date:
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Appendix C: Interview schedule
Interview Schedule
1. Can you tell me about how you came to be where you are today?
2. Would you mind telling me a little about your clinical experience?
3. Do you find that being a trainee counselling psychologist involves the use diagnostic 
terms (i.e. terms which refer to diagnoses found in DSM-IV-TR, DSM-V, ICD-10 or 
other such taxonomies)?
4. How? Or if not, why not?
5. What, in your own words, do you think diagnosis is?
6. How would you say that clients/patients understand diagnoses?
7. How has diagnosis come up in the therapeutic relationship, if at all?
8. How have your patients/clients talked about diagnoses?
9. Can you tell me about an occasion when diagnosis has come up in your work?
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Dialogue Sketch*
Interviewee:
Clinical role:
Current workplace:
Age:
Gender:
Other demographic details: 
Location:
Date:
Dialogue length: 58 minutes
Female
‘White’; ‘Middle class’ 
Interviewee’s home
Abigail
Trainee counselling psychologist
Notes:
This felt like a very comfortable environment in which Abigail was able to talk freely about 
her experience. I didn’t have to ask all of the questions, because much of the material came up 
of its own accord.
I felt there were some moments in which it became difficult for Abigail to express exactly 
what she thought and others where I got a bit lost and found myself trying to fill in gaps about 
what she was talking about.
As the researcher, I found myself wanting to elaborate arguments which she was putting 
together with my own knowledge and occasionally felt that I put words into her mouth. 
However, most of the time I felt that this was attuned suggestion.
One thing which sticks in my mind an hour or so after, as I write this, is avoidance. This was a 
motif she attached to diagnosis -  and I felt later on, by trying to ‘diagnose’ her position, I 
might have been embodied in the process she talked about of existing with uncertainty.
Another immediate point of interest was the motif of outside-ness which seemed to crop up 
biographically as well as in her current workplace where she feels outside the dominant 
diagnostic discourse.
*This sketch has been copied from the original in my notepad so that it can be read more 
easily. I have redacted some details in order to protect Abigail’s anonymity.
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Appendix E: Approval letter from the FAHS Ethics Committee
Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences
Ethics Committee
Chair’s Action
Ref:
Name of Student:
Title of Project:
Supervisor:
Date of submission: 
Date of re-submission:
848-PSY-12 RS 
SAM SPEDDING
A Critical Exploration of Constructions o f  
Diagnosis Among Clinicians Working in Mental 
Health
DR DORA BROWN,
DR RICCARDO DRAGHI-LORENZ
13th DECEMBER 2012
9th FEBRUARY 2013
The above Project has been re-submitted to the FAHS Ethics Committee.
A favourable ethical opinion has now been given.
Signed
Brdfessor Bertram Opitz
Chair
Dated:
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Appendix F: Submission guidelines for Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, 
Research and Practice
Author Guidelines
Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory Research and Practice (formerly The British Journal o f  
Medical Psychology) is an international scientific journal with a focus on the psychological aspects o f  
mental health difficulties and well-being; and psychological problems and their psychological 
treatments. W e welcom e submissions from mental health professionals and researchers from all 
relevant professional backgrounds. The Journal welcom es submissions o f  original high quality 
empirical research and rigorous theoretical papers o f  any theoretical provenance provided they have a 
bearing upon vulnerability to, adjustment to, assessment of, and recovery (assisted or otherwise) from 
psychological disorders. Submission o f  systematic reviews and other research reports which support 
evidence-based practice are also welcomed, as are relevant high quality analogue studies. The Journal 
thus aims to promote theoretical and research developments in the understanding o f  cognitive and 
emotional factors in psychological disorders, interpersonal attitudes, behaviour and relationships, and 
psychological therapies (including both process and outcome research) where mental health is 
concerned. Clinical or case studies w ill not normally be considered except where they illustrate 
particularly unusual forms o f  psychopathology or innovative forms o f  therapy and meet scientific 
criteria through appropriate use o f  single case experimental designs.
1. Circulation
The circulation o f  the Journal is worldwide. Papers are invited and encouraged from authors throughout 
the world.
2. Length
All articles submitted to PAPT must adhere to the stated word limit for the particular article type. The 
journal operates a policy o f  returning any papers that are over this word limit to the authors. The word 
limit does not include the abstract, reference list, figures and tables. Appendices however are included 
in the word limit. The Editors retain discretion to publish papers beyond this length in cases where the 
clear and concise expression o f  the scientific content requires greater length (e.g., a new theory or a 
new method). The authors should contact the Editors first in such a case.
Word limits for specific article types are as follows:
• Research articles: 5000 words
• Qualitative papers: 6000 words
• Review papers: 6000 words
• Special Issue papers: 5000 words
3. B rief reports
These should be limited to 1000 words and may include research studies and theoretical, critical or 
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